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ARTICLES: 
 
Fugitive Slaves and Undocumented 
Immigrants: Testing the Boundaries of 
Our Federalism 
SANDRA L. RIERSON* 
 
Federalism—the dual system of sovereignty that invests 
both the nation as a whole and each individual state with the 
authority to govern the people of the United States of Amer-
ica—is a foundational pillar of American democracy. 
Throughout the nation’s history, political crises have tested 
the resilience of this dual system of government established 
by the United States Constitution.  The fundamental contra-
diction of slavery in a nation founded on the principle that 
“all men are created equal” triggered the nation’s most 
prominent existential crisis, resulting in the Civil War. In the 
years leading up to that war, the federal government’s pro-
tection of the institution of slavery, via the Fugitive Slave 
Acts, clashed with the personal liberty laws of the free states.  
These states had eliminated slavery within their own bor-
ders, and hence did not embrace federal laws compelling 
them to allow (or assist in) the pursuit and capture of puta-
tive slaves living on free soil. The intensity of the resistance 
within these states increased as the federal government 
 
 *  Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. This Article has 
benefited from the helpful feedback and critique of Ilene Durst, Paul Finkelman, 
Eric Foner, Julie Greenberg, Shaun Martin, and Bryan Wildenthal, for which I am 
very grateful. I also received helpful comments and insights from the participants 
in the 2018 University of Detroit-Mercy Law Review Symposium, The Return of 
Sanctuary Cities: The Muslim Ban, Hurricane Maria, and Everything in Between. 
I am also indebted to Christopher Netniss and Sierra Martin for their invaluable 
research assistance, and to Thomas Jefferson School of Law for its support. 
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ratcheted up efforts to enforce the Fugitive Slave Acts, with 
little consideration given to the conflicting values of Ameri-
can citizens living in free states. 
The most crucial federalism crisis of today stems from 
conflicting state and federal perspectives as to immigration. 
The Trump administration’s “zero tolerance” approach to 
“illegal” immigration has been tone deaf to the mores of 
people who live in diverse states such as California, espe-
cially as to immigrants who are seeking asylum.  The Presi-
dent has personally repudiated and even mocked the na-
tion’s long-standing commitment to the legal principle of 
non-refoulement, which prohibits the forcible return of ref-
ugees to countries where they face serious threats to their 
lives or freedom. Moreover, the Trump administration’s 
heavy reliance on executive action to achieve its goals, ra-
ther than the legislative process, has generated policies that 
lack widespread support among the national citizenry, not 
just that of an individual state.    
The United States may learn some valuable lessons by 
reflecting on its past, specifically the history of the federal 
laws that sought to force the free states to recognize slavery 
within their borders. Heavy-handed attempts to compel com-
pliance with federal law tend to engender resistance rather 
than cooperation, especially when, in the eyes of many, the 
federal law lacks both moral and democratic legitimacy. At 
a minimum, the federal government should not attempt to 
commandeer California and similar states to implement fed-
eral immigration policies that are misaligned with the values 
of the majority of their citizens. The safety valve of federal-
ism allows these states to decline to do so. 
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INTRODUCTION 
History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes.1 
 
The presence of slavery in some, but not all, of the United States 
posed an existential threat to the dual system of federalism created 
by the U.S. Constitution from the earliest days of the Republic.2 The 
South’s dogged quest to protect the institution of slavery is tradi-
tionally associated with a states’ rights philosophy.3 However, dur-
ing this era, the South relied heavily on federal power to preserve 
slavery in the South and enable its spread throughout the territories.4 
The battle over fugitive slaves—enslaved people who escaped their 
masters and fled to free states in the North—pitted the federal Fugi-
tive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850, which granted Southerners broad 
powers to reclaim human “property” in free states, against free 
states’ personal liberty laws, which sought to protect the civil and 
human rights of all state citizens, including the free blacks and 
slaves who were at risk under the federal law.5 
Today, the United States faces another challenge testing the 
boundaries of federalism, this time involving immigration rather 
 
 1 This quote is often attributed to Samuel Clemens, the nineteenth century 
author known by his pen name, Mark Twain. History Does Not Repeat Itself, but 
it Rhymes, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Jan. 12, 2014), https://quoteinvestiga-
tor.com/2014/01/12/history-rhymes/. However, the true origin of the quote is un-
known. See id. A passage from Twain’s satire of the Gilded Age encapsulates the 
idea expressed within it: “History never repeats itself, but the Kaleidoscopic com-
binations of the pictured present often seem to be constructed out of the broken 
fragments of antique legends.” MARK TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE 
GILDED AGE: A TALE OF TO-DAY 430 (1873). Historian Eric Foner has made a 
similar observation regarding the immigration conflict that is the subject of this 
Article: “History never really repeats itself, but uncanny resemblances exist be-
tween the pre-Civil War years and our own time, in terms of both the actions of 
the federal government and the resistance it has evoked.” Eric Foner, What the 
Fugitive Slave Act Teaches Us About How States Can Resist Oppressive Federal 
Power, NATION (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-
the-fugitive-slave-act-teaches/ [hereinafter Foner, What the Fugitive Slave Act 
Teaches Us]. 
 2 See infra Section I.  
 3 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, States’ Rights, Southern Hypocrisy, and the Cri-
sis of the Union, 45 AKRON L. REV. 449, 470 (2012) [hereinafter Finkelman, 
States’ Rights]. 
 4 See infra Sections I.C.–I.E. 
 5  See infra Sections I.B.–I.E. 
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than slavery. More parallels exist between these two controversies 
than are immediately apparent.6 As most of the power in Washing-
ton, D.C. has shifted right with the Trump administration, propo-
nents of states’ rights are increasingly found in left-leaning Blue 
states, not the conservative Red states typically associated with de-
mands for local control.7 Like the Fugitive Slave Acts, efforts to in-
crease enforcement of federal immigration laws have engendered 
conflict between federal and local governments.8 President Trump, 
 
 6 See, e.g., Foner, What the Fugitive Slave Act Teaches Us, supra note 1; 
Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Immigration Enforcement Reform: Learning from the History 
of Fugitive Slave Rendition, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 5–7 (2013) [hereinafter 
Schmitt, Immigration Enforcement Reform]; Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Re-
sistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 216–32 (2013); Karla M. McKanders, Immigration 
Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave Acts: Exploring Their Similarities, 61 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 921, 947–52 (2012); Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note, The Underground 
Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement: A Comparison of History, Litigation, and 
Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429, 1435 (1987); James A. Kraehenbuehl, Com-
ment, Lessons from the Past: How the Antebellum Fugitive Slave Debate Informs 
State Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1481–
86 (2011). 
 7 See infra Section II.C.2.; see also Mallory E. SoRelle & Alexis N. Walker, 
Both Democrats and Republicans Care About ‘States’ Rights’ – When It Suits 
Them, WASH. POST (June 23, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/23/both-democrats-and-republi-
cans-care-about-states-rights-when-it-suits-them/ (discussing that while states’ 
rights is a notion typically associated with the Republican party, in the wake of 
the Trump administration, Democrats are turning to state power); Heather Gerken, 
We’re About to See States’ Rights Used Defensively Against Trump, VOX, 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/12/13915990/federalism-trump-pro-
gressive-uncooperative (last updated Jan. 20, 2017, 2:14 PM). 
 8 See infra Part II. 
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who decried federal government overreach during the Obama ad-
ministration,9 has vowed that recalcitrant states will bend to the fed-
eral will.10 
Three main ideological parallels exist between the modern im-
migration debate and the fugitive slave crisis: 
1) Lack of public faith in the federal law leads some individuals 
to conclude that the law is so morally bankrupt that they are com-
pelled to violate it.11 The Underground Railroad of the 1850s and 
the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s existed for this reason.12 In 
essence, the gulf between the beliefs of the people of an individual 
state versus the values embodied in a federal statute drives some cit-
izens to exercise civil disobedience.13 
2) Fundamentally, modern refugees share one critical common-
ality with antebellum fugitives: a desire to make or retain a home on 
“free soil” and not to return from whence they came.14 In both eras, 
some members of these vulnerable populations are or were legally 
entitled to remain as either free persons of color in the nineteenth 
century or as asylees today.15 The failure of federal law to provide 
due process to those who are targeted for removal under the terms 
 
 9 In 2012, Trump tweeted, “Why is @BarackObama constantly issuing ex-
ecutive orders that are major power grabs of authority?.” @realDonaldTrump, 
TWITTER (July 10, 2012, 10:11 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/sta-
tus/222739756105207808; see also Aaron Blake, The GOP Decried ‘King 
Obama.’ Now It’s Mostly Quiet on Trump’s Effort to Revise the Constitution by 
Himself, WASH. POST (June 31, 2018, 12:36 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/politics/2018/10/31/gop-decried-king-obama-now-its-mostly-quiet-
trumps-effort-revise-constitution-by-himself/. 
 10 See infra Section II.C.2.–II.C.3 (discussing Trump’s Executive Order and 
lawsuits filed by the Department of Justice seeking to compel state cooperation 
with federal authorities in the immigration arena). 
 11 See infra Section II.A; see also, e.g., Michelle Boorstein, Trump Admin-
istration’s Immigration Policies are ‘Immoral,’ Say Leading Catholic Bishops, 
INDEPENDENT (June 14, 2018, 6:46 PM), https://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/americas/trump-immigration-catholic-bishops-moral-us-
mexico-border-a8399016.html. 
 12 See infra  notes 313–315, 316–334 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra Section II.A. 
 14 Immigrants at risk of deportation, like free Blacks and fugitive slaves of 
the nineteenth century, must live “in constant fear of being torn from their families 
and homes.” Schmitt, Immigration Enforcement Reform, supra note 6, at 1. 
 15 See infra Sections II.B.1.–II.B.2. 
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of the Fugitive Slave Acts and the Immigration and Nationality Act 
undermines the legal and moral legitimacy of both laws.16 
3) If the lack of public support for federal law is sufficiently 
widespread in a particular state, that state may decline to participate 
in the administration of the federal law.17 The anti-commandeering 
principle, which traces its roots to the fugitive slave crisis,18 is cur-
rently the primary means by which states resist the implementation 
of federal immigration policy within their borders.19 
The struggles of the nineteenth century offer more than a history 
lesson in today’s increasingly charged immigration debate. In each 
case, absolutist interpretation and enforcement of federal laws in-
tended to compel compliance may have had the opposite effect. Hy-
per-charged efforts to enforce laws may do more to expose the in-
justice engendered by those laws than years of advocacy by people 
opposed to them. 
I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN PROTECTING 
SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ANTEBELLUM ERA 
The existence of slavery in the United States, and its dispropor-
tionate concentration in the South, created sectional conflict from 
the time of the Founding until the Civil War. When the Constitu-
tional Convention convened in 1787, slavery was recognized and 
protected under the laws of every state except Massachusetts.20 
However, the states were moving in opposite directions on the issue 
of slavery: states north of the Mason-Dixon line had begun the pro-
cess of immediate or gradual emancipation or would soon do so, 
while states to the south clung to slavery, which tightened rather 
than loosened its grip on the region during the post-Revolutionary 
 
 16 See Section II.B., infra. 
 17 See Section II.C., infra. 
 18 See infra notes 135–144, 510–513, 524–529 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra Section II.C. 
 20 Massachusetts abolished slavery in 1780 by virtue of that state’s constitu-
tional Declaration of Rights, a result that was later affirmed by case law.  See 
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 43–45 (1975); see also William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of 
Slavery in British North America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1742–73 (1996). 
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period.21 The division between slave and free states created a feder-
alism dilemma: what was the status of a person who was labeled a 
slave under the laws of one state upon removing himself to the ter-
ritorial boundaries of a state that did not recognize the institution of 
slavery?22 The Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause was one of the 
nation’s earliest attempts to answer that question. 
A. The Origins of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause 
The Fugitive Slave Clause—which, like all other provisions of 
the Constitution, does not include the word “slave”—provides the 
following: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, 
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, 
in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be 
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be 
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Ser-
vice or Labour may be due.23 
This provision of the Constitution, which was approved unani-
mously, generated a “puzzling” and “deeply disturbing” lack of de-
bate.24 The Fugitive Slave Clause and the statutes that later inter-
preted it were key factors contributing to the intersectional strife that 
culminated in the Civil War.25 
The Fugitive Slave Clause was initially proposed by South Car-
olina delegates Charles Pinckney and Pierce Butler, in the context 
 
 21 See Sandra L. Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolu-
tion, 35 VT. L. REV. 765, 781–84 (2011) (discussing the process by which slavery 
was abolished in the northeastern and mid-Atlantic states). 
 22 See infra Part I; see also Paul Finkelman, The Roots of Printz: Proslavery 
Constitutionalism, National Law Enforcement, Federalism, and Local Coopera-
tion, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1399, 1406, 1414 (2004) [hereinafter Finkelman, The 
Roots of Printz].  
 23 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 24 See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 330–33 (2009) (discussing the legislative history of 
the clause). 
 25 See, e.g., Rierson, supra note 21, at 808–23 (discussing the Fugitive Slave 
Laws and concluding that “[t]he Fugitive Slave Laws and the controversies that 
they spawned were but one example of a force that drove the two regions apart, 
with each side becoming increasingly intolerant of the other’s position”). 
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of the debate regarding the extradition clause. Pinckney and Butler’s 
original wording proposed “to require fugitive slaves and servants 
to be delivered up like criminals.”26 James Wilson of Pennsylvania 
immediately objected on the grounds that this language would re-
quire “the Executive of the State” to capture such fugitives, “at the 
public expence.”27 Roger Sherman of Connecticut interjected that 
he “saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a 
slave or servant, than a horse.”28 Butler then withdrew his motion 
but reintroduced it the next day, revised as follows: 
If any Person bound to service or labor in any of the 
United States shall escape into another State, He or 
She shall not be discharged from such service or la-
bor in consequence of any regulations subsisting in 
the State to which they escape; but shall be delivered 
up to the person justly claiming their service or la-
bor.29 
The delegates then approved Butler’s motion unanimously, with no 
further debate.30 
The paucity of recorded debate surrounding the Fugitive Slave 
Clause suggests that, at a minimum, the delegates failed to appreci-
ate the significance of it.31 In part, this failure may have been due to 
a lack of foresight. As noted above, at the time of the Convention 
almost all of the states recognized the institution of slavery.32 In fact, 
as of the date of the first national census, more slaves were living in 
New York and New Jersey than in Georgia.33 Because the Mason-
 
 26 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 443 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 445–46. 
 30 Id. at 446. 
 31 Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylva-
nia and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 260 
(1994) [hereinafter Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court] (describing 
the history of the clause and concluding that the lack of debate likely demonstrated 
that “northern delegates simply failed to appreciate the legal problems and moral 
dilemmas that the rendition of fugitive slaves would pose”). 
 32 See Wiecek, supra note 20. 
 33 The census documented 21,324 slaves living in New York and 11,423 
slaves living in New Jersey in 1790 (for a total of 32,747); at the same time 29,264 
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Dixon Line was not a bright demarcation between slavery and free-
dom in 1789, the federalism conflict presented by alleged fugitives 
was not a significant extant problem.34 Although the slave popula-
tion boomed in the South and declined (slowly or quickly, depend-
ing on the state) in the North after the Convention,35 the delegates 
may not have fully appreciated that they were on the front end of 
this trend. Nevertheless, the Southern delegates would have been 
keen to avoid this conflict, given that English law on the subject was 
not favorable to them. The English high court decided Somerset v. 
Stewart in 1772, holding that a Virginia slave who escaped from his 
master while living in London was no longer a slave, given that the 
“positive law” of England did not allow slavery.36 Therefore, South-
ern delegates would have wanted to ensure that freedom was not 
similarly bestowed upon a slave who escaped to a state, such as Mas-
sachusetts, that had no “positive law” respecting slavery.37 
Northern delegates, however, may have regarded South Caro-
lina’s request regarding fugitive slaves as a relatively minor issue. 
 
slaves were recorded as living in Georgia. Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Histor-
ical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and by His-
panic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States, 
tbls 25, 45, 47 (United States Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper 
No. 56, 2002), http://mapmaker.rutgers.edu/REFERENCE/Hist_Pop_stats.pdf; 
see generally GRAHAM RUSSELL HODGES, ROOT & BRANCH: AFRICAN 
AMERICANS IN NEW YORK & EAST JERSEY 1613-1863 (1999) (discussing the his-
tory of slavery in these states). 
 34 See DON E. FEHRENBACHER & WARD M. MCAFEE, THE SLAVEHOLDING 
REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES’ GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO 
SLAVERY 207 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001) (observing that, in 1787, “flight of 
slaves across state boundaries was still far from being a significant national prob-
lem”). 
 35 Lincoln Mullen, These Maps Reveal How Slavery Expanded Across the 
United States, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 15, 2014), https://www.smithson-
ianmag.com/history/maps-reveal-slavery-expanded-across-united-states-
180951452/; see also Rierson, supra note 21, at 781–84 (discussing the abolition 
of slavery in Northern and mid-Atlantic states). 
 36 Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B.). For a more 
complete account of Somerset, see MARK S. WEINER, BLACK TRIALS: 
CITIZENSHIP FROM THE BEGINNING OF SLAVERY TO THE END OF CASTE 70–88 
(2004); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND 
COMITY 16–18, 70–125 (1981) (discussing treatment of Somerset in U.S. courts). 
 37 See COVER, supra note 20, at 43–45; see also Massachusetts Constitution 
and the Abolition of Slavery, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/guides/massa-
chusetts-constitution-and-the-abolition-of-slavery (last visited Mar. 11, 2020). 
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Even though Somerset raised the possibility that a slave’s status 
could be altered by his location,38 the common law (of which the 
delegates would have been aware) presumed that slave holders had 
a right of recaption as to any escaped slave.39 The common law right 
of recaption permitted owners of “lost property capable of locomo-
tion” to retrieve their property without legal process, so long as they 
did so in an “orderly” fashion without injuring any third parties.40 
When Connecticut representative Sherman compared the seizure of 
a slave to the capture of a horse,41 he could have been referring to 
this common law principle, which did in fact treat fleeing slaves and 
runaway horses identically.42 Moreover, unlike the other major com-
promises on slavery, the Fugitive Slave Clause did not impact the 
balance of power among the states in Congress.43 The Three-Fifths 
Clause did so directly: it included three-fifths of all slaves in the 
population used to calculate the number of Congressmen a state 
could send to the House of Representatives.44 The Slave Trade 
Clause indirectly enhanced Congressional representation in the 
 
 38 See Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510. 
 39 See ERIC FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE 
UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 32 (2015) [hereinafter FONER, GATEWAY TO 
FREEDOM]. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 443; 
THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE 
NORTH 1780–1861, 17 (1974). 
 42 See FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 32. 
 43 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 2, with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIII, § 1. 
 44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
Based on the 1790 Census, Virginia’s enslaved population alone entitled it to ap-
proximately six members in the House of Representatives, more than the total 
allotment of Congressional representatives for five other states. See Gibson & 
Jung, supra note 33. Three-fifths, or 60%, of Virginia’s 1790 slave population 
(287,959) was equivalent to approximately 172,775 free persons for the purpose 
of calculating Congressional representation. Id. That number, divided by 30,000 
(the population base for apportionment of Congressional representation), equals 
5.8, or six seats in the House of Representatives. The states with total population 
below 172,775 were Delaware (59,096, including 8,887 slaves), Georgia (82,548, 
including 29,264 slaves), New Hampshire (141,885), Rhode Island (68,825), and 
Vermont (85,425). Id. 
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South.45 By allowing the continued importation of slaves (or at least 
preventing Congressional interference with it) for twenty years, this 
Constitutional clause allowed Southern states participating in the in-
ternational trade to increase their slave populations,46 which ulti-
mately would augment their representation in Congress via the 
Three-Fifths Clause.47 Unlike these other Constitutional provisions, 
the Fugitive Slave Clause did not have the potential to alter any 
state’s federal political representation.48 
The delegates were also almost certainly aware that the Conti-
nental Congress had passed the Northwest Ordinance only weeks 
earlier. The Ordinance famously excluded slavery from the North-
west Territories and thereby provided an eventual template for the 
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery.49 
However, it also included an analog to the Fugitive Slave Clause: 
“[A]ny person escaping into the [Northwest territories], from whom 
labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original 
States, . . . may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person 
claiming his or her labor or service.”50 This provision of the Ordi-
nance, which itself generated little recorded debate, was not directly 
discussed during the Convention debate on the Fugitive Slave 
Clause.51 However, the delegates may have been inspired by it or at 
 
 45 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 26 at 
222–23 (recording remarks by Governor Morris (Pennsylvania), arguing that the 
southern states were encouraged to import “fresh supplies of wretched Africans” 
by the “assurance of having their votes in the Natl Govt increased in proportion” 
to the number of slaves imported). 
 48 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 2, and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, 
repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 49 Article 6 of the Ordinance provides: “There shall be neither slavery nor 
involuntary Servitude in the said territory otherwise than in the punishment of 
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” 32 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 343 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) [herein-
after NORTHWEST ORDINANCE]. 
 50 Id. 
 51 FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 35–36. 
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least aware of it; the differences between the two clauses, in terms 
of wording, are relatively minor.52 
A final reason for the lack of extended discussion of the Fugitive 
Slave Clause may relate to its timing. When the Fugitive Slave 
Clause was proposed in August 1787, the delegates had already en-
dured the long, hot summer months in Philadelphia.53 The prospect 
of engaging in another lengthy, contentious debate regarding the 
subject of slavery (or anything else) would not have been enticing 
to anyone. The delegates almost certainly wanted to go home.54 The 
Convention concluded on September 17, 1787,55 approximately two 
weeks after the delegates added the Fugitive Slave Clause to the 
Constitution.56 
Whatever the reason, Northern delegates acquiesced to Southern 
demands on the subject of fugitive slaves at the Constitutional Con-
vention, offering a mere token resistance.57 What followed, how-
ever, was a wave of increasingly hostile reactions to Southern slave 
catchers in the Northern states that were neither token nor insignifi-
cant. 
 
 52 Compare NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 49, at 343 (“[A]ny person 
escaping into the [Northwest territories], from whom labor or service is lawfully 
claimed in any one of the original States, . . . may be lawfully reclaimed and con-
veyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. 
art. IV, § 2, cl. 3., repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“No Person held to 
Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, 
shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such 
Service or Labour may be due.”). 
 53 See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of 
the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1206 (2003) (dis-
cussing the consequences of “four months of hard work drafting a Constitution in 
the hot Philadelphia summer of 1787”). 
 54 See FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 36 (noting that “ready 
acceptance” of the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution was likely due in part 
to “the weary desire of most delegates to finish their work and go home”). 
 55  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 641 
(Sept. 17, 1787). 
 56 The delegates adopted the clause in substance in a vote taken on August 
29, 1787. Id. at 446. However, the final version of the Fugitive Slave Clause, 
which included minor changes in wording proposed by Committee of Style, was 
approved on September 15, 1787. Id. at 621. 
 57 See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text; see also FEHRENBACHER & 
MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 35–36. 
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B. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and the Anti-Kidnapping 
Laws of the Northern States 
Congress passed the first statute implementing the Fugitive 
Slave Clause of the Constitution in 1793.58 Like the Constitution it-
self, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 never uses the word “slave”; 
instead, it refers to an enslaved person as “a person held to labor in 
any of the United States [or the Territories], under the laws 
thereof.”59 The Act empowered a slaveholder—a “person to whom 
such labor or service may be due, his agent or attorney”—“to seize 
or arrest” an alleged fugitive in the state to which he had escaped.60 
Once the alleged fugitive had been seized, the Act permitted the 
“claimant” to bring the fugitive before a federal judge or a local 
magistrate in the non-slave state, where he was required to prove the 
slave status of the fugitive “to the satisfaction of such Judge or mag-
istrate, either by oral testimony or affidavit.”61 If the judge or mag-
istrate was “satisfied” with the proof of the person’s enslavement, 
he was required to “give a certificate” to the claimant, which acted 
as a warrant to remove that person to the state or territory where he 
was enslaved.62 The Act also imposed a penalty of $500 on anyone 
who tried to “rescue,” “harbor or conceal” a fugitive slave, or who 
tried to “obstruct or hinder” efforts to capture an alleged fugitive.63 
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was silent as to the rights of 
those accused of being fugitive slaves.64 Although it empowered pri-
vate citizens to “seize or arrest”65 alleged fugitive slaves, it did not 
specify the manner by which an arrest could be carried out. More 
importantly, the Act did not describe the process by which the en-
slavement of a person could be proven, other than refer to “oral tes-
timony or affidavit.”66 Due process protections on behalf of alleged 
fugitives—some of whom were in fact free—were not part of the 
 
 58 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–05. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. § 4. 
 64 See id. § 3. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
612 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:598 
 
Act.67 Key procedural protections that were well-established under 
nineteenth century law, such as the right of trial by jury and the writ 
of habeas corpus,68 were not guaranteed. Finally, although the Act 
imposed criminal penalties on those who sought to thwart the appre-
hension of an alleged fugitive, it did not punish those who intention-
ally kidnapped free blacks and sold them into slavery for profit, un-
der the guise of capturing fugitive slaves.69 The problem of kidnap-
ping and wrongful enslavement was a significant one, even at the 
nation’s Founding.70 
Some efforts were made, at the federal level, to improve the Fu-
gitive Slave Act of 1793, specifically as to its encouragement, or at 
least enablement, of the kidnapping of free blacks.71 The free black 
 
 67 MORRIS, supra note 41, at 21 (describing the process established under the 
1793 Act as “a summary ministerial hearing,” pursuant to which a judge had “no 
authority to conduct a full investigation if there was a competing claim to free-
dom”). 
 68 See id. at 8–12. 
 69 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 302, 302. 
 70 In 1788, Massachusetts abolished the slave trade and took steps to curb 
kidnapping of free blacks via statute. Act of Mar. 26, 1788, ch. 48, 1787 Mass. 
Acts 615. The statute, which provided a private right of action for “friends” and 
families of Massachusetts inhabitants who were removed from the state and sold 
into slavery, recognized that “peaceable inhabitants of this Commonwealth . . . 
have been privately carried off by force, or decoyed away under various pretenses, 
by evil minded persons, [and] with a probable intention of being sold as slaves” 
outside the Commonwealth. Id. at 616; see also Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 444, 
pmbl., 1819 Ohio Laws 1052, 1052 (recognizing that “unprincipled persons have 
kidnapped free persons of color, within this state, and attempted to transport them 
out of the state, and sell them into slavery,” a practice which the legislature char-
acterized as “nefarious and inhuman”). The American Convention of Abolitionist 
Societies alerted its members in 1801 that the “inhuman crime of kidnapping” had 
“recently increased to an alarming degree” in certain parts of the country. MORRIS, 
supra note 41, at 26; see also infra notes 83–95 and accompanying text. Despite 
the Northern states’ efforts to prevent the kidnapping of free blacks, this practice 
continued throughout the antebellum period. See generally SOLOMON NORTHRUP, 
TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE (David Wilson ed., 2011) (memoir of Solomon 
Northrup, a free man from New York who was kidnapped and sold into slavery 
in the South); CAROL WILSON, FREEDOM AT RISK: THE KIDNAPPING OF FREE 
BLACKS IN AMERICA 1780–1865 (1994); see also Judson Crump & Alfred L. Bro-
phy, Twenty-One Months a Slave: Cornelius Sinclair’s Odyssey, 86 MISS. L. J. 
457, 458–59, 468 (2017) (describing Sinclair’s kidnapping in Philadelphia and 
the trial that eventually returned him to freedom). 
 71 See MORRIS, supra note 41, at 30–34. 
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population was instrumental in raising these issues in Congress via 
the petition process.72 In 1797, a group of former slaves from North 
Carolina submitted a petition to Congress claiming that, after they 
had been manumitted by their owners, they were pursued, captured 
from their homes in Pennsylvania, and ultimately sold back into 
slavery under the auspices of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.73 They 
sought redress from the Congress, especially on behalf of those 
“who have been emancipated and tasted the sweets of liberty, and 
[were] again reduced to slavery by kidnappers and man-stealers,” 
asking, “is not some remedy for an evil of such magnitude highly 
worthy of the deep inquiry and unfeigned zeal of the supreme Leg-
islative body of a free and enlightened people?”74 Although Con-
gress ultimately provided the petitioners no relief, Representative 
Joseph B. Varnum of Massachusetts responded to the petition by 
suggesting that the Act should be amended to better protect alleged 
fugitives who claimed to be freemen but were labeled fugitive slaves 
under the Act, adding that he hoped “the House would take all pos-
sible care that freemen should not be made slaves.”75 A similar pe-
tition was submitted by Pennsylvania Rep. Robert Wal, on behalf of 
a group of free blacks from Philadelphia in 1800.76 The petitioners 
wrote that the “solemn compact, the Constitution, was violated by 
the trade of kidnapping, carried on by the people of some of the 
Southern States on the shores of Maryland and Delaware,” resulting 
 
 72 See, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 2015–18 (1797). 
 73 See id.; see also The Earliest Extant Negro Petition to Congress, 1797, 
reprinted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 39, 39–44 (Herbert Aptheker, ed. 1951) (commenting on and reproducing 
text of the petition). 
 74 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018 (1797). 
 75 Id. at 2023–24. Varnum observed that “[i]f these people had been free, and 
yet were taken up under a law of the United States, and put into prison, then it 
appeared plainly the duty of the House to inquire whether that act had such an 
unjust tendency, and if it had, proper amendments should be made to it to prevent 
the like consequences in the future.” Id. at 2023. 
 76 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 229–31 (1800); see also A “Disquieting” Negro Pe-
tition to Congress, 1800, reprinted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO 
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 73, at 44, 44–45 (commenting on and 
reproducing text of the petition). 
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in the separation of families and the sale of free persons into slavery 
in Georgia, “which was degrading to the dignified nature of man.”77 
Congress took no action to solve the problem of kidnapping de-
scribed in these petitions. Pro-slavery Congressmen successfully re-
sisted any attempts to modify the Act in ways that would have com-
plicated slaveholders’ efforts to reclaim their human “property” in 
Northern states.78 During debates regarding the 1850 Fugitive Slave 
Law, Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi (who would later be-
come the first and only President of the Confederacy) flatly denied 
that any free black person had ever been kidnapped from a free state 
and sold into slavery.79 In the end, the only proposed amendments 
to the 1793 Act that came close to success were those that restricted, 
rather than expanded, the rights of free blacks under the Act.80 
As a result of their lack of success at the federal level, some 
states that either had abolished slavery or had enacted gradual eman-
cipation statutes sought to mitigate the negative impacts of the Fu-
gitive Slave Act of 1793 through their own laws. These early “per-
sonal liberty laws” were generally not intended to assist slaves who 
were attempting to escape to freedom.81 Most proponents of these 
 
 77 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1800). Rep. Waln characterized this grievance 
as “the operation of the fugitive act, by which free men were carried and sold into 
slavery.” Id. at 230. 
 78 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1585, 1588 (1850); MORRIS, 
supra note 41, at 35–41. 
 79 See Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1588 (1850). Davis argued that he 
had “yet to see the first proof” that any free Black person living in a free state had 
been kidnapped and sold into slavery in the South, arguing that if such a kidnap-
ping were to occur, the victim would be “liberated at once and the thief arrested.” 
Id.; see also FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 228–29 (discussing 
legislative history of 1850 Fugitive Slave Act). 
 80 See MORRIS, supra note 41, at 35–41 (describing Congressional efforts to 
amend the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 during the period 1817 to 1822); H. Robert 
Baker, The Fugitive Slave Clause and the Antebellum Constitution, 30 L. & HIST. 
REV. 1133, 1143, 1146–48 (2012) (describing failed Congressional efforts to pass 
a bill in 1801 and 1802 that would have imposed liability on Northern employers 
for hiring fugitive slaves and required free blacks to carry certificates of freedom). 
 81 The majority of these statutes were limited, by their terms, only to the kid-
napping of free citizens who were sold into slavery. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 1, 1808, 
ch. 96, § 1, 1808 N.Y. Laws 300, 300 (applying to any “person of colour, not 
being a slave”); Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 444, pmbl., 1819 Ohio Laws 1052, 1052 
(applying to “free persons of color”); Act of June 30, 1854, ch. 65, § 1, 1854 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 80, 80 (applying to “any free person entitled to freedom”); Act of Feb. 
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laws were not abolitionists: they did not believe that Congress had 
the power to eliminate slavery in any state that wanted to keep it.82 
These state laws were passed primarily to address the problem of 
kidnapping and subsequent enslavement of free blacks who resided 
in these states. To achieve this goal, these laws generally served one 
of two basic purposes: 1) to criminalize the kidnapping of free black 
people for the purpose of selling them into slavery;83 and/or 2) to 
require some measure of due process in the proceedings that deter-
mined whether a person was in fact a fugitive slave (or, alternatively, 
a free person).84 
The earliest state laws that addressed the problem of kidnapping, 
particularly as it applied to free black people residing in free states, 
tended to focus on criminal penalties associated with taking free 
people out of these states for the purpose of selling them into slavery 
in states or territories that recognized slavery.85 The most obvious 
 
13, 1855, No. 162, § 6, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413, 414 (same). Others achieved 
the same goal by limiting the scope of their application to persons to whom a 
claim had not been properly established under the federal Fugitive Slave Act. See, 
e.g., ILL. CRIM. CODE § 56 (1833) (criminalizing the theft, taking, or arrest of any 
person, “whether white, black, or colored, in this state,” for the purpose of carry-
ing that person “into another country, state, or territory . . . without having estab-
lished a claim according to the laws of the United States”). 
 82 See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, FUGITIVE JUSTICE: RUNAWAYS, RESCUERS, AND 
SLAVERY ON TRIAL 24–25 (2010). 
 83 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 1, 1808, ch. 96, § 1, 1808 N.Y. Laws 300, 300 (pun-
ishing anyone who “without due process of law, [does] seize and forcibly confine 
or inveigle, or kidnap any negro, mulatto, mestee, or other person of colour, not 
being a slave, with intent to send him out of this state, against his will”); ILL. 
CRIM. CODE, § 56 (1833). 
 84 LUBET, supra note 82, at 29 (noting that “many northern states attempted 
to impede the rush to bondage by enacting personal liberty laws . . . that required 
some measure of legal process as a condition of lawful removal” during this time 
period); MORRIS, supra note 41, at 29 (observing that “[t]hrough the first two 
decades of the nineteenth century . . . the free states acted to secure a hearing 
within their jurisdiction for those who claimed to be free in the face of a competing 
claim to slavery, and at the same time they continued to accept the fact that a 
general right of recaption [of slaves] existed.”). 
 85 One of the earliest statutes addressing this issue, however, addressed civil 
damages rather than criminal penalties assessed against those who would carry 
off by force or lure away “peaceable inhabitants” of the state, “with a probable 
intention of being sold as slaves” outside the state. Act of Mar. 26, 1788, ch. 48, 
1787 Mass. Acts 615, 616. The title—An Act to Prevent the Slave Trade, and for 
Granting Relief to the Families of Such Unhappy Persons as may be Kidnapped 
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cases of kidnapping involved the forcible removal of a known free 
person of color from the state with the intent to transport that person 
over state lines and into slavery.86 Such forcible removal could be 
accompanied by a bad faith claim that the person was a fugitive 
slave.87 Of course, with no effective legal process, the states had no 
way to test claims as to a person’s slave status. Particularly after the 
passage of the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, states focused 
their statutory efforts on assuring that established legal processes—
which often tracked the terms of the 1793 law—were followed, to 
provide some assurance of a good faith claim to slave status.88 The 
goal of these laws was to decrease the likelihood that a free person 
would be doomed to slavery, either intentionally or unintention-
ally.89 The penalties for violating these laws typically involved a 
 
or Decoyed Away from this Commonwealth—suggests the statute was designed 
to secure damages on behalf of the family of the person captured and sold into 
slavery, as it specified that the money recovered was for the “use and maintenance 
of the wife, children or family of the injured party.” Id. at 617. The law notes that 
criminal remedies for kidnapping were provided by the common law, specifically 
the writ de homine replegiando. Id. at 616–17. 
 86 In addition to forcible removal, however, almost all of the statutes also 
prohibited anyone from luring a free person out of the state by fraud or false pre-
tenses. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 1, 1808, ch. 96, § 1, 1808 N.Y. Laws 300, 300 (de-
fining kidnapping to include inveigling “any negro, mulatto, mestee, or other per-
son of colour, not being a slave” to leave the state); Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 444, 
§1, 1819 Ohio Laws 1052, 1052 (preventing the removal of a free black person 
from the state by “fraud[] or deception”); Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, § 1, 1820 
Pa. Laws 104, 104 (criminalizing the removal of a free person of color from the 
state by “fraud or false pretences” or seduction); Act of Mar. 185, 1838, ch. 323, 
§ 1, 1838 Me. Laws 470, 470 (imposing criminal penalties on anyone who “shall 
inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent either to cause such person to be 
secretly confined or imprisoned in this State against his will, or to be sold as a 
slave”). 
 87 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of the 
intentional kidnapping of free blacks); see also LUBET, supra note 82, at 28–29. 
 88 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 15, 1846, ch. 6, § 13, 1846 N.J. Laws 567, 572 (pe-
nalizing anyone who takes a person out of the state “under pretence” that the per-
son is a fugitive slave, without following procedures established by the statute); 
Act of Mar. 25, 1826, ch. 301, § 3, 1826 Pa. Laws 793, 794 (establishing a process 
for reclaiming a person “held to labour or service in any of the United States, or 
in any of the territories,” who had escaped into Pennsylvania). 
 89 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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fine not exceeding $1,000, and/or a term of imprisonment or sen-
tence to hard labor ranging from one to ten years or more.90 
Later versions of the personal liberty laws focused more specif-
ically on the procedural protections afforded to those who were ac-
cused of being fugitive slaves. Apparently unconvinced that the 
summary procedures afforded under federal law were adequate to 
prevent either errant or intentional wrongful declarations of enslave-
ment, these state laws endeavored to provide fugitive slaves with a 
heightened degree of legal process.91 In 1824, Indiana granted a 
right to an “appeal” to a trial by jury, if either party was dissatisfied 
with the outcome of the summary proceeding regarding a person’s 
enslavement.92 An 1840 New York law replaced the summary pro-
cess previously established by statute with a right to trial by jury on 
behalf of the “claimant” or the person accused of being a fugitive 
slave.93 Connecticut also granted the right to trial by jury to either 
party in a case involving an alleged fugitive slave, but also 
 
 90 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 444, § 1, 1819 Ohio Laws 1052, 1052 
(establishing a sentence of confinement plus hard labor for a period of one to ten 
years); Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, § 1, 1820 Pa. Laws 104, 104–05 (establishing 
a penalty of a fine of $500 to $2,000, in addition to seven to twenty-one years of 
imprisonment); ILL. CRIM. CODE § 56 (1833) (establishing a penalty of one to 
seven years confinement, for each person kidnapped or attempted to be kid-
napped). New York established a severe penalty for a second offense, imposing a 
term of imprisonment “at hard labor, or in solitude” for life. Act of Apr. 1, 1808, 
ch. 96, § 2, 1808 N.Y. Laws 300, 300. Vermont, in one of the earliest statutes, 
gave the convicted defendant a choice of being “publicly whipped, on his naked 
back, not exceeding 39 stripes,” or paying a fine of up to $1,000, or hard labor or 
imprisonment for up to seven years, and also required him to pay damages to the 
person kidnapped. Act of Nov. 8, 1806, ch. 103, 1806 Vt. Acts & Resolves 151, 
151–52. 
 91 See infra notes 92–96. 
 92 Act of Jan. 22, 2824, ch. 47, § 2, 1824 Ind. Acts 221, 221–22 (allowing 
either party to appeal from summary process of determining whether an alleged 
fugitive was a fugitive slave, to a jury trial). 
 93 Act of May 6, 1840, ch. 225, § 1, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 174 (providing 
that, upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of an alleged fugitive 
slave, “the claim to the service of such alleged fugitive, his identity, and the fact 
of his having escaped from another state of the United States into this state, shall 
be determined by a jury”). Several other states also guaranteed the right to a trial 
by jury in any case involving a fugitive slave. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 29, 1840, No. 
8, § 3, 1840 Vt. Acts & Resolves 13, 13; Act of Apr. 15, 1846, ch. 6, § 5, 1846 
N.J. Laws 567; Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, § 2, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413, 
413; Act of Feb. 19, 1857, ch. 8, § 6, 1857 Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 13. 
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“[p]rovided, that “no person shall be qualified to sit as a Juror in said 
case, who believes there is not constitutionally, or legally, a slave in 
the land.”94 States also frequently guaranteed both claimants and ac-
cused slaves the right to seek relief via a writ of habeas corpus95 or 
a writ of personal replevin.96 
These laws illustrate free states’ growing frustration with the 
federal government’s failure to protect the rights of free black peo-
ple living within their borders, who often lived in fear that they 
would be yanked from the street and sold into slavery. Free states 
acted in response to federal government inaction and their own shift-
ing tides of public opinion, eventually erecting legal barriers to the 
reclamation of fugitive slaves that made “slave hunting” a legally 
fraught endeavor. As a result, historian Paul Finkelman has esti-
mated that, after 1830, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was “virtually 
unenforceable” outside the border states.97 
C. Prigg v. Pennsylvania and the Triumph of Federal 
Supremacy 
Against this backdrop of growing state resistance, in 1842 the 
Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania.98 Prigg tested the boundaries of federalism under the 
Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution.99 The Supreme Court, in 
a majority opinion written by Associate Justice Joseph Story, upheld 
the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and struck 
down Pennsylvania’s personal liberty laws on federal supremacy 
grounds.100 The Court’s decision, however, did not put an end to 
 
 94 Act of June 1, 1838, ch. 37, § 4, 1838 Conn. Pub. Acts 32, 33. 
 95 See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1840, ch. 225, § 1, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 174; Act 
of June 1, 1838, ch. 37, § 1, 1838 Conn. Pub. Acts 32, 32; Act of May 21, 1855, 
ch. 489, § 2, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 924; Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, § 2, 1855 
Mich. Pub. Acts 413, 413; Act of Feb. 19, 1857, ch. 8, § 5, 1857 Wis. Sess. Laws 
12, 13. 
 96 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 13, 1837, ch. 221, § 1, 1837 Mass. Laws 240, 240–
41. 
 97 Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns 
Case, Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1793, 
1797–98 (1996) [hereinafter Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves], 
 98 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 99 See Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves, supra note 97 at 1798–
99. 
 100 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 542, 571. 
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personal liberty laws, nor did it resolve the crisis of federalism cre-
ated by the Mason Dixon Line’s demarcation between slavery and 
freedom. 
The facts underlying the dispute in Prigg illustrate both the 
tragic circumstances under which the states’ personal liberty laws 
were invoked and the practical limits of their effectiveness. The case 
involved a woman named Margaret who was, at least in theory, en-
slaved under the laws of Maryland.101 Her parents were held in slav-
ery in Maryland, but their putative owner, John Ashmore, allowed 
them to live independently and told others that he had freed them.102 
Margaret, her husband Jerry Morgan (a free black man born in Penn-
sylvania), and their two children were all described as “free” in the 
1830 Maryland census.103 In 1832, several years after Ashmore’s 
death, Margaret and Jerry Morgan and their children moved from 
Maryland to Pennsylvania.104 The Morgans had at least one addi-
tional child while living in Pennsylvania, who would have been con-
sidered free under Pennsylvania law.105 Five years after the family 
left Maryland, Ashmore’s widow hired an attorney and neighbor, 
Edward Prigg, to recover Margaret Morgan and her children from 
Pennsylvania, claiming to own them as slaves.106 Prigg traveled to 
Pennsylvania, apprehended the Morgan family, and took them to a 
local magistrate to obtain a certificate deeming Margaret and her 
children fugitives, thus authorizing their rendition to Maryland as 
 
 101 Id. at 539. 
 102 Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 274. 
 103 Id. at 275. Despite this evidence, the jury in the underlying state case found 
that Margaret Morgan was, in fact, a fugitive slave who was the property of John 
Ashford’s widow, Margaret Ashford. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 556. 
 104 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 556 (discussing jury’s special verdict, finding 
that Margaret Morgan moved from Maryland to Pennsylvania in 1832); see also 
LUBET, supra note 82, at 30; Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, 
supra note 31, at 274–75. 
 105 Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 276. 
The Pennsylvania jury found that at least one of the Morgans’s children was born 
in Pennsylvania under circumstances that would have rendered the child free un-
der Pennsylvania law. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 557. 
 106 Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 275–
76; see also LUBET, supra note 82, at 30. Prigg was accompanied by John Ash-
more’s son-in-law, Nathan Bemis, and two neighbors, Jacob Forward and Stephen 
Lewis, Jr. Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 275–
76. 
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slaves.107 The magistrate, however, refused to issue the certificate, 
apparently not convinced of their enslavement.108 Rather than seek 
the legal redress provided for in the Pennsylvania statute, Prigg for-
cibly took Margaret Morgan and her children (but not her husband 
Jerry Morgan) south to Maryland, where they were delivered to 
Ashmore’s widow and later sold to a slave trader.109 The legal record 
makes no further mention of the fate of Margaret Morgan or her 
children. Prigg, however, was extradited from Maryland and tried 
and convicted of kidnapping by a Pennsylvania jury.110 The appeal 
of his criminal conviction was taken up directly by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 111 
Prigg was charged under a Pennsylvania law enacted in 1826, 
titled “An act to give effect to the provisions of the constitution of 
the United States, relative to fugitives from labor, for the protection 
of free people of color, and to prevent kidnapping.”112 Prigg was 
indicted for violating section 1 of this law when he removed Marga-
ret Morgan from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania “with force 
and violence” and took her to Maryland, “with a design and inten-
tion there to sell and dispose of [her] as and for a slave and servant 
for life.”113 The jury that convicted Prigg did not find that Margaret 
Morgan was free.114 On the contrary, they found that she was en-
slaved and further that she had “escaped and fled from the state of 
 
 107 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 556–57 (findings of jury’s special verdict). 
 108 LUBET, supra note 82, at 30; Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme 
Court, supra note 31, at 276. 
 109 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 557 (findings of jury’s special verdict); see also 
LUBET, supra note 82, at 30; Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, 
supra note 31, at 276. 
 110 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 543. Bemis, Forward, and Lewis were also in-
dicted for kidnapping. Id. 
 111 Id. at 558 (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved the lower 
court judgment pro forma, allowing defendant to prosecute a writ of error in the 
U.S. Supreme Court). 
 112 Act of Apr. 11, 1826, ch. 301, 1826 Pa. Laws 150. The text of this statute 
is reproduced in the Prigg opinion, as part of the jury’s special verdict. Prigg, 41 
U.S. (16 Pet.) at 551–56. 
 113 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 543; see also Act of Apr. 11, 1826, ch. 301, § 1, 
1826 Pa. Laws 150, 150 (any person who “by force and violence” takes or carries 
away “any negro or mulatto” from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, “with a 
design and intention of selling and disposing of such negro or mulatto, as a slave 
or servant for life,” is guilty of a felony). 
 114 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 556. 
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Maryland” without her owner’s knowledge or consent.115 The jury’s 
finding of guilt was based on Prigg’s failure to follow the procedures 
set forth in the Pennsylvania statute for reclaiming an alleged fugi-
tive slave.116 
Justice Story invalidated Prigg’s conviction for kidnapping, 
holding that the law he violated—Pennsylvania’s personal liberty 
law—was unconstitutional on grounds of federal supremacy.117 He 
wrote that “[t]he [Fugitive Slave] clause manifestly contemplates 
the existence of a positive, unqualified right on the part of the owner 
of the slave [to reclaim his property], which no state law or regula-
tion can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain.”118 Story 
concluded that “we hold the power of legislation on this subject to 
be exclusive in Congress.”119 Under this logic, almost all of the ex-
isting state personal liberty laws were unconstitutional in that they 
infringed upon the plenary power of Congress to regulate in this 
arena. The Supreme Court thus held that the free states were power-
less to directly impose conditions on the manner in which the Fugi-
tive Slave Clause was implemented on their soil. 
Justice Story claimed that his decision in Prigg was compelled 
by his duty to faithfully interpret the law, especially as expressed in 
the U.S. Constitution.120 However, the decision that he wrote was 
anything but inevitable. From a structural standpoint, the Fugitive 
Slave Clause was not a poster child for federal supremacy. The pow-
ers of Congress are articulated in Article I, Section 8, of the United 
States Constitution.121 The Constitution imbues Congress with the 
power “[t]o lay and collect taxes, . . . to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 556–57. 
 117 Id. at 612. 
 118 Id. at 612 (emphasis added). 
 119 Id. at 625 (emphasis added). 
 120 2 JOSEPH STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, ASSOCIATE 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND DANE PROFESSOR 
OF LAW AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 431 (William W. Story ed., 1851) [hereinaf-
ter LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY] (“I [would] never hesitate to do my duty 
as a Judge, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, be the conse-
quences what they may. That Constitution I have sworn to support, and I cannot 
forget or repudiate my solemn obligations at pleasure.”) 
 121 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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States, . . . [t]o borrow money, . . . [t]o regulate commerce, . . . [t]o 
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, . . . [t]o coin money,” to 
create federal courts, and “[t]o declare war,” among other things.122 
Article I, Section 8, does not refer to fugitive slaves, either directly 
or indirectly.123 Therefore, as a matter of textual interpretation, the 
Fugitive Slave Clause is not obviously within the plenary power of 
Congress.124 
The Fugitive Slave Clause appears in Article IV of the Consti-
tution, which generally addresses comity among the states.125 Sec-
tion 1 of Article IV contains the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which 
requires each state to give “full faith and credit” to the laws and ju-
dicial proceedings of other states.126 When the laws of two states are 
diametrically opposed—e.g., when one state embraces slavery and 
another state rejects the propertization of human beings—then “full 
faith and credit” is impossible.127 Section 2 of Article IV contains 
the Fugitive Slave Clause, which attempted to resolve this antici-
pated conflict among free and slave states.128 Abolitionists argued, 
and some state courts agreed, that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 
was unconstitutional on the grounds that the States, rather than Con-
gress, held the exclusive power to implement this Constitutional di-
rective.129 From a textual standpoint, these state courts may have had 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 See id. 
 124 Justice Story addressed this argument in his decision, dismissing it on 
grounds that Congress was empowered to enact the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 
U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 618–19 (1842) (“The end being required, it has been deemed 
a just and necessary implication, that the means to accomplish it are given also.”). 
 125 See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
 126 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 127 See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 623–24. 
 128 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 443–46. 
 129 See Baker, supra note 80, at 1153 (describing arguments made by the Penn-
sylvania Abolition Society regarding the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 1793); Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 
269–73 (discussing state court opinions interpreting the constitutionality of same). 
State courts in New York and New Jersey held the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law un-
constitutional. See, e.g., Jack v. Martin, 14 Wend. 507, 525–26 (N.Y. 1835); 
Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 269–73 (dis-
cussing state court opinions finding the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law unconstitu-
tional). The New Jersey opinion was unpublished. Finkelman, Story Telling on 
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the better side of the argument. However, Prigg held the opposite, 
thereby placing the power of implementing the Fugitive Slave 
Clause squarely within the plenary powers of Congress.130 
Justice Story also relied on the “historical necessity” argument 
to buttress his decision.131 Story and many other judges argued that 
the Fugitive Slave Clause could not be tampered with by the states, 
because, without it, “the Union could not have been formed.”132 
However, as discussed, the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitu-
tion generated very little debate.133 As to other Constitutional provi-
sions—most prominently the Three-Fifths and Slave Trade 
Clauses—Southern delegates loudly and frequently threatened to 
abandon the Union if they did not get the concessions they de-
manded on slavery.134 However, no legislative history suggests that 
the same was true as to the Fugitive Slave Clause. Therefore, the 
 
the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 270–71. Writing for New York’s highest 
court, Chancellor Reuben Wallworth reasoned, “I have looked in vain among the 
powers delegated to congress by the constitution, for any general authority to that 
body to legislate on this subject. It certainly is not contained in any express grant 
of power, and it does not appear to be embraced in the general grant of incidental 
powers contained in the last clause of the constitution relative to the powers of 
congress.” Jack, 14 Wend. at 525–26; see also Finkelman, Story Telling on the 
Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 272–73 (discussing Story’s treatment and mis-
interpretation of Martin in his opinion in Prigg). 
 130 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625. 
 131 Id. at 610–11. 
 132 Id. at 611; see also Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 62, 63 (Pa. 1819) 
(reasoning that “it is well known that our southern brethren would not have con-
sented to become parties to a constitution . . . unless their property in slaves had 
been secured”). 
 133 See supra Section I.A. 
 134 During the Three-Fifths Clause debate, North Carolina delegate William 
Richardson Davie stated that he was sure his state “would never confederate on 
any terms that did not rate [slaves] at least as 3/5,” and further that “[i]f the Eastern 
States meant therefore to exclude [slaves] altogether [from the ratio of represen-
tation] the business was at an end.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 593 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. During the debate regarding the inter-
national slave trade, South Carolina delegate Benjamin Rutledge bluntly stated 
that “[t]he true question . . . is whether the Southn. [sic] States shall or shall not 
be parties to the Union.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra 
note 26, at 364. His fellow South Carolinian, Charles Pinckney, similarly threat-
ened that “South Carolina can never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave trade.” 
Id. 
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historical necessity justification for Story’s decision in Prigg, like 
the argument based on the plain language of the Constitution, is 
weak. 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg undermined 
many of the free states’ attempts to protect the rights of black citi-
zens via anti-kidnapping laws, the decision’s emphasis on the ple-
nary power of Congress also created new avenues for state legisla-
tion designed to achieve the same ends.135 In his opinion, Justice 
Story questioned the section of the 1793 Act that purported to re-
quire state enforcement of the federal law.136 In keeping with his 
finding that the power to legislate on the subject of fugitive slaves 
was “exclusive in Congress,”137 Story suggested that the states could 
not be compelled to enforce the Act.138 He reasoned that it might be 
unconstitutional “to insist that the states are bound to provide means 
to carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere 
delegated or intrusted [sic] to them by the Constitution.”139 
Story’s opinion did not hold that states were powerless to pass 
laws or decide court cases that affected fugitive slaves.140 Story rec-
ognized that the states, under their general police powers, did pos-
sess “full jurisdiction to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and re-
move them from their borders,” for the purpose of securing “the pro-
tection, safety, and peace of the state.”141 Although these types of 
state laws could and did incidentally benefit slave owners, the fed-
eral government could not require the states to pass such laws for 
 
 135 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625; see infra notes 147–51. 
 136 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 616. 
 137 Id. at 625. 
 138 Id. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Taney rejected Story’s reasoning 
on this point, arguing that the states had a duty to “protect and support the [slave] 
owner when he is endeavouring to obtain possession of his property found within 
their respective territories,” while they were expressly forbidden to “make any 
regulation” that would impair the slave owner’s ability to do so. Id. at 627 (Taney, 
C.J., concurring). 
 139 Id. at 616 (majority opinion). 
 140 Id. at 615–16, 625. 
 141 Id. at 625; see also Kraehenbuehl, supra note 6, at 1477 (concluding that, 
under this reasoning from Prigg, “States could . . . either assist in enforcing fed-
eral law or refuse to aid in enforcement if they so desired.”); Finkelman, The Roots 
of Printz, supra note 22, at 1408–09 (concluding that, under Prigg, state officials 
could enforce the federal Fugitive Slave Law, but could not be required to do so 
by the federal government). 
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the purpose of enforcing the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause.142 
Similarly, although Story noted that a “difference of opinion” ex-
isted as to whether state magistrates were required to accept juris-
diction over Fugitive Slave Act cases, the Court entertained no 
doubt that state magistrates could exercise such authority if they 
chose to do so, “unless prohibited by state legislation.”143 
In response to this reasoning in Prigg, some states passed new 
legislation that forbade state cooperation with federal enforcement 
of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.144 These “noncooperative” per-
sonal liberty laws prohibited the use of state resources—including 
jurists, jails, sheriffs, and courtrooms—to recapture alleged fugitive 
slaves.145 These personal liberty laws were intended to send a mes-
sage to the slave states: free state citizens would not voluntarily hunt 
down alleged fugitive slaves, forcibly remove them from free state 
soil, and send them back into slavery. If the laws were intended to 
end southern demands of this nature, however, they failed misera-
bly.146 
D. Northerners Fight for Local Control: The Second Wave of 
Personal Liberty Laws 
In the years following the Prigg decision, and prior to the pas-
sage of a new, more pro-slavery version of the federal Fugitive Slave 
Act in 1850, five free states passed personal liberty laws that explic-
itly forbade cooperation with the federal government with regard to 
the rendition of fugitive slaves: Massachusetts (1843),147 Vermont 
(1843),148 Connecticut (1844),149 Pennsylvania (1847),150 and 
 
 142 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615–16, 625. 
 143 Id. at 622; see also Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1408–
11 (discussing this reasoning in Prigg). 
 144 See infra notes 147–51; MORRIS, supra note 41, at 118. 
 145 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, § 2, 1843 Mass. Acts 33, 33. His-
torian Thomas D. Morris describes these “noncooperative” personal liberty laws 
as part of a “containment policy” in the free states. See MORRIS, supra note 41, at 
107–29 (discussing the legislative history of these laws). 
 146 See Rierson, supra note 21, at 813–14 (describing Southern reaction to the 
personal liberty laws passed by Northern states after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Prigg).  
 147 Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, 1843 Mass. Acts 33. 
 148 Act of Nov. 1, 1843, No. 15, 1843 Vt. Acts & Resolves 11. 
 149 Act of June 6, 1844, ch. 27, 1844 Conn. Pub. Acts 33. 
 150 Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, 1847 Pa. Laws 206. 
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Rhode Island (1848).151 By enacting these laws, free states at-
tempted to “disassociate themselves from slavery and thereby con-
fine all action to the narrowest limits that would satisfy the Consti-
tution.”152 These laws hindered Southerners’ efforts to reclaim 
slaves in these states, at least temporarily, because, at the time, few 
federal marshals and even fewer federal jails existed to fill the void 
left by the denial of state law enforcement and judicial resources.153 
In fact, before 1850, most free states—where fugitive slave disputes 
were decided—had but a single federal judge.154 
Connecticut passed a personal liberty law explicitly in response 
to the Prigg decision.155 In its preamble, Connecticut’s 1844 law re-
pealed two personal liberty laws passed in 1838 and 1839, reasoning 
that “it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States . . . that both the duty and the power of legislation on [the] 
subject [of fugitive slaves] pertain exclusively to the National Gov-
ernment.”156 The new statute deprived state judicial officers of the 
authority to issue a warrant “for the arrest or detention of any person 
claimed to be a fugitive from labor or service, as a slave, under the 
laws of any other state or country, escaping into this state, or to grant 
a certificate of the title of any claimant to the service of any person 
so claimed to be a fugitive.”157 The Act specified, however, that it 
did not purport to deprive any slaveholder of his Constitutional right 
 
 151 Act of Jan. 13, 1848, 1848 R.I. Acts & Resolves 12. Rhode Island amended 
this statute in 1854 to clarify that its provisions were still in effect after Congress 
passed a new Fugitive Slave Law in 1850. Act of June 14, 1854, 1854 R.I. Acts 
& Resolves 22. 
 152 MORRIS, supra note 41, at 127. 
 153 See LUBET, supra note 82, at 34 (“At a time when there were few federal 
judges and marshals, and virtually no federal jails, the denial of state facilities was 
potentially a major impediment to the arrest, detention, and eventual return of 
fugitives.”); Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with 
Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 845, 879 (2011) [hereinafter Finkelman, The Cost of 
Compromise] (“With only a few federal courts operating in the country and a sim-
ilarly small number of federal marshals, masters had to pursue their slaves on their 
own or with professional slave catchers.”). 
 154 Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1403–04. 
 155 Act of June 6, 1844, ch. 27, 1844 Conn. Pub. Acts 33. 
 156 Id. pmbl. 
 157 Id. § 2. 
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to reclaim a fugitive or to prevent any federal judicial officer from 
enforcing those rights.158 
Massachusetts enacted a non-cooperative personal liberty law in 
1843, one year before the Connecticut statute was passed.159 More 
than any other state, the Massachusetts law reflected popular senti-
ment against the federal Fugitive Slave Act, specifically in response 
to the well-publicized arrest and trial of fugitive slave George Lati-
mer in Boston.160 After much legal maneuvering in the Massachu-
setts courts, Latimer was ultimately released to the custody of his 
putative owner, James Gray of Virginia.161 However, a group of 
prominent Bostonians “bought” Latimer from Gray and thereby pre-
vented his re-enslavement.162 In a letter published in The Liberator, 
abolitionist and former slave Frederick Douglass wrote the follow-
ing in reference to Latimer’s case: 
Boston has become the hunting-ground of merciless 
men-hunters, and man-stealers. Henceforth we need 
not portray to the imagination of northern people, the 
flying slave making his way through thick and dark 
woods of the South, with white-fanged blood hounds 
yelping on his blood-stained track; but refer to the 
streets of Boston, made dark and dense by crowds of 
professed christians.163 
In response to the Latimer case, Massachusetts citizens submit-
ted the “Great Massachusetts Petition” to the state legislature, a doc-
ument containing over 60,000 signatures.164 The petition requested 
the following: 
 
 158 Id. 
 159 Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, 1843 Mass. Acts 33. 
 160 See id. For a discussion of George Latimer’s arrest and trial under the Fu-
gitive Slave Act and the passage of legislation in response to it, see FONER, 
GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 111; MORRIS, supra note 41, at 109–
11; LUBET, supra note 82, at 32–34. 
 161 MORRIS, supra note 41, at 111; LUBET, supra note 82, at 32, 34. 
 162 MORRIS, supra note 41, at 111; LUBET, supra note 82, at 34. 
 163 Letter from Frederick Douglass to The Liberator (Nov. 18, 1842), re-
printed in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 73, at 222, 224–25. 
 164 MORRIS, supra note 41, at 113; LUBET, supra note 82, at 34. 
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1. To forbid all persons holding office under any law 
of this state from in any way . . . aiding or abetting 
the arrest or detention of any person claimed as a fu-
gitive from slavery. 
2. To forbid the use of our jails or public property . . . 
in the detention of any alleged fugitive from slavery. 
3. To propose such amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States as shall forever separate the peo-
ple of Massachusetts from all connection with slav-
ery.165 
The first and second objectives of the Petition took the form of 
a bill introduced by State Representative Charles Francis Adams 
(son of former President John Quincy Adams and grandson of for-
mer President John Adams),166 which was signed into law on March 
24, 1843, with little debate.167 Like Connecticut, Massachusetts de-
prived its state judges of the authority to issue certificates or other-
wise adjudicate fugitive slave cases.168 Massachusetts went further, 
however, and also decreed that “[n]o sheriff, deputy-sheriff, coro-
ner, constable, jailer, or other officer of this Commonwealth” could 
arrest, detain, or imprison “in any jail or other building belonging to 
this Commonwealth” any person on grounds that such person was 
 
 165 Massachusetts Historical Society, The Great Massachusetts Petition, 
MASS. HIST. SOC’Y (1842), http://www.masshist.org/data-
base/viewer.php?item_id=1683&mode=large&img_step=1&; see also MORRIS, 
supra note 41, at 113. 
 166   Adams, Charles Francis, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. 
CONGRESS, https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIn-
dex=A000032 (last visited April 10, 2020). 
 167 Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, 1843 Mass. Acts 33; MORRIS, supra note 41, 
at 112–13 (discussing legislative history). 
 168 Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, §1, 1843 Mass. Acts 33, 33. 
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“claimed as a fugitive slave.”169 Both Vermont170 and Rhode Is-
land171 passed statutes that were essentially identical to Massachu-
setts’ 1843 personal liberty law, in 1843 and 1848, respectively. As 
discussed infra, the 1843 Massachusetts statute was amended and 
supplemented in 1855, yielding a more detailed personal liberty law 
that pushed even farther at the bounds of the states’ Constitutional 
ability to mandate resistance to enforcement of the federal fugitive 
slave law within their borders.172 
The state that was at the center of the controversy in Prigg—
Pennsylvania—was actually the first state to enact a personal liberty 
law that deprived state judges of the authority to hear Fugitive Slave 
Act cases.173 Pennsylvania enacted this law in 1820, approximately 
twenty years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg.174 The 
Act specified that “no alderman or justice of the peace of this Com-
monwealth shall have jurisdiction or take cognizance of the case of 
any fugitive from labor from any of the United States or Territories, 
under [the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act].”175 However, six years later 
Pennsylvania passed a new personal liberty law that detailed the pro-
cess by which state judges would hear such cases.176 As discussed 
supra, the Supreme Court in Prigg struck down Pennsylvania’s 
1826 personal liberty law on grounds of federal supremacy.177 
 
 169 Id. § 2. The penalty for violating either section 1 or 2 of the Act was a fine 
of up to $1,000 or a maximum jail sentence of one year. Id. § 3. 
 170 Act of Nov. 1, 1843, No. 15, 1843 Vt. Acts & Resolves 11. Section 3 of 
the Act also prohibited a sheriff or other “officer or citizen of this state” from 
transporting or removing a fugitive slave “from any place in this state to any other 
place within or without” the state of Vermont. Id. § 3. The statute also repealed 
Vermont’s earlier personal liberty law, which focused on providing a right to trial 
by jury and other procedural protections to alleged fugitive slaves. Id. § 6. 
 171 Act of Jan. 13, 1848, 1848 R.I. Acts & Resolves 12. The penalties provided 
for under the Rhode Island statute were a maximum $500 fine or up to six months 
in jail. Id. § 3. 
 172 See infra notes 259–67 and accompanying text (discussing Act of May 21, 
1855, ch. 489, 1855 Mass. Acts 917; Act of Mar. 27, 1858, ch. 175, 1858 Mass. 
Acts 151). 
 173 Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, 1820 Pa. Laws 70. 
 174 See id.; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 175 Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, § 3, 1820 Pa. Laws 70, 70. 
 176 Act of Apr. 11, 1826, ch. 301, § 5, 1826 Pa. Laws 150, 152. 
 177 See Prigg, 41 U.S. at 625. 
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In 1847, Pennsylvania enacted a new personal liberty law that 
repealed the law passed in 1826, attempting to comply with the letter 
of the law as explicated by Story in Prigg.178 Section 3 of that law, 
which was essentially identical to the same section in the 1820 stat-
ute, effectively deprived state judges of jurisdiction to hear Fugitive 
Slave Act cases.179 Similar to the personal liberty laws passed by 
Massachusetts, Vermont, and later Rhode Island, the Pennsylvania 
statute further prohibited use of “any jail or prison of this common-
wealth, for the detention of any person claimed as a fugitive from 
servitude or labor.”180 The law also prohibited the kidnapping of any 
“free negro or mulatto” from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
for the purpose of selling that person into slavery outside the state.181 
It also recognized and reaffirmed state court judges’ authority to is-
sue the writ of habeas corpus, “and to inquire into the causes and 
legality of the arrest or imprisonment of any human being within 
this commonwealth.”182 Historian Thomas Morris has described 
Pennsylvania’s 1847 statute as “an experiment in the possibilities 
left open by [Prigg], as well as an effort at containment.”183 
The personal liberty laws that were passed in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania aimed to satisfy 
the constitutional obligations imposed on states while minimizing 
the states’ connection to the institution of slavery. Some states re-
pealed all pre-existing laws that attempted to provide accused fugi-
tives with procedural protections in favor of the non-cooperative ap-
proach,184 but others, like Pennsylvania, attempted to maintain some 
of these procedural protections even in the wake of Prigg.185 The 
viability of these laws was thrown into question when Congress 
 
 178 Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, 1847 Pa. Laws 206; Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 
at 625. 
 179 Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, § 3, 1847 Pa. Laws 206, 207. 
 180 Id. § 6. The Act further required any jailer violating this part of the Act to 
pay a $500 fine and “be removed from office, and be incapable of holding such 
office . . . at any time during his natural life.” Id. 
 181 Id. §§ 1–2. These sections of the Act were essentially identical to the same 
sections of the 1820 Act, except the 1847 statute specifically applied to “free” 
negros or mulattos, whereas the word “free” was omitted from the 1820 statute. 
Compare id., with Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, 1820 Penn. Laws 70. 
 182 Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, § 5, 1847 Pa. Laws 206, 208. 
 183 MORRIS, supra note 41, at 118. 
 184 See, e.g., Act of June 6, 1844, ch. 27, 1844 Conn. Pub. Acts 33. 
 185 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, 1847 Pa. Laws 206. 
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passed a law that did not attempt to compromise on the subject of 
fugitive slaves, but rather capitulated to Southern demands: the 1850 
Fugitive Slave Act.186 
E. The Triumph of Federal Power via the Fugitive Slave Act 
of 1850 
Congress attempted to resolve the federalism issues created by 
the Prigg decision and the free states’ response to it when it enacted 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.187 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
was part of the Compromise of 1850, an omnibus agreement that 
was intended to (but obviously did not) avert the Civil War, which 
broke out about a decade later.188 The Act, like many parts of the 
Compromise of 1850, was a concession to the Southern States.189 
No part of the Act was designed to protect the rights of black Amer-
icans, and it expressly required free state citizens to assist with the 
implementation of the federal law and the apprehension of alleged 
fugitives found on their soil.190 Historian Eric Foner has described 
this statute as “the most robust expansion of federal authority over 
the states, and over individual Americans, of the antebellum era.”191 
 
 186 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 187 Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 41, at 146 (noting key provisions of the 
Act); COVER, supra note 20, at 175 (same). The legislative history of the Act is 
discussed at MORRIS, supra note 41, at 131–45. 
 188 Under the Compromise of 1850, Congress: (1) admitted California to the 
Union as a free state; (2) prohibited the slave trade in the District of Columbia; 
(3) paid ten million dollars to Texas to settle a border dispute with New Mexico; 
(4) enacted the Fugitive Slave Act; and (5) organized Utah and New Mexico as 
territories without restrictions on slavery. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY 
OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 75–76 (C. Vann. Woodward ed., 1988) (sum-
marizing key provisions of the Compromise of 1850). For a more in-depth dis-
cussion of the Compromise of 1850, see HOLMAN HAMILTON, PROLOGUE TO 
CONFLICT: THE CRISIS AND COMPROMISE OF 1850 (2005); see also WILLIAM W. 
FREEHLING, 1 THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY 1776-1854, at 
487–510 (1990). 
 189 See Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise, supra note 153, at 882 (arguing 
that the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act could not “be considered part of a ‘compromise’ 
because it was so utterly one-sided” in favor of the South); MORRIS, supra note 
41, at 146 (observing that the “Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was scarcely a com-
promise”). 
 190 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 191 FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 125; see Foner, What 
the Fugitive Slave Act Teaches Us, supra note 1 (characterizing the 1850 Fugitive 
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The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850—which, like the Constitution’s 
Fugitive Slave Clause and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, never 
uses the word “slave”192—was intended to ensure that the free states 
and their citizens did not impede Southern slaveholders’ efforts to 
reclaim putative human property on free soil.193 The 1850 Act took 
aim at free states’ personal liberty laws, trying to dismantle their 
attempts to provide procedural protections to those who were ac-
cused of being fugitive slaves.194 The 1850 Act also went further, 
legislatively declaring that free state citizens owed a duty to assist 
the slave-catchers who pursued fugitives within their states.195 Al-
though the Act attempted to squelch free states’ resistance to slave-
hunting on their soil, it failed.196 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
ultimately inflamed, rather than ameliorated, the federalism crisis 
engendered by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.197 
Free-state efforts to provide alleged fugitive slaves with a meas-
ure of due process, which had been ruled unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,198 were targeted 
 
Slave Act as “probably the most intrusive intervention by Washington into local 
affairs of the entire pre-Civil War period”). See also Gautham Rao, The Federal 
Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nine-
teenth Century America, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 20–26 (2008) (discussing the in-
corporation of the federal posse comitatus doctrine into the Fugitive Slave Law of 
1850, concluding that the doctrine radically transformed federal power over the 
U.S. citizenry). 
 192 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, 
§ 1; Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302. Like the 1793 Act, the statute 
adopted in 1850 refers to escaping slaves as “fugitives” or “fugitives from service 
or labor.” Compare Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, with Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. Slaveholders are consistently referred to as 
“claimants.” Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. The word “slave” 
appears nowhere in either Act or in the Constitution.  
 193 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462; see also LUBET, supra 
note 82, at 43 (noting that “it was evident from the start that the entire purpose of 
the Act was to make it nearly impossible for judicial process to delay the restora-
tion of slaves to claimants”). 
 194 See LUBET, supra note 82, at 45. 
 195 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 5–6, 9 Stat. 462, 462–63. 
 196 See FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 125 (observing that 
the Act “could hardly have been designed to arouse greater opposition in the 
North”). 
 197 See Rierson, supra note 21, at 814–22 (discussing the Fugitive Slave Act 
of 1850 and the role it played in bringing about the Civil War). 
 198 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842). 
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and dismantled by federal law. While the 1793 Act did not guarantee 
a jury trial, an appeal, or any other procedural protections, it also did 
not explicitly exclude them.199 The 1793 Act also did not specify 
acceptable forms of evidence on the issue of slave status, other than 
to reference proof “either by oral testimony or affidavit.”200 The Fu-
gitive Slave Act of 1850 was more specific in its denial of proce-
dural protections for those accused of being fugitive slaves.201 In 
defining what constituted “satisfactory proof” of ownership of an 
alleged fugitive, the 1850 Act excluded the testimony of the person 
accused of being a fugitive slave, which could not be admitted into 
evidence.202 The law allowed slave holders to seize and arrest a per-
son suspected to be a fugitive slave in a free state “without process,” 
so long as they took the alleged fugitive before a federal commis-
sioner to have his slave status determined in a summary proceed-
ing.203 The federal commissioner’s decision as to the status of an 
alleged fugitive was final; appeals were not permitted.204 The law 
further provided that, if a commissioner issued a certificate finding 
a person to be a fugitive slave, that finding would “prevent all mo-
lestation of [the putative owner of the slave] by any process issued 
by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever.”205 
Most courts interpreted this statutory language to prevent use of the 
writ of habeas corpus to seek state court review of the legality of a 
person’s detention as a fugitive slave.206 The Act contained no stat-
ute of limitations.207 
To resolve the problems created by a lack of federal manpower 
to enforce the federal fugitive slave law, the 1850 Fugitive Slave 
 
 199 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302. 
 200 Id. § 3. 
 201 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 6–7, 9 Stat. 462, 463–64. 
 202 Id. § 6. 
 203 Id. 
 204 The certificate issued by the commissioner was considered “conclusive” of 
the claimant’s right to remove the fugitive “to the State or Territory from which 
he escaped.” Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See MORRIS, supra note 41, at 143–44, 152–54 (discussing legislative his-
tory on writ of habeas corpus and the federal fugitive slave law, describing various 
court opinions interpreting the fugitive slave law, and noting that the “effect of 
the federal law on runaways upon a state habeas corpus” was “one of the most 
warmly debated legal and constitutional problems of the decade”). 
 207 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
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Act created a new, “national system of law enforcement.”208 The Act 
authorized the creation of a new type of federal judicial officer in 
the States and Territories: the federal commissioner, one of whom 
was to be appointed in every county.209 The Act supplemented the 
power of the federal commissioners by authorizing and empowering 
them to appoint “any one or more suitable persons” to execute war-
rants issued under the Act, and further “to summon and call to their 
aid the bystanders, or posse comitatus of the proper county, when 
necessary to ensure a faithful observance” of the Constitution’s Fu-
gitive Slave Clause.210 The Act further commanded “all good citi-
zens” to “aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this 
law, whenever their services may be required.”211 
From the perspective of citizens residing in the free 
states, the section of the Act that compelled their par-
ticipation was particularly offensive, as it effectively 
impressed them into the service of the slaveholder 
and thereby metaphorically “enslaved” them as well. 
Moreover, it directly and inescapably conflicted with 
the laws and social norms of free state society, which 
did not embrace complaisance with perpetrating 
slavery.212 
Anyone who resisted the commands of the Fugitive Slave Act 
risked his liberty and the contents of his wallet. Any person who 
assisted a runaway slave—by attempting to rescue him, harboring 
or concealing him, or by aiding or abetting his escape (either directly 
or indirectly)—could be sentenced to a maximum of six months in 
prison, forced to pay a maximum $1000 fine, plus an additional 
 
 208 Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise, supra note 153, at 879. 
 209 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 1–2, 9 Stat. 462, 462. The Act spec-
ified that the federal courts “shall from time to time enlarge the number of the 
commissioners, with a view to afford reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives 
from labor, and to the prompt discharge of the duties imposed by this act.” Id. § 3 
 210 Id. § 5; see also Rao, supra note 191, at 20–26 (concluding that the incor-
poration of the federal posse comitatus doctrine into the Fugitive Slave Law of 
1850 radically transformed federal power over the U.S. citizenry). 
 211 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §5, 9 Stat. 462, 463. 
 212 See Rierson, supra note 21, at 816; see also Rao, supra note 191, at 5 (not-
ing that “a national duty to assist in the recovery of fugitive slaves imposed the 
legal norms of slave society on free states”). 
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thousand dollars in civil damages payable to the claimant.213 If a 
federal marshal failed to “obey and execute” a warrant for a fugitive, 
he could be fined $1000, payable to the claimant.214 If a marshal had 
custody of a fugitive who managed to escape (with or without the 
marshal’s assent), the marshal was liable to the claimant for the “full 
value of the service or labor” of the fugitive.215 The federal commis-
sioners who administered the Act also had a financial incentive to 
find in favor of slaveholders.216 They earned a fee of $10 if they 
issued a certificate affirming the claimant’s right to reclaim a fugi-
tive slave; the fee was reduced to $5 if the commissioner found in-
sufficient proof to issue a certificate.217 
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 1850 
Fugitive Slave Act in Ableman v. Booth, a case arising from a slave 
rescue in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1854.218 Sherman M. Booth, the 
editor of an abolitionist newspaper in Milwaukee, led the group that 
freed Joshua Glover, an enslaved man who fled from Missouri and 
ultimately escaped to Canada.219 Booth was charged with violating 
the anti-aiding and abetting provisions of the 1850 Fugitive Slave 
Act.220 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, acting on a writ of habeas 
corpus, ordered that Booth be released from custody on the grounds 
that the Fugitive Slave Act violated the U.S. Constitution and was 
 
 213 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §5, 9 Stat. 462, 463. 
 214 Id. § 5. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See id. § 8. 
 217 Id. 
 218 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858). For a more complete discussion of the 
facts and politics surrounding this case, see generally Earl M. Maltz, Slavery, 
Federalism, and the Constitution: Ableman v. Booth and the Struggle over Fugi-
tive Slaves, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 83 (2008); Jeffrey Schmitt, Note, Rethinking 
Ableman v. Booth and States’ Rights in Wisconsin, 93 VA. L. REV. 1315 (2007); 
A.J. Beitzinger, Federal Law Enforcement and the Booth Cases, 41 MARQUETTE 
L. REV. 7 (1957). 
 219 Maltz, supra note 218, at 89–90; see also Schmitt, supra note 218, at 1323–
25; Beitzinger, supra note 218, at 10–11. 
 220 Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 507 (referencing Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850, ch. 60, § 7, 9 Stat. 462, 464) (imposing liability on any person who aids, 
abets or assists a slave who attempts to escape from custody under the Act). 
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therefore void.221 The case eventually found its way to the U.S. Su-
preme Court. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice 
Taney, the Court held that “the fugitive slave law is, in all of its 
provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the United 
States.”222 The decision, which has been characterized as a “power-
ful reassertion of the Supreme Court’s authority over state 
courts,”223 reasoned that “no power is more clearly conferred by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, than the power of this 
court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases arising under such 
Constitution and laws.”224 Booth reaffirmed the federal courts’ abil-
ity to compel enforcement of federal law, even in states where that 
law was exceedingly unpopular, like the Fugitive Slave Act in ante-
bellum Wisconsin. 
The heavy-handedness of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was un-
deniable, leading one historian to describe it as “one of the most 
draconian laws ever passed by Congress.”225 Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, one of the first persons determined to be a fugitive slave under 
the Act, Adam Gibson, was not, in fact, a slave: when Gibson was 
presented to his putative owner in Maryland, the slaveholder 
acknowledged that Gibson was not the man who had escaped him.226 
The vast majority of proceedings instituted under the Act resulted in 
the re-enslavement of alleged fugitives; federal commissioners 
rarely found that an alleged fugitive slave was, in fact, free.227 
 
 221 Id. at 507–08. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the Fugitive Slave Act 
to be “unconstitutional and void” on five separate grounds, which are briefly set 
forth in its opinion. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 14 (Wis. 1854), rev’d sub nom. Able-
man, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 506; see also Schmitt, supra note 218, at 1330–36 
(discussing the opinions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court). 
 222 Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 526. 
 223 Maltz, supra note 218, at 105. 
 224 Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 525. 
 225 Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1416; see FONER, 
GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 124 (similarly describing the Act as 
“draconian”). 
 226 FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 241–42. 
 227 Out of 332 total cases brought under the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act over a 
ten-year period, only eleven alleged fugitives were released from custody on the 
grounds that they were free. See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 207 (1970); see also 
HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION 
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Slave owners’ high rate of success in proceedings instituted un-
der the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act perhaps belied the overall ineffec-
tiveness of the law in retrieving slaves who fled North in search of 
freedom.228 Although it is impossible to calculate the exact number 
of slaves who escaped bondage during the decade between the en-
actment of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law and the outbreak of the 
Civil War in 1861, estimates range from eight to fifteen thousand.229 
During this same period, only about three hundred fugitives were 
returned to slavery under the auspices of the 1850 Fugitive Slave 
Act.230 Many factors contributed to the fugitive slaves’ ability to 
avoid capture, especially once they were ensconced in free commu-
nities.231 Resistance in the free states, both via efforts to work within 
the law and in outright defiance of it, was one of them. 
1. CONTINUED LEGISLATIVE RESISTANCE IN THE FREE STATES 
The free states did not embrace the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. 
Although some political and religious leaders in these states initially 
counseled citizens to follow the law, regardless of their disdain for 
it, resistance grew over time.232 Other events in the nation fed anti-
 
OF SLAVERY 412 (1998) (estimating that approximately 98% of prosecutions un-
der the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 resulted in the fugitive being returned to slav-
ery). 
 228 Schmitt, Immigration Enforcement Reform, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that 
“[a]lthough the federal government vigorously enforced the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850, it was widely perceived to be a failure.”); Foner, What the Fugitive Slave 
Act Teaches Us, supra note 1, (“The draconian law of 1850 didn’t stop the steady 
flow of runaways from the South.”). 
 229 CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 168. Research has suggested that the number 
of runaway slaves in the South may have been understated, particularly on the eve 
of the Civil War. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN SCHWENINGER, 
RUNAWAY SLAVES: REBELS ON THE PLANTATION 282 (1999). In 1860 alone, as 
many as 50,000 slaves may have fled their masters but did not leave the South. 
Id. 
 230 Out of 332 total cases, about 300 alleged fugitives were either “remanded” 
to the South pursuant to a federal court order or were returned to the South “with-
out due process.” CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 207. About thirty alleged fugi-
tives were either found to be free, escaped, or were rescued from federal custody. 
Id. 
 231 See id. at 168–69. 
 232 See Rierson, supra note 21, at 818–22 (describing the evolution of North-
ern opinion in relation to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, from grudging ac-
ceptance to outright defiance). 
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slavery sentiment and increased politicians’ desire and ability to en-
act personal liberty laws that—at least in certain states—increas-
ingly defied federal law on the subject.233 Most of the personal lib-
erty laws discussed below were adopted after the passage of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.234 The Kansas-Nebraska Act, which 
repudiated the Missouri Compromise by repealing the federal ban 
on slavery in the Northwest Territories,235 was a concession to 
Southerners that generated an “explosion of northern anger” that ul-
timately “transformed the national party system and renewed the 
sectional controversy in all its bitterness.”236 It also generated re-
newed opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.237 Other social 
and political events during the 1850s also contributed to anti-slavery 
sentiment in the Northern free states, including the publication of 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin in 1852,238 Preston Brooks’ assault on Charles 
Sumner in the Senate in 1856,239 and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Dred Scott v. Sandford in 1857.240 All of these events influenced 
 
 233 See id. at 834 (“Although many white citizens in the free states opposed 
slavery in the mid-nineteenth century, few would have accepted the label of ‘abo-
litionist,’ defined as one who advocated the immediate and total abolition of slav-
ery, even in the southern states.”). Few anti-slavery Northerners wanted to elimi-
nate slavery in the South; instead they were determined to prevent the spread of 
slavery to the Territories. Id. at 838. Their objections to the institution of slavery 
were primarily founded on a “free labor” philosophy, not a moral critique of the 
institution. See id. at 838–44; see also ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE 
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 54–58 
(1970) (describing reasons for intense Republican opposition to the spread of slav-
ery into the Territories). 
 234 See, e.g., Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489, 1855 Mass. Acts 924. 
 235 Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 14, 10 Stat. 277, 282–83. 
 236 FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 236; see DAVID M. POTTER, 
THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 160–76 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976) 
(discussing the legislative history of the Kansas-Nebraska Act). 
 237 See FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 236 (“Enactment of the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill, said one conservative Whig, would mean the ‘complete 
nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law.’”) (citation omitted). 
 238 See infra notes 439–43 and accompanying text. 
 239 See DAVID DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 293–96 (1960); see also Rierson, supra note 21, at 826–28. 
 240 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1856), superseded by constitutional amend-
ment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (holding that Dred Scott was a citizen and there-
fore the Court could not exercise jurisdiction over his lawsuit); see also Paul 
Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of Law, 20 HAMLINE L. 
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public sentiment towards the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which in 
turn inspired numerous states to take legislative action in opposition 
to it.241 
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 did not attempt to compel the 
States to administer it. Rather, the Fugitive Slave Act authorized the 
appointment of federal commissioners to enforce its own provi-
sions.242 In 1855, Maine and Michigan passed new laws forbidding 
cooperation with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.243 The language 
used in Maine’s statute was essentially identical to that contained in 
the non-cooperative personal liberty laws passed earlier by Massa-
chusetts, Vermont, and Rhode Island.244 As discussed above, these 
laws prohibited use of state resources to pursue and capture fugitive 
slaves on their soil, primarily (1) the state judiciary; (2) state depu-
ties and other law enforcement officers; and (3) state jails and other 
facilities for holding prisoners.245 
Other personal liberty laws passed after the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Congress’s adoption of the 1850 
 
REV. 1, 30–33 (1996) (discussing the impact the Dred Scott decision had on slav-
ery); ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN 
SLAVERY 92–98 (2010) (discussing Republican reactions to the Dred Scott deci-
sion); Rierson, supra note 21, at 828–32 (discussing the Dred Scott opinion and 
the reaction to it in the Northern states). 
 241 See infra notes 243–69. 
 242 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 1–2, 9 Stat. 462, 462. 
 243 See Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch, 182, §§ 1–2, 1855 Me. Laws 207, 207–08; 
Act of Nov. 13, 1850, No. 16, §§ 3, 6, 1855 Vt. Acts & Resolves 9, 9–10. 
 244 Compare Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch. 182, 1855 Me. Laws 207, with Act of 
Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, 1843 Mass. Acts 33, and Act of Nov. 1, 1843, No. 15, 1843 
Vt. Acts & Resolves 11, and Act of Jan. 13, 1848, 1848 R.I. Acts & Resolves 12. 
Maine’s law additionally clarified that it did not permit anyone to “hinder or ob-
struct” a U.S. marshal or any federal official from enforcing the Fugitive Slave 
Law. Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch. 182, § 4, 1855 Me. Laws 207, 208. 
 245 See supra notes 168–172 and accompanying text (discussing personal lib-
erty laws of Massachusetts, Vermont, and Rhode Island). The law passed in Mich-
igan focused solely on law enforcement officers and jails; it did not address the 
use of state judicial officers in Fugitive Slave Act cases. Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 
162, § 5, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413, 414 (“No person arrested and claimed as a 
fugitive slave shall be imprisoned in any jail or other prison in this State . . . .”); 
Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 163, § 1, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 415, 415 (“[N]othing in 
this [statute] . . . shall be construed to authorize or require any sheriff or other 
officer to receive into or detain . . . in any of said jails or other public buildings, 
any person claimed as a fugitive slave . . . .”). 
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Fugitive Slave Act appeared to either ignore or narrowly interpret 
these federal authorities.246 These personal liberty laws focused 
again on extending procedural protections to those who were ac-
cused of being fugitive slaves.247 Some states, like Michigan, passed 
such laws in concert with the non-cooperative personal liberty laws 
described above.248 Michigan’s statute, passed in 1855, guaranteed 
a person accused of being a fugitive slave the right to seek review 
of detention decisions via the writ of habeas corpus and a jury 
trial.249 Vermont, which had repealed its statute guaranteeing proce-
dural protections to alleged fugitives in 1840 (in the same statute 
that mandated non-cooperation with the federal government),250 re-
instated some of these procedural protections in 1850, including the 
writ of habeas corpus and the right to a trial by jury.251 
Other statutes passed in the 1850’s granted further procedural 
protections that directly contravened the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act,252 
which required commissioners to “hear and determine” fugitive 
slave cases “in a summary manner; and upon satisfactory proof be-
ing made, by deposition or affidavit.”253 Connecticut, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin passed laws mandating that testi-
mony by deposition could not be offered at a trial regarding a per-
son’s slave status.254 These same states, along with Michigan, also 
required that any declaration offered to establish a person’s enslave-
ment required the support of the testimony of “at least two credible 
 
 246 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch. 182, 1855 Me. Laws 207. 
 247 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, §§ 3–4, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413, 
414. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Act of Nov. 1, 1843, No. 15, 1843 Vt. Acts & Resolves 11. 
 251 Act of Nov. 13, 1850, No. 16, §§ 3, 6, 1850 Vt. Acts & Resolves 9, 9–10. 
 252 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch. 182, 1855 Me. Laws 207. 
 253 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463–64. 
 254 Act of June 30, 1854, ch. 65, § 4, 1854 Conn. Pub. Acts 80, 81; Act of Nov. 
14, 1854, No. 52, § 3, 1854 Vt. Acts & Resolves 51, 52; Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 
489, § 6, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 925–26; Act of Feb. 23, 1857, ch. 8, § 9, 1857 
Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 14. 
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witnesses.”255 Some states also specified that giving false testimony 
as to a person’s slave status was a criminal offense.256 
Some personal liberty laws attempted to ensure that those ac-
cused of being fugitive slaves had meaningful access to the courts 
in that state.257 Over a hundred years before the Supreme Court held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to provide indigent 
criminal defendants with access to counsel,258 New York, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin passed laws instructing state of-
ficials, typically a prosecutor, to provide free legal representation to 
persons accused of being runaway slaves.259 New York and Ver-
mont also statutorily mandated that alleged fugitive slaves could 
subpoena witnesses free of charge.260 By passing these laws, states 
recognized that without legal counsel and meaningful access to 
 
 255 Act of June 30, 1854, ch. 65, § 2, 1854 Conn. Pub. Acts 80, 80; Act of Nov. 
14, 1854, No. 52, § 2, 1854 Vt. Acts & Resolves 51, 52; Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 
489, § 6, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 925–26; Act of Feb. 23, 1857, ch. 8, § 8, 1857 
Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 13–14; Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, § 8, 1855 Mich. Pub. 
Acts 413, 414–15. 
 256 See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1854, ch. 65, § 1, 1854 Conn. Pub. Acts 80, 80 
(imposing criminal penalties on anyone “who shall falsely and maliciously de-
clare, represent or pretend, that any free person” is a slave, “with intent to procure 
or to aid or assist in procuring the forcible removal of such free person from this 
State as a slave”); Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, § 6, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413, 
414 (same); Act of Feb. 23, 1857, ch. 8, § 7, 1857 Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 13 (same). 
 257 See, e.g., Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489, § 17, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 928. 
 258 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (holding that indigent 
criminal defendants charged with serious crimes are entitled to legal representa-
tion in state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 259 Act of May 6, 1840, ch, 225, § 9, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 175–76 (providing 
that the County district attorney must “render his advice and professional ser-
vices” to alleged fugitive slaves, and “shall attend in his behalf on the trial of such 
claim”; attorney fees were paid by the county); Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489, 
§ 17, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 928 (requiring the governor to appoint, in every 
county, a commissioner who would “diligently and faithfully . . . use all lawful 
means to protect, defend, and secure to [alleged fugitive slaves] a fair and impar-
tial trial by jury”); Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 163, § 1, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 415, 
415; (requiring prosecuting attorneys to “diligently and faithfully . . . use all law-
ful means to protect and defend” any inhabitant of their respective counties who 
is “arrested or claimed as a fugitive slave”); Act Feb. 23, 1857, ch. 8, § 2, 1857 
Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 12 (same). 
 260 See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1840, ch, 225, § 10, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 176; Act 
of Oct. 29, 1840, No. 8, § 7, 1840 Vt. Acts & Resolves 13, 14. 
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courts, black citizens accused of being fugitive slaves stood no 
chance of preserving their freedom. 
The personal liberty law that went the farthest in terms of pun-
ishing those who assisted with enforcement of the Fugitive Slave 
Act was adopted by Massachusetts in 1855261 over the veto of Gov-
ernor Henry Gardner, a member of the Know-Nothing Party.262 Its 
most controversial provisions were repealed in 1858.263 The law 
passed in 1855 forbade any person “holding any office of honor, 
trust, or emolument, under the laws of this Commonwealth” from 
serving a warrant or issuing a certificate to enforce the Fugitive 
Slave Act.264 Anyone who violated this provision was deemed to 
have resigned his office, and was “forever thereafter ineligible to 
[hold] any office of trust, honor or emolument” in the state.265 Any 
judge who acted as a federal commissioner in a Fugitive Slave Act 
case could be impeached.266 Any lawyer who represented a claim-
ant/slaveholder in a Fugitive Slave Act case could no longer appear 
in the courts of the Commonwealth.267 Any law enforcement officer 
who arrested or detained an alleged fugitive slave was subject to a 
$1000 to $2000 fine and required to serve one to two years in state 
prison.268 Three years later, these controversial provisions were ei-
ther repealed or amended to clarify that punishment would not apply 
to acts of “military obedience and subordination.”269 
These non-cooperative personal liberty laws sought to fill the 
space left by the Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg and to minimize 
free states’ participation in the system of slavery that permeated the 
South. Many states also sought to legislatively enhance due process 
in fugitive slave rendition, despite the Supreme Court’s instruction 
that such laws were invalid on grounds of federal preemption. Ulti-
mately, these efforts were not effective in protecting individuals 
who were arrested and charged under the Fugitive Slave Acts, only 
a tiny fraction of whom were found to be free. Defiance of the law, 
 
 261 Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489, 1855 Mass. Acts 924. 
 262 See MORRIS, supra note 41, at 168–71. 
 263 Act of Mar. 27, 1858, ch. 175, 1858 Mass. Acts 151. 
 264 Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489, § 9, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 926. 
 265 Id. § 10. 
 266 Id. § 12. 
 267 Id. § 11. 
 268 Id. § 15. 
 269 Act of Mar. 27, 1858, ch. 175, 1858 Mass. Acts 151. 
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rather than attempts to reform it, secured freedom on behalf of hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of individuals, very few of whom were ever 
prosecuted under the Fugitive Slave Acts. 
2. SLAVE RESCUES AND JURY NULLIFICATION 
The personal liberty laws described above represented just one 
form of resistance to the activity of “slave catching” in the free 
states. Some citizens, who answered to a “higher law” than the Fu-
gitive Slave Acts, actively sought to thwart slaveholders who at-
tempted to capture former slaves living on free soil. Prosecutors who 
sought to convict these abolitionists for violating the Fugitive Slave 
Acts, or for more serious crimes, often faced juries who refused to 
convict. These well-publicized clashes among slave catchers, fugi-
tive slaves, and abolitionists eroded public support for the Fugitive 
Slave Acts in the free states, especially after 1850. As the cost of the 
law’s enforcement grew, so did its repugnance in the eyes of north-
ern citizens. 
During the antebellum era, some opponents of slavery denied 
that they owed any duty to slaveholders, under either the Constitu-
tion or federal law, on the grounds that they were bound by a “higher 
law” that did not recognize slavery. This philosophy was famously 
articulated by New York Senator William Seward, who proclaimed 
the following on the floor of the Senate during debates regarding the 
status of slavery in the proposed new state of California: 
the Constitution devotes the domain [of the territo-
ries] to union, to justice, to defence, to welfare, and 
to liberty. But there is a higher law than the Consti-
tution, which regulates our authority over the do-
main, and devotes it to the same noble purposes. The 
territory is a part . . . of the common heritage of man-
kind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the Uni-
verse.270 
 
 270 CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1446 (1850) (emphasis added); see 
also DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 146–48 (2005) (discussing Seward’s speech); FONER, 
GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 87 (noting Lincoln’s rejection of the 
“higher law” doctrine). References to a “higher law” were also part of the rhetoric 
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Although Seward did not urge defiance of federal law in this 
speech, others did. Defense attorney Albert Riddle unapologetically 
espoused allegiance to the “higher law” in court, in a legal proceed-
ing stemming from an incident known as the Oberlin-Wellington 
rescue.271 Although thirty-seven indictments for violations of the 
Fugitive Slave Act were obtained in this case, most of the indict-
ments were abandoned, and only two individuals were convicted.272 
In defending the men who assisted fugitive slave John Price in his 
escape to freedom,273 Riddle declared himself a “votary” of the 
“Higher Law,” arguing, “Right, and its everlasting opposite, Wrong, 
existed anterior to the feeble enactments of men, and will survive 
their final repeal . . . they are such unchanged and unqualified by 
your acts of Congress, and statutes of your Legislatures.”274 Riddle 
encouraged the jury to reward rather than convict Price’s rescuers, 
who had “follow[ed] the path of conscience” and “obeyed the laws 
of God.”275 After his conviction, defendant Charles Langston, a free 
black man, also eloquently embraced the higher law when he spoke 
to the court, arguing that his actions were honorable and right, “no 
matter what the laws might [be].”276 
The Oberlin-Wellington rescue was but one example of the 
clashes that arose among slaveholders, federal authorities, and 
 
of the American Revolution. Hamilton eloquently espoused this view: “The sa-
cred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or 
musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human 
nature, by the hand of the divinity itself and can never be erased or obscured by 
mortal power.” Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, &c., [23 February] 
1775, NAT’L ARCHIVES FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/docu-
ments/Hamilton/01-01-02-0057. 
 271 See LUBET, supra note 82, at 267–68; see also NAT BRANDT, THE TOWN 
THAT STARTED THE CIVIL WAR 89–111 (1990) (discussing Price slave rescue and 
resistance to slavery in Oberlin, Ohio); Villarruel, supra note 6, at 1437–39 
(same). 
 272 FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 239. 
 273 With the help of Langston and others, Price escaped slavery and fled to 
Canada. LUBET, supra note 82, at 246–47. 
 274 Id. at 267. 
 275 Id. at 267–68. 
 276 Charles Langston’s Speech at the Cuyahoga County Courthouse, 
ELECTRONIC OBERLIN GROUP, http://www2.oberlin.edu/external/EOG/Oberlin-
Wellington_Rescue/c._langston_speech.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2020). Charles 
Langston’s grandson was the acclaimed poet Langston Hughes. See FAITH 
BERRY, LANGSTON HUGHES, BEFORE AND BEYOND HARLEM 2 (1992). 
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northern citizens when abolitionists attempted to physically block 
enforcement of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law in their states (with 
varying degrees of success). Many of the most well publicized slave 
rescues occurred in Massachusetts. Early attempts to enforce this 
federal law in Boston were unsuccessful: William and Ellen Craft, 
prominent Boston abolitionists who had fled slavery in Georgia, 
evaded slavecatchers just weeks after passage of the 1850 Fugitive 
Slave Law.277 The Crafts ultimately settled in England, where they 
continued to protest slavery.278 Shadrach Minkins, a former Virginia 
slave who worked as a waiter at a Boston coffee shop, evaded at-
tempts to re-enslave him when members of the black community 
forcibly removed him from the federal courtroom in Boston and then 
hid him so that he could escape to Canada.279 Although ten defend-
ants were criminally charged in Minkins’ escape (three white and 
seven black men), none were convicted.280 Another former slave 
from Georgia, Thomas Sims, was not so fortunate. Sims was seized 
on April 3, 1851, and tried before federal commissioner George 
Ticknor Curtis in Boston.281 Ultimately, in spite of much legal ma-
neuvering by the anti-slavery bar, Curtis issued a certificate author-
izing Sims’ return to slavery in Savannah, Georgia.282 To avoid an-
other escape and to ensure successful enforcement of the federal 
law, a heavy chain was placed around the Boston courthouse. 283 
Sims was marched from the federal courthouse to a south-bound 
ship at 4:00 AM, escorted by three hundred armed men.284 Sims’ 
 
 277 See LUBET, supra note 82, at 267–68. 
 278 Id. at 47–49, 134–35. 
 279 See id. at 137–41. 
 280 See id. at 141–46. 
 281 Id. at 147–48; CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 117–21 (discussing Sims’s 
arrest and rendition to slavery). 
 282 See LUBET, supra note 82, at 149–55. After he was forced to return to 
Georgia, Sims was jailed and ultimately sold to a brick mason in Vicksburg, Mis-
sissippi, from whom he escaped in 1863, during the Civil War. CAMPBELL, supra 
note 227, at 120. 
 283 See LUBET, supra note 82, at 149–49; see also COVER, supra note 20, at 
176 (noting that an abolitionist newspaper, The Liberator, proclaimed, “Justice in 
Chains.”) 
 284 See LUBET, supra note 82, at 155; see also FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, 
supra note 34, at 234. 
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rendition to slavery cost the federal government approximately 
$20,000.285 
The arrest and rendition of another fugitive slave in Boston, An-
thony Burns, further aroused public sentiment against slavery in the 
Northeast.286 After Burns’ arrest, a mob stormed the courthouse in a 
violent, yet ultimately futile, attempt to free him.287  During the at-
tempt to free Burns from federal custody, a U.S. Marshal was 
killed.288 An estimated crowd of 10,000 people subsequently gath-
ered around the courthouse for the trial.289 After Burns was con-
victed of being a fugitive slave, federal troops marched him to the 
harbor through the streets of Boston, which were draped in black. 290 
The federal power displayed in Boston on behalf of the Southern 
slaveholder who claimed to own Anthony Burns was even more 
“formidable and costly” than in the Sims case.291 American flags 
were hung  at half-mast and a coffin labeled “The Funeral of Lib-
erty” was displayed over State Street.292 At an antislavery rally held 
at Faneuil Hall in Boston soon after Burns was returned to slavery 
 
 285 See LUBET, supra note 82, at 155; see also FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, 
supra note 34, at 234. In an apparent reference to the arrest and rendition of 
Thomas Sims, Maine Republican John Perry remarked on the House floor in 1860 
that the “Boston court-house has been put in chains, and the peaceable people of 
that State kept out of the temple of justice by Federal bayonets, and the Treasury 
of the United States robbed of its thousands and tens of thousands to pay the bills 
for returning a fugitive slave.” CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034, 1036 
(1860). Perry’s point in making this observation was to demonstrate that Northern 
citizens had enforced the Fugitive Slave Law, despite the heavy burden of doing 
so, in response to Southern claims that they had failed to uphold their Constitu-
tional duty in this respect. See id. at 1035 (“[Y]ou charge us with numerous dere-
lictions in duty [under the Constitution]; we charge them back upon you.”). 
 286 See CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 124–32 (discussing arrest, trial, and ren-
dition of Anthony Burns); LUBET, supra note 82, at 159–67 (same); see generally 
ALBERT J. VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF ANTHONY BURNS: FREEDOM AND 
SLAVERY IN EMERSON’S BOSTON (1998); JANE H. PEASE & WILLIAM H. PEASE, 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW AND ANTHONY BURNS: A PROBLEM IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 43 (1975); Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves, supra 
note 97. 
 287 CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 126. 
 288 Id. at 127. 
 289 Id. at 128. 
 290 Id. at 129. 
 291 FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 237. 
 292 Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1795 
2020] FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 647 
 
in Virginia, abolitionist Wendell Phillips said, “Nebraska I call 
knocking a man down, and this [the arrest and extradition of An-
thony Burns] is spitting in his face after he is down.”293 Despite at-
tempts to prosecute those who were involved in the rioting and in 
the death of the marshal during Anthony Burns’ arrest, trial, and re-
turn to slavery, no one was convicted.294 
The need for federal intervention to enforce the Fugitive Slave 
Law was not isolated to Boston. One of the most violent confronta-
tions between the federal authorities and abolitionists occurred in 
Christiana, Pennsylvania, on September 11, 1851, soon after the 
passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law.295 A Maryland slaveholder, 
Edward Gorsuch, his relatives, and a deputy marshal attempted to 
reclaim two alleged fugitive slaves from the home of a free black 
person, William Parker.296 A group of black men armed with guns 
and clubs assembled at Parker’s home, and they refused to surrender 
the alleged fugitives.297 Shooting ensued, leaving Gorsuch and three 
black men dead, with several others injured.298 President Millard 
Filmore sent the Marines and federal marshals to arrest those re-
sponsible.299 A federal grand jury indicted thirty-six blacks and five 
whites for violating the Fugitive Slave Act and for treason; however, 
no one was convicted.300 
These incidents, in conjunction with political developments—
chief among them the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act—both 
molded and mirrored public opinion in the free states regarding slav-
ery. Resistance to the institution of slavery, at least as to Southern-
ers’ attempts to capture and enslave (or re-enslave) those living on 
free soil, was thus not significantly impeded by the 1850 Fugitive 
Slave Act, but ultimately encouraged by it. 
 
 293 FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 237. Phillips’ reference to 
Nebraska alluded to passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. 
 294 Id.   
 295 See CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 151–53; LUBET, supra note 82, at 51–
52; see generally THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, BLOODY DAWN: THE CHRISTIANA RIOT 
AND RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH (1991) (detailing the events 
leading up to, during, and after the Christiana Riot). 
 296 CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 151. 
 297 Id. at 152; see also LUBET, supra note 84, at 52. 
 298 CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 152. 
 299 FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 146. 
 300 Id. 
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II. FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: THE 
PRESENT ECHOES THE PAST 
In many ways, the modern conflict between federal immigration 
laws and state sanctuary policies echoes the crisis of federalism en-
gendered by the clash between the Fugitive Slave Acts and state per-
sonal liberty laws. In each case, the federal government has enacted 
laws or enforced laws in ways that deviate from the mores of indi-
vidual citizens (at least those living in certain states). Both then and 
now, some states have enacted laws that attempt to reflect and pro-
tect the values of the people living within their borders. The extent 
to which these state and federal laws can peacefully co-exist pre-
sents a thorny legal and ethical issue today, just as it did approxi-
mately 150 years ago. 
A. The Higher Law Fuels Resistance to Federal Enforcement 
on Moral Grounds 
A law that deviates sharply from the beliefs and mores of the 
citizens it purports to regulate has lost its moral legitimacy, and thus 
some people will defy it.301 This phenomenon played out in the an-
tebellum era, as many Northern citizens were confronted with a fed-
eral Fugitive Slave Law that opened their borders to the institution 
of slavery, undermining their core values with respect to freedom 
and humanity. In the modern era, many citizens similarly believe 
that federal immigration laws are being enforced in ways that are 
inhumane and destructive to fundamental notions of human dignity. 
In both contexts, some of those who perceive the applicable federal 
law as immoral or unjust will reject the law and refuse to follow it.302 
 
 301 Rierson, supra note 25, at 768 (observing that “the greater the disparity 
between the conduct demanded by law and the underlying social norm, the greater 
the possibility that the governed will reject or rebel against the law and, conse-
quently, that the law will have limited effectiveness.”); see also ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 137–47 
(1991) (arguing that “legal centralism,” the primacy of law in shaping human be-
havior, has been overstated); see generally Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. 
Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
 302 See generally Villarruel, supra note 6; Pamela Begaj, Comment, An Anal-
ysis of Historical and Legal Sanctuary and a Cohesive Approach to the Current 
Movement, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 135 (2008). See also BRANDT, supra note 
271, at xiii (comparing the abolitionist community in Oberlin, Ohio to the Sanc-
tuary movement of the 1980’s). Similar networks of individuals willing to defy 
2020] FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 649 
 
If the underlying law is unjust, the argument then goes, good citizens 
should not support it and are not morally bound to follow or enforce 
the law.303 
The federal laws at issue in the context of both immigration and 
slavery expressly anticipate and forbid resistance to their enforce-
ment. As discussed above, anyone who assisted in the escape of a 
runaway slave could be imprisoned and/or forced to pay a signifi-
cant fine under either the 1793 or 1850 version of the Fugitive Slave 
Act. The 1793 Act imposed a $500 fine on anyone who “knowingly 
and willingly” obstructed or hindered attempts to seize and arrest a 
fugitive slave or who concealed or harbored a known fugitive 
slave.304 The 1850 Act went farther, both in terms of prohibited con-
duct and its penalties.305 It contained the same language noted above 
from the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793;306 in addition, it imposed lia-
bility on anyone who rescued or attempted to rescue a fugitive slave, 
or who aided, abetted, or assisted in the escape of a fugitive slave, 
either “directly or indirectly.” 307 A person who violated these pro-
visions risked six months imprisonment and up to $1000 in fines and 
civil penalties.308 
Modern immigration law echoes the Fugitive Slave Acts with 
regard to the harboring or concealment of those the law targets for 
exclusion. The anti-harboring provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) impose criminal penalties on anyone who 
knowingly “conceals, harbors, or shields from detection” an alien 
who “has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in viola-
tion of law,” or attempts to do so.309 To prove a violation of the 
INA’s harboring provisions, the government must show 
 
unjust laws existed in Europe during World War II, saving thousands of Jews from 
death during the Holocaust. See LINDA RABBEN, SANCTUARY AND ASYLUM: A 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 108–21 (2016). 
 303 See Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance, and 
the Value of ‘Justice Delayed,’ 78 IOWA L. REV. 89, 89 (1992) (noting that “[i]f 
the law itself is unjust, then its enforcement may be equally unjust.”). 
 304 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 302, 305. 
 305 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 306 Compare Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, with Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 307 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 7, 9 Stat. 462, 464. 
 308 Id. 
 309 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2018). 
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(1) the alien entered or remained in the United States 
in violation of the law, (2) the defendant concealed, 
harbored or sheltered the alien in the United States, 
(3) the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that 
the alien entered or remained in the United States in 
violation of the law, and (4) the defendant’s conduct 
tended to substantially facilitate the alien remaining 
in the United States illegally.310 
Violation of these provisions constitutes a felony, punishable by 
a fine and up to five years imprisonment.311 The individuals who 
violate these laws generally do so intentionally—and sometimes 
openly—because they reject the law’s legitimacy.312 
Abolitionists who shepherded former slaves to freedom during 
the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, like Harriet Tub-
man and Frederick Douglass, made no pretense of obeying the Fu-
gitive Slave Laws or any other statutory authority that sanctioned 
slavery.313 As discussed above, well-publicized incidents such as the 
freeing of Shadrach Minkins in Boston, the Oberlin-Wellington 
Rescue, and the violent confrontation at Christiana, Pennsylvania, 
demonstrated that some opponents of slavery were willing to openly 
defy state and federal laws with respect to slavery and fugitive 
slaves.314 Sometimes referred to as the Underground Railroad, the 
collection of people who chose to violate the Fugitive Slave Acts in 
 
 310 United States v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also 
John Medeiros & Philip Steger, Sanctuary and Harboring in Trump’s America, 
44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 869, 885–900 (2018) (discussing the definition 
of “harboring” under INA). 
 311 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii). The penalties significantly increase if aliens 
are harbored for private financial gain (up to ten years imprisonment), or if serious 
bodily injury occurs as a result of the defendant’s conduct (up to twenty years 
imprisonment). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii). If a person is killed as a result 
of defendant’s conduct in violation of the statute, the defendant may be subject to 
the death penalty or life in prison. 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(B)(iv). 
 312 See, e.g., Lorne Matalon, Extending ‘Zero Tolerance’ to People Who Help 
Migrants Along the Border, NPR (May 28, 2019, 4:22 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/05/28/725716169/extending-zero-tolerance-to-peo-
ple-who-help-migrants-along-the-border. 
 313 See generally FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39. 
 314 See supra Section I.E.2. 
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favor of allegiance to God’s “higher law” risked prosecution and 
imprisonment. In some communities, the broader populace shared 
these beliefs, as evidenced by numerous examples of jury nullifica-
tion in such cases.315 
Willingness to defy an unjust law—also known as civil disobe-
dience—is also part and parcel of the state/federal conflict embed-
ded in modern immigration law. Beginning in the 1980s and contin-
uing to the present in the Trump era, defiance of federal immigration 
law, especially in religious communities, reflects the judgment of 
those communities that these laws are immoral and unjust, just as 
similar communities rejected the laws of slavery and the Fugitive 
Slave Acts over 150 years ago. As federal immigration law has 
waxed and waned in its enforcement severity, it has to varying de-
grees conflicted with the mores of the people who live in the states 
where the laws are being enforced. For example, the Sanctuary 
Movement in the United States relies on “God’s law” to justify of-
fering shelter and support to immigrants who may face death or per-
secution if they are deported. Like the slave rescuers, these individ-
uals, who are often religious leaders, risk and have faced criminal 
prosecution. 
The most well-documented immigration sanctuary movement in 
the United States arose during the 1980s. Like the conductors on the 
Underground Railroad, the leaders of this movement spurned fed-
eral laws they deemed to be fundamentally unfair and sinful.316 The 
Sanctuary Movement arose from the Reagan administration’s treat-
ment of immigrants from Central America, primarily El Salvador 
 
 315 See supra notes 272, 280, 294, & 285 and accompanying text.  
 316 See Valerie J. Munson, On Holy Ground:  Church Sanctuary in the Trump 
Era, 47 SOUTHWESTERN L. REV. 49, 52–53 (2017); Begaj, supra note 302, at 141–
45; Michael Scott Feeley, Towards the Cathedral: Ancient Sanctuary Represented 
in the American Context, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 819–24 (1990); Villarruel, 
supra note 6, at 1433–35. A leader of the movement, Pastor John Fife, explained, 
We believe that justice and mercy require that people of con-
science actively assert our God-given right to aid anyone flee-
ing from persecution and murder. The current administration of 
the United States law prohibits us from sheltering these refu-
gees from Central America. Therefore we believe that admin-
istration of the law is immoral as well as illegal. 
Arthur Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States 
Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 493, 502 (1986). 
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and Guatemala.317 During this time period, the United States largely 
refused to grant asylum to individuals fleeing these countries.318 Out 
of approximately 5500 applications for asylum submitted by Salva-
dorans in 1981 and 1982, the United States granted two.319 As ad-
vocates began to realize that individuals fleeing these countries 
could not obtain safe haven in the United States through asylum pro-
cedures administered by the INS, they adopted a new strategy of 
evading immigration laws rather than adhering to them.320 By the 
mid-1980s, approximately five hundred churches and synagogues 
across the country had declared themselves sanctuaries for Central 
Americans seeking refuge in the United States.321 These religious 
havens sought to provide “physical and spiritual assistance” to Cen-
tral American refugees, and often placed them with sponsoring con-
gregations to ease their transition to life in the United States.322 
The federal government’s tolerance of the church-led sanctuary 
movement ended in 1984, when federal prosecutors conducted an 
 
 317 Munson, supra note 316, at 52; Begaj, supra note 302, at 141–45; Feeley, 
supra note 316, at 819–21; Villarruel, supra note 6, at 1433–34. 
 318 Begaj, supra note 302, at 145 (describing the Sanctuary Movement as a 
“‘dramatic response to the refusal of the United States Government to grant legal 
sanctuary, or asylum’ to immigrants facing deportation.”) (citation omitted); Fee-
ley, supra note 316, at 820 (noting that “[i]n spite of an energetic legal advocacy 
program, the INS deported Salvadorans and Guatemalans in droves” during the 
early 1980’s). 
 319 Feeley, supra note 316, at 817, 820 (comparing Salvadoran and Guatema-
lan asylum approval rates in 1983 and 1985, ranging from one percent to three 
percent, with much higher rates for applicants from other countries); Medeiros & 
Steger, supra note 310, at 877–78 (citing similar statistics). 
 320 See Feeley, supra note 316, at 820; see also Medeiros & Steger, supra note 
310, at 878–79 (noting that the movement “transitioned from working within the 
law to exploring more options that posed higher legal risks” after discovering that 
its efforts to secure asylum were “futile”). 
 321 Munson, supra note 316, at 53; see also Feeley, supra note 316, at 820 
(noting that “several hundred churches [had] openly declared themselves sanctu-
aries”); Medeiros & Steger, supra note 310, at 880 (noting that “[b]y the fall of 
1983, the number of sanctuary sites throughout America rose to almost 70, and 
by the summer of 1984 grew to more than 150, with thousands of individuals 
committed to the movement”) 
 322 Feeley, supra note 316, at 820; see also Munson, supra note 316, at 52–53 
(noting that sanctuaries provided lodging to refugees and “aided them in obtaining 
medical, legal, and other needed services.”); Helton, supra note 316, at 493. 
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undercover sting ironically named “Operation Sojourner,”323 refer-
encing the former slave and conductor on the Underground Rail-
road, Sojourner Truth.324 Operation Sojourner employed four under-
cover agents to infiltrate church congregations, where they surrepti-
tiously gathered evidence.325 As a result, several religious leaders 
(including Catholic priests, a nun, and a Presbyterian minister) were 
arrested, indicted, and ultimately convicted of violating INA’s anti-
harboring provisions.326 
In upholding these convictions, the Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Aguilar described the sanctuary movement as “a modern-
day underground railroad that smuggled Central American natives 
across the Mexican border with Arizona.”327 In this case, which the 
prosecutor dubbed the “death knell of the Sanctuary Movement,”328 
the Ninth Circuit refused to allow the defendants to argue that they 
had not “knowingly” violated federal immigration law because they 
honestly believed that the aliens they were assisting were legally en-
titled to remain in the United States.329 Specifically, the defendants 
argued that they believed these individuals qualified as refugees un-
der the Refugee Act of 1980330 due to the individuals’ well-founded 
fear of persecution in their home countries.331 The Ninth Circuit de-
termined that to allow such a defense would essentially “put Reagan 
Administration foreign policy on trial” in the context of the criminal 
case.332 The court also rejected the argument that the defendants’ 
activities were protected as religious exercise under the First 
 
 323 Medeiros & Steger, supra note 310, at 882; Feeley, supra note 316, at 821. 
 324 Sojourner Truth was a former slave from New York who settled in Battle 
Creek, Michigan, in 1857, where she assisted runaway slaves on the Underground 
Railroad. See generally SOJOURNER TRUTH, NARRATIVE OF SOJOURNER TRUTH, 
A NORTHERN SLAVE (1850). 
 325 Feeley, supra note 316, at 821; see also Medeiros & Steger, supra note 
310, at 882. 
 326 Feeley, supra note 316, at 821–22; see also United States v. Aguilar, 883 
F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 327 Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 666. 
 328 Medeiros & Steger, supra note 310, at 882. 
 329 Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 673. 
 330 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982). 
 331 See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 673–76. 
 332 Id. at 673. 
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Amendment.333 The jury convicted all of the defendants, who were 
then sentenced to probation and did not serve jail time.334 
Although more recent examples of religious sanctuary have not 
had the same level of impact as the widespread movement of the 
1980s, they do still exist.335 In fact, the number of places of worship 
acting as immigration sanctuaries has more than doubled since the 
 
 333 Id. at 684–85. But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 
719–26 (2014)) (holding that a contraception mandate would violate a corpora-
tion’s right to free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §2000(b)(b), enacted 1993); Elizabeth Brown & Inara 
Scott, Sanctuary Corporations: Should Liberal Corporations Get Religion?, 20 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1101, 1121–38 (2018) (arguing for a corporate right to offer 
sanctuary under  the RFRA). 
 334 Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 667. 
 335 See, e.g., Stephanie McCrummen, A Sanctuary of One, WASH. POST (Mar. 
31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp 
/2018/03/31/feature/after-30-years-in-america-she-was-about-to-be-deported-
then-a-tiny-colorado-church-offered-her-sanctuary/ (describing one woman’s de-
cision to seek sanctuary from deportation by living in a small Colorado church); 
see also Jason Hanna, Can Churches Provide Legal Sanctuary to Undocumented 
Immigrants?, CNN (Feb. 17, 2017) (discussing the growing number of churches 
willing to provide sanctuary to undocumented immigrants in the Trump era); Lau-
rie Goodstein, Houses of Worship Poised to Serve as Trump-Era Immigrant Sanc-
tuaries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/12/27/us/houses-of-worship-poised-to-serve-as-trump-era-im-
migrant-sanctuaries.html. (same). One website, action.groundswell-mvmt.org, 
has collected over 40,000 signatures through various campaigns, supporting a re-
surgent sanctuary movement. Sanctuary Movement, GROUNDSWELL, https://ac-
tion.groundswell-mvmt.org/efforts/sanctuary2014?page=2 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2020). It describes its mission as follows: 
Calling upon the ancient traditions of our faiths, which recog-
nized houses of worship as a refuge for the runaway slave, the 
conscientious objector, and the Central American refugee flee-
ing the civil wars of the 1980s, Sanctuary is once again growing 
among communities of faith that are standing in solidarity with 
immigrants and marginalized communities facing immoral and 
unjust deportation and discrimination policies. 
Id. The religious sanctuary phenomenon is not limited to the United States. See, 
e.g., Richard Perez-Pena, 5 Weeks and Counting: Dutch Church Holds Worship 
Marathon to Protect Migrant Family, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/world/europe/bethel-church-netherlands-
deportation.html (describing the efforts of one Dutch church to prevent the depor-
tation of an Armenian family who was denied asylum in that country). 
2020] FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 655 
 
inauguration of President Trump.336 The federal government has not 
aggressively cracked down on these efforts to provide safe harbor 
within the confines of houses of worship, most likely because of the 
negative publicity that would almost certainly accompany Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (“DHS”) raids on churches and syna-
gogues.337 Recently, however, Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (“ICE”) has attempted to coerce self-deportation by issuing 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines to immigrants seeking 
sanctuary in houses of worship for “willfully” remaining in the 
United States and having “connived or conspired” to avoid deporta-
tion.338 
The Trump administration has aggressively prosecuted individ-
uals whom it perceives to have impeded enforcement of federal im-
migration laws. In April 2017, Trump’s then-attorney general, Jef-
ferson Beauregard Sessions,339 issued a memorandum to all federal 
prosecutors instructing them to prioritize cases under the anti-har-
boring provisions of the INA.340 In fiscal year 2018, more than 4500 
 
 336 Medeiros & Steger, supra note 310, at 872 (“In response to the President’s 
hard line stance on immigration, many American churches and other places of 
worship have declared themselves sanctuaries, or safe havens, for undocumented 
and other vulnerable immigrants.”); see also Brown & Scott, supra note 333, at 
1102–03 (noting that, as a result of President Trump’s immigration policies, a 
growing number of institutions have begun to offer “support and refuge” to an 
“increasingly vulnerable immigrant population”). 
 337 The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) avoids 
arresting individuals at “sensitive locations” like a church. Hanna, supra note 335. 
Immigration law professor Stephen Yale-Loehr suggests that ICE “does not like 
to go into churches,” for “publicity reasons.” Id. 
 338 Maria Sacchetti, Trump Administration Threatens Hefty Fines on Immi-
grants Who Elude Deportation, WASH. POST (July 2, 2019, 2:27 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-administration-threatens-
hefty-fines-on-immigrants-who-elude-deportation/2019/07/02/956e2334-9cc2-
11e9-9ed4-c9089972ad5a_story.html. 
 339 Attorney General Jeff Sessions resigned at the request of President Trump 
in November 2018. See Devil Barrett et al., Jeff Sessions Forced Out as Attorney 
General, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/national-security/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-resigns-at-
trumps-request/2018/11/07/d1b7a214-e144-11e8-ab2c-
b31dcd53ca6b_story.html. 
 340 Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jeffrey Sessions to All Federal Prose-
cutors About Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 
17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download. 
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people were charged with violating this section of the statute, a more 
than 30% increase since 2015.341 
The government has also taken an increasingly broad view of 
what constitutes “harboring” an alien, filing criminal charges 
against individuals who have provided food and water to migrants 
in southern border crossing areas. Many border regions are harsh 
deserts, and, since 2001, thousands have died here as they attempted 
to cross the border into the United States.342 A spokesperson for the 
humanitarian aid group No Más Muertes, or No More Deaths, has 
decried the government’s recent “criminalization of humanitarian 
aid work.”343 
The government has criminally charged multiple members of No 
Más Muertes for illegally entering federally protected land—a nec-
essary action for the members to assist migrants in remote desert 
areas.344 For example, in August 2017, four members of the group 
were charged with misdemeanors for leaving canned food and water 
jugs in a federal refuge frequented by migrants.345 A federal magis-
trate judge convicted them in January 2019, finding that the women 
had violated “the national decision to maintain the Refuge in its pris-
tine nature.”346 However, in February of 2020, United States District 
Judge Rosemary Márquez reversed the convictions on the basis that 
the defendants’ actions were protected under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).347 The RFRA was enacted in 1993, four 
years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Aguilar, which rejected a 
 
 341 Matalon, supra note 312. 
 342 Id. 
 343 Asher Stockler, As Trump’s DOJ Prosecutes Aid Worker, Humanitarian 
Groups Promise Continued Support for Migrants, NEWSWEEK (May 29, 2019, 
5:10 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/work-continues-humanitarian-groups-
vow-support-migrants-doj-prosecutes-aid-1438793. 
 344 See Matalon, supra note 312. 
 345 Kristine Phillips, They Left Food and Water for Migrants in the Desert. 
Now They Might Go to Prison, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2019, 2:52 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/01/20/they-left-food-water-mi-
grants-desert-now-they-might-go-prison/. 
 346 Id.  
 347 United States v. Hoffman, No. CR1900693001TUCRM, 2020 WL 531943, 
at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 3, 2020) (holding that defendants’ actions were protected un-
der the RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014)). 
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similar defense based on freedom of religion.348 Whether other 
courts will similarly recognize the provision of life-saving food and 
water to migrants as a religious act, entitled to protection under the 
RFRA, remains to be seen.  
The government has also filed more serious criminal charges 
against individuals offering humanitarian assistance to migrants.  
Scott Warren, a thirty-six-year-old geography teacher and No Más 
Muertes volunteer, was charged with three felonies under the anti-
harboring provisions of the INA in 2018.349 In June 2019, Warren 
was tried by a jury, which deadlocked 8-4 in favor of acquittal.350 
When the government chose to retry the case against Warren in No-
vember of the same year, the jury acquitted him.351 If convicted, 
Warren would have faced up to twenty years in prison.352 In a simi-
lar case, Theresa Todd, a city and county attorney in Marfa, Texas, 
was arrested and detained by Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) officers on suspicion of harboring aliens, because she 
pulled over in her car to help a woman in danger of dying from de-
hydration.353 Whether the Department of Justice will continue to 
prosecute these types of humanitarian activities—and, if it  does, 
whether juries will convict—is an open question. 
The “zero tolerance policy” embraced by the Department of Jus-
tice has also resulted in legal action against a sitting state court judge 
 
 348 United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 684–85 (9th Cir. 1989); see supra 
note 333 and accompanying text. 
 349 United States v. Warren, No. MJ-17-0341-TUC-BGM, 2018 WL 2416188, 
at *1 (D. Ariz. May 29, 2018); see also Miriam Jordan, An Arizona Teacher 
Helped Migrants. Jurors Couldn’t Decide If It Was a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (June 
11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/us/scott-warren-arizona-
deaths.html.. 
 350 Hung Jury in Case Against Scott Warren, NO MORE DEATHS (June 11, 
2019), https://nomoredeaths.org/hung-jury-in-case-against-scott-warren/; see 
also Jordan, supra note 349. 
 351 Teo Armus, After Helping Migrants in the Arizona Desert, an Activist Was 
Charged with a Felony. Now, He’s Been Acquitted, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2019, 
7:03 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/11/21/arizona-activist-
scott-warren-acquitted-charges-helping-migrants-cross-border/. 
 352 Matalon, supra note 312. 
 353 Manny Fernandez, She Stopped to Help Migrants on a Texas Highway. 
Moments Later, She Was Arrested, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/05/10/us/texas-border-good-samaritan.html. 
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in Massachusetts, Judge Shelley M. Richmond Joseph.354 In a case 
described by the media as a “dramatic turn in the long-running clash 
between the Trump administration and state governments that have 
resisted its hard-line approach to immigration,” federal prosecutors 
obtained a grand jury indictment against Judge Joseph due to her 
failure to cooperate with ICE.355 They charged her with obstruction 
of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and obstruction of a federal 
proceeding.356 The judge allegedly orchestrated the exit of a crimi-
nal defendant from the courtroom after he was released from state 
custody via a back door rather than the front, to enable him to avoid 
arrest and deportation.357 Massachusetts Attorney General Martha 
Healey, a Democrat, described the indictment as “a radical and po-
litically motivated attack on our state and the independence of our 
courts.”358 The U.S. Attorney defended the indictment, stating that 
“[w]e cannot pick and choose the federal laws we follow, or use our 
personal views to justify violating the law.”359 Judge Joseph, who 
rejected a plea deal from the federal government, faces up to twenty-
five years in prison if convicted of the obstruction of justice 
charges.360 
The Trump administration’s zero tolerance policy with regard to 
illegal immigration—a category that it has defined to include indi-
viduals who have a legal right to apply for asylum in this country—
 
 354 See Liam Stack, Judge Is Charged with Helping Immigrant Escape ICE at 
Courthouse, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/04/25/us/judge-shelley-joseph-indicted.html. 
 355 See id.; see also Steve Burkholder, Massachusetts Judge and Ex-Official 
Accused of Preventing Migrant’s Arrest by ICE, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2019 7:46 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/massachusetts-judge-and-
ex-official-accused-of-preventing-migrants-arrest-by-ice/2019/04/25/664ed43c-
677e-11e9-82ba-fcfeff232e8f_story.html. 
 356 Indictment at 15–17, United States v. Joseph, No. 19-CR-10141 (D. Mass. 
Apr. 25, 2019), ECF No. 1, 2019 WL 1878050. 
 357 Id. at 10–11. 
 358 Stack, supra note 354. Healey also argued that “[i]t is a bedrock principle 
of our constitutional system that federal prosecutors should not recklessly inter-
fere with the operation of state courts and their administration of justice.” Id. 
 359 Id. 
 360 Jonathan Ng, Judge Shelley Joseph Rejects Deal in ICE Obstruction Case, 
BOS. HERALD (July 24, 2019), https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/07/24/in-
dicted-massachusetts-judge-shelley-joseph-rejects-plea-deal-over-ice-obstruc-
tion-case/ (last updated July 24, 2019, 6:14 PM);  Stack, supra note 354 (noting 
the possibility of a twenty-five year sentence for Judge Joseph). 
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has led to heart-wrenching results. While these policies may appeal 
to President Trump’s base of support among Republican voters, they 
are not widely shared across the country.361 Among Democratic vot-
ers in the states where these laws are being enforced, especially Cal-
ifornia, the rate of disapproval is presumably even higher.362 As the 
gulf between the values reflected in federal policy and those held by 
individuals widens, the incentive to reject and disobey the law ex-
ponentially increases. 
B. Deprivation of Due Process in the Nineteenth Century and 
Today 
While some individuals may be compelled by religious belief or 
internal moral compass to openly defy an unjust law, most citizens 
are unwilling to take this risk. Moreover, some people comply with 
laws that they disagree with, even those that they find to be morally 
repugnant, out of respect for the rule of law. To these individuals, 
the only acceptable way to protest an unjust law is to attempt to 
amend or repeal it via the legislative process. 
Federalism, of course, poses unique challenges in this regard. 
Citizens of an individual state are constrained in their ability to 
change federal law, especially if their views are not shared across 
the United States. They can more easily adopt state laws reflecting 
their own views and values, but these laws are valid only so long as 
they do not conflict with or frustrate the purpose of federal law. With 
respect to both fugitive slaves and immigrants, the concept of fed-
eral supremacy has limited states’ ability to effect change via legis-
lation, as discussed below. 
 
 361 See Aaron Blake, Trump’s Asylum Changes Are Even Less Desired Than 
His Border Wall, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2019, 10:02 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/30/trumps-asylum-changes-
are-even-less-desired-than-his-border-wall/ (noting that, according to a Post-ABC 
poll, only about thirty percent of Americans favor changes to make the process of 
applying for asylum more difficult); Alana Abramson, Most Americans Don’t Ap-
prove of Trump’s Immigration Policies, Poll Finds, TIME (July 6, 2018), 
https://time.com/5332298/trump-immigration-policy-poll/ (discussing a Post-
Schar School poll result showing that approximately sixty percent of American 
do not approve of Trump’s immigration policies). 
 362 See Blake, supra note 361 (noting only 15% of Democrats support parts of 
President Trump’s immigration policies). 
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One aspect of federal legislation that is central to the controver-
sies surrounding both fugitive slaves and undocumented immi-
grants, hinges on the legal status of specific individuals: free versus 
slave; asylee versus excludable alien. As in the antebellum era, some 
people are wrongfully targeted for removal when they have a legal 
right to stay. Some alleged fugitive slaves were free blacks who had 
been kidnapped and sold into slavery.363 Some “illegal aliens” have 
a right to stay in the United States because they have a well-founded 
fear of persecution in their home countries.364 In each instance, the 
law must provide a process to determine the legal status of the indi-
vidual. Under the INA, like the Fugitive Slave Acts, the process to 
determine removal is often wholly inadequate, especially given that 
an incorrect decision can result in serious bodily harm or death to 
the affected person.365 In both instances, federal judicial officers are 
(or were) making these critical decisions with a lesser and inferior 
degree of process than would be accorded in a criminal case.366 The 
doctrine of federal supremacy prevents the states from altering or 
augmenting these federal procedures, but their inadequacy under-
mines public confidence in the laws and increases the difficulty of 
their enforcement. 
1. SLAVE OR FREE? 
As discussed at length above, blacks were afforded very little 
process when they were arrested and accused of being fugitive 
slaves.367 This system almost certainly led to errant results. Because 
there was no right of appeal, it is impossible to tell what percentage 
of individuals arrested and ultimately deported to the South, under 
the auspices of the Fugitive Slave Laws, were in fact free. 
Both the 1793 and 1850 Fugitive Slave Acts failed to guarantee 
any semblance of due process to a person accused of being a fugitive 
 
 363 See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text. 
 364 See infra notes 378–387 and accompanying text. 
 365 Professor Christopher Lasch has similarly drawn a parallel between the 
lack of procedural integrity under the Fugitive Slave Acts and in immigration ren-
dition proceedings. See Lasch, supra note 6, at 220–24 (arguing that the “near 
absolute lack of procedural protections for immigrants in the rendition” causes it 
to mirror the slave rendition process of the antebellum period). 
 366 See infra note 392 and accompanying text.   
 367 See supra Sections I.B & I.E. 
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slave.368 Perhaps most offensive to modern sensibilities, the 1850 
Fugitive Slave Law prohibited the alleged fugitive from testifying 
in her own defense: the accused could not tell the court why she 
believed herself to be free.369 Slaveholders, on the other hand, could 
not be required to provide in-person testimony; instead they could 
establish their putative property interest in another human being by 
simply providing an affidavit.370 Two of the key procedural protec-
tions that were fundamental to antebellum law—the right to trial by 
jury and the right to seek review via the writ of habeas corpus—
were denied to alleged fugitives under federal law.371 States at-
tempted to extend these rights to alleged fugitives long after the Su-
preme Court declared such laws void under the Constitution’s Su-
premacy Clause in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.372 Moreover, there was 
no right of appeal from the decision of a federal commissioner as to 
a person’s slave status under either version of the law.373 If the al-
leged fugitive claimed that the federal commissioner had erred in 
finding him to be a slave, his only legal recourse was to seek justice 
in the courts of the slave state to which he was returned.374 Perhaps 
not surprisingly, this option was not feasible for most slaves, who 
neither had access to courts nor the resources to hire counsel in the 
states where they were enslaved.375 
 
 368 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 369 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463–64. 
 370 Id. 
 371 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 372 See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text; see also Prigg v. Pennsyl-
vania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842). 
 373 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 374 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 stat. 462, 463–64; see also 
Crump & Brophy, supra note 70, at 480–81. 
 375 See Crump & Brophy, supra note 70, at 489 (observing that “even tempo-
rarily and wrongfully enslaved people . . . needed the assistance of powerful white 
people to successfully assert their freedom.”); see also ANDREW FEDE, 
ROADBLOCKS TO FREEDOM: SLAVERY AND MANUMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES 
SOUTH 147–50 (2011). 
662 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:598 
 
2. EXCLUDABLE ALIEN OR ASYLEE? 
Even in the context of a legal system that recognizes slavery, 
legal process should not permit the enslavement of persons who are 
legally free. Similarly, the U.S. government should not deport a per-
son who has a “well-founded fear of persecution” in the country 
from which she is fleeing.376 Under the letter of the law, these indi-
viduals are entitled to remain in the United States.377 However, the 
attainment of this status requires the decision of a court, just as 
courts were called upon to determine whether a black person who 
was apprehended in the mid-nineteenth century was free or a fugi-
tive from slavery. As was the case with fugitive slaves, the cost of 
an errant decision can be fatal.378 
Asylum law, in the United States and many other countries, 
traces its roots to World War II and the Holocaust. As a result of the 
horror unleashed by this war, particularly the genocide resulting in 
the deaths of approximately six million Jewish people, the United 
States and 144 other countries signed a treaty—the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention”).379 
 
 376 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018) (defining the term “refugee”). 
 377 See infra notes 384–388 and accompanying text.  
 378 See Sarah Stillman, When Deportation is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER 
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 2018/01/15/when-depor-
tation-is-a-death-sentence (recounting various instances of refugees who were de-
ported from the United States and subsequently murdered in their home coun-
tries). The article is based on a study conducted by the Global Migration Project 
at the Columbia School of Journalism, which created a database of over sixty 
people who were deported to their deaths or other serious harm. Id.; see also 
C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 633 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring) (noting 
that “[t]he impact of deportation could be persecution, including potential police 
beatings, torture, and sexual assault . . . or gun violence at the hands of gang mem-
bers”); Anthony Asuncion, Note, INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Establishment of a 
More Liberal Asylum Standard, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 915, 919 (1988) (observing 
that the “[r]eality for those wrongfully deported may mean death”). 
 379 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 32, July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]; see also RABBEN, su-
pra note 302, at 122–26 (discussing the Refugee Convention and noting the con-
nection between the Holocaust and the revivification of international human rights 
law). The United States signed the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) in 1968. The Protocol incorporated articles 2 
through 34 of the Refugee Convention and adopted the Convention’s definition 
of refugee. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268; see also 
2020] FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 663 
 
The “core principle” embodied in the Refugee Convention is that of 
non-refoulement, which commands that “a refugee should not be re-
turned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or 
freedom.”380 The treaty defines a refugee as a person who has “a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”381 Under the terms of the Refugee Convention, a person 
who satisfies these criteria cannot be compelled to return to a terri-
tory where she fears threats to her “life or freedom.”382 Thousands 
of would-be Jewish refugees died in the Holocaust because the 
United States and other countries refused to admit them as immi-
grants.383 The Refugee Convention reflects an international consen-
sus that this tragedy should not happen again. 
 
Kristin Garner, Aliens’ Rights to Notification of the Availability of Political Asy-
lum and Assistance of Counsel Affirmed, Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 
F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1990), 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 822, 825–26 (1992) (dis-
cussing the Convention and the Protocol). 
 380 The 1951 Refugee Convention, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html (last visited Mar. 16, 
2020); see also 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 379, art. 33. Non-re-
foulement was first recognized as a principle of international law when it was 
embodied in the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees of 
1933. See Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees art. 3, Oct. 
28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199. However, only eight countries signed this treaty (Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, France, Italy, Norway, and Czechoslovakia), 
and it applied only to a narrow category of Russian and Armenian refugees. Id. 
art. 1; see also Henry Mascia, Comment, A Reconsideration of Haitian Claims for 
Withholding of Removal Under the Convention Against Torture, 19 PACE INT’L 
L. REV. 287, 290–91 (2007). 
 381 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 379, art. 1, ¶ A(2). 
 382 Id. art. 31, ¶ 1. 
 383 See Daniel A. Gross, The U.S. Government Turned Away Thousands of 
Jewish Refugees, Fearing that They Were Nazi Spies, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 
18, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/us-government-turned-
away-thousands-jewish-refugees-fearing-they-were-nazi-spies-180957324/ (dis-
cussing Herbert Karl Friedrich Bahr, a Jewish refugee convicted of spying on be-
half of Germany, and the impact of his case on refugee policy in the United States 
during World War II); see generally DAVID S. WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF 
THE JEWS: AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1941–1945 (1984). The most infa-
mous example of U.S. policy in this regard is the case of the St. Louis, a German 
ship that carried over 900 refugees, almost all Jewish, to the United States in 1939, 
only to be denied entry and sent back to Germany. Gross, supra. About a fourth 
of those onboard died in the Holocaust. Id.; see also Rebecca Erbelding, After the 
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The principle of non-refoulement, expressed in the Refugee 
Convention, is codified in two sections of United States immigration 
law that provide alternative remedies.384 First, the INA permits with-
holding of deportation as to any alien who “more likely than not” 
would be persecuted, if forced to return to his home country.385 Sec-
ond, the Refugee Act of 1980 provides a broader remedy to those 
seeking refuge in the United States: asylum.386 Under this statute, a 
refugee is defined as a person who is unable or unwilling to return 
to his home country due to a “well-founded fear of persecution” on 
the grounds of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion.”387 The right to apply for asy-
lum exists for “[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United 
States or who arrives in the United States,” regardless of whether 
she crosses the border “illegally” (i.e., not at a designated port of 
entry) and “irrespective of [her] status.”388 
The rights of asylum applicants are protected by the U.S. Con-
stitution and by statute. The Due Process guarantees of the Fifth 
Amendment apply to individuals who apply for asylum in the United 
States.389 By statute, individuals applying for asylum have a right to 
 
Holocaust, the U.S. Promised to Protect Refugees. We’re Failing, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 31, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postevery-
thing/wp/2018/01/31/after-the-holocaust-the-u-s-promised-to-protect-refugees-
were-failing/?utm_term=.8de26754dfe5 (“We lament America’s failure to admit 
more European Jewish refugees before the Holocaust. Our descendants will be 
much harsher when they look at America’s inaction today.”). 
 384 See generally Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases—Immigration 
Law, Political Asylum: Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca, 101 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1987) (discussing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421 (1987), and the difference between these two remedies); Asuncion, su-
pra note 378. 
 385 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2018); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 
(1984) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)) (1976)); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 423–24. The test for determining withholding of deportation is commonly 
referred to as the “clear probability of persecution” standard. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 
429. 
 386 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (cross-referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). 
 387 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
 388 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1); see also Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 
F.2d 549, 553–54 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 389 C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring); 
see also Orantes-Hernandez, 919 F.2d at 554; Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 90–91 
(9th Cir. 1988); Rios-Berrios v. INS., 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985); Haitian 
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be represented by counsel of their choosing.390 Furthermore, they 
are entitled to be notified of their right to seek counsel.391 However, 
they do not have a right to appointed counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment because immigration matters are considered civil, not 
criminal, proceedings.392 Given that most aliens seeking asylum ar-
rive in the United States penniless and destitute, as a practical mat-
ter, the vast majority rely on pro bono legal services for representa-
tion, which are often unavailable.393 
International human rights law recognizes a right to procedural 
due process in expulsion proceedings, including, “most importantly, 
the right to be represented.”394 Although immigration advocates 
 
Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States 
v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 390 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(a); § 1362; see also Baires, 856 F.2d at 91; 8 C.F.R. 
§ 242.10 (2019). 
 391 Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 862 (discussing the right to counsel in deporta-
tion proceedings); 8 C.F.R. § 242.16 (2019) (requiring Immigration Judges to ad-
vise aliens seeking asylum of their “right to representation, at no expense to the 
Government, by counsel of [their] own choice,” and to advise them “of the avail-
ability of free legal services programs” authorized to practice in the immigration 
courts); U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, NATIONAL STANDARDS ON 
TRANSPORT, ESCORT, DETENTION, AND SEARCH 16 (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Feb/cbp-teds-
policy-october2015.pdf [hereinafter CBP STANDARDS] (instructing CBP officers 
that “[d]etainees referred for removal proceedings shall be provided with a list of 
legal service providers and their contact information”). 
 392 Baires, 856 F.2d at 90; see also Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 
1312 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 393 See Kara A. Naseef, Note How to Decrease the Immigration Backlog: Ex-
pand Representation and End Unnecessary Detention, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
771, 780 (2019) (noting that “non-citizens often must proceed pro se as they are 
unable to afford or find counsel.”); Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou, The Thousands of 
Children Who Go to Immigration Court Alone, ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/children-immigration-
court/567490/ (discussing the dearth of lawyers available to represent children in 
immigration proceedings in Fresno County, California). 
 394 Won Kidane, Procedural Due Process in the Expulsion of Aliens Under 
International, United States, and European Union Law: A Comparative Analysis, 
27 EMORY INT’L L.J. 285, 297–302 (2013); see also 1951 Refugee Convention, 
supra note 379, art. 33, ¶ 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
art. 13, Dec. 6, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons art. 31 ¶ 2, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117. 
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have argued that the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee ex-
tends the right of counsel in this setting,395 the federal courts have 
not agreed to date.396 Not surprisingly, access to counsel is critical 
for asylum-seekers, especially minors.397 Data collected from over 
100,000 cases showed that about 90% of children who did not have 
a lawyer in their immigration proceedings were ordered deported; 
almost half of the children who were represented by an attorney 
were allowed to stay in the United States.398 In cases involving 
women and children, courts were fourteen times more likely to al-
low those represented by an attorney to stay in the United States.399 
 
 395 See, e.g., Denis Slattery, New Push to Grant Immigrants Right to Counsel 
Gains Support from Advocates and Lawmakers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 15, 2020, 
4:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-immigrants-right-to-
counsel-legislation-hoylman-albany-20200115-3ltsjawul5acvfiecv5ntyuh5i-
story.html. 
 396 The Ninth Circuit recently had the opportunity to address the issue of mi-
nors’ right to counsel in immigration proceedings, but, in the words of the con-
currence, “inexplicably punt[ed] the question yet again.” C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 
F.3d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring). The concurrence argues in 
favor of a right to appointed counsel for minors claiming asylum. Id. at 630–39. 
 397 Id. at 631 (“‘The importance of counsel, particularly in asylum cases where 
the law is complex and developing, can neither be overemphasized nor ignored.’ 
For immigrant children, that is especially true.”) (quoting Reyes-Palacios v. INS, 
836 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988)). According to data collected by the Study 
Group on Immigrant Representation, headed by Second Circuit Chief Judge Rob-
ert Katzmann, “[o]nly 13 percent of asylum-seeking immigrants prevail in their 
cases without a lawyer, while 74 percent of those with a lawyer see success.” 
Nicole Narea, 3 Cases that Could Boost Immigrants’ Access to Counsel, LAW360 
(Feb. 10, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1124682/3-cases-
that-could-boost-immigrants-access-to-counsel. 
 398 TRAC Immigration, New Data on Unaccompanied Children, in TRAC 
SERIES ON JUVENILES AND FAMILIES IN IMMIGRATION COURT (2014), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/359/; see also Stillman, supra note 378 
(discussing the case of a Honduran girl who was separated from her grandmother 
at the border and convinced to sign a form waiving her right to a hearing before 
an immigration judge). 
 399 TRAC Immigration, Representation Makes 14-Fold Difference, in TRAC 
SERIES ON JUVENILES AND FAMILIES IN IMMIGRATION COURT (2014), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/396. The report further found that “[i]n 
cases that have thus far been closed, women and children were represented by an 
attorney only 14.0 percent of the time.” Id. 
2020] FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 667 
 
Under the Trump administration’s family separation policy, dis-
cussed infra,400 children as young as three are representing them-
selves in immigration court.401 
The need for legal representation in cases where a person’s 
safety and freedom are at stake is as apparent today as it was in the 
nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, under the Fugitive Slave Acts, 
the federal government did not provide legal representation to per-
sons accused of being fugitive slaves.402 However, some states’ per-
sonal liberty laws guaranteed alleged fugitives the right to counsel, 
a role often fulfilled by the local district attorney.403 These states 
also endeavored to ensure that alleged fugitives were not hamstrung 
by a lack of resources, providing that they could not be charged for 
the cost of serving a subpoena, for example.404 These states recog-
nized that, without legal assistance and access to the courts, alleged 
fugitives stood no chance of proving their entitlement to freedom. 
Some states have attempted to ensure that immigrants have ac-
cess to counsel in deportation proceedings, even though federal 
courts have not required them to do so. New York, which was the 
first state to guarantee legal representation to alleged fugitive 
slaves,405 recently became the first state to provide this same right 
to immigrants in detention and facing deportation.406 While the right 
to counsel is not guaranteed in California, the state has expanded its 
state budget allocation for immigration legal services, and the San 
Francisco Public Defender’s Office recently opened an immigration 
unit to fight “deportation of detained non-citizens.”407 These efforts, 
while laudable, are insufficient in that the majority of individuals 
 
 400 See infra notes 419–38 and accompanying text. 
 401 See Christina Jewett & Shefali Luthra, Immigrant Toddlers Ordered to Ap-
pear in Court Alone, TEX. TRIBUNE (June 27, 2018, 9:00 PM), https://www.tex-
astribune.org/2018/06/27/immigrant-toddlers-ordered-appear-court-alone/; 
Egkolfopoulou, supra note 393. 
 402 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 403 See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1840, ch, 225, § 9, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 175–76. 
 404 See, e.g., id. § 10. 
 405 See id. § 9 (providing that the County district attorney must “render his 
advice and professional services” to alleged fugitive slaves, and “shall attend in 
his behalf on the trial of such claim”; attorney fees were paid by the county). 
 406 Naseef, supra note 393, at 790. 
 407 Id. 
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who appear in immigration court proceedings, including children, 
still lack legal representation.408 
Even the limited statutory and Constitutional rights that are ac-
corded to asylum applicants are routinely violated. CBP officers are 
supposed to screen detained noncitizens for potential asylum claims 
before deporting them by asking whether the person has “any fear 
or concern about being returned to [her] home country or being re-
moved from the United States.”409 Approximately a dozen female 
asylum seekers interviewed by the Columbia Global Migration Pro-
ject in 2016 and 2017 reported that CBP officers did not ask them if 
they feared returning to their home countries;  instead, officers  “ig-
nored, mocked, or even sexually propositioned” the women  and 
then deported them with no further process.410 Many of these 
women were attacked and seriously harmed after they were forced 
to return to the places from which they had fled.411 Similarly, ap-
proximately half of the 350 asylum-seeking individuals surveyed at 
the San Diego Migrant Family Shelter in 2019 indicated that they 
had suffered various forms of “mistreatment from immigration of-
ficers during apprehension, processing and/or detention.”412 Alt-
hough the scale of these abuses appears to have grown during the 
 
 408 Despite efforts to increase legal representation for minors in immigration 
proceedings, data shows a trend in the opposite direction. Thirty percent of chil-
dren whose immigration cases began in fiscal year 2015 were unrepresented. 
TRAC Immigration, Children: Amid A Growing Court Backlog Many Still Un-
represented, in TRAC SERIES ON JUVENILES AND FAMILIES IN IMMIGRATION 
COURT (2014), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/482. That figure rose to 
forty percent, for children whose cases began in 2016. Id. Seventy-five percent of 
children whose immigration cases originated in 2017 represented themselves in 
their immigration proceedings. Id. 
 409 Claims of Fear, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/claims-fear (last vis-
ited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 410 Stillman, supra note 378. Of course, such conduct violates internal govern-
ment standards, which require all CBP officers to “speak and act with the utmost 
integrity and professionalism,” and espouses a “zero tolerance policy” as to all 
forms of sexual abuse of detainees. CBP STANDARDS, supra note 391, at 3, 4. 
 411 Stillman, supra note 378. 
 412 JILL ESBENSHADE ET AL., AMER. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF SAN 
DIEGO, THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM: MIGRANT’S STORIES OF THE STRUGGLE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, DIGNITY, PEACE AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 6, 24 
(2019), https://www.aclusandiego.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2019/12/The_Right_to_Seek_Asylum-Migrant-Stories_with_Links-1.pdf. 
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Trump administration, they did not originate with it.413 However, 
the remarkable level of hostility towards asylum-seekers expressed 
by the President himself is unprecedented.414 
President Trump has loudly and persistently complained about 
the very existence of asylum law in the United States, characterizing 
it as a “loophole”415 in the immigration system and a “big fat con 
job”416 being perpetrated on the American people. He has character-
 
 413 For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a permanent injunction against  the  
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) in 1990, supported by 
“overwhelming” evidence that the agency had systematically coerced El Salva-
doran immigrants to waive their right to apply for asylum by signing voluntary 
departure forms. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 559, 562 
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding that, even after a preliminary injunction was issued for-
bidding this conduct, the pattern of inducing class members into accepting volun-
tary departure persisted, even when the noncitizen expressed fear of returning to 
El Salvador or had specifically requested asylum). 
 414 See infra notes 415–18 and accompanying text. 
 415 E.g., President Donald J. Trump is Working to Stop the Abuse of our Asy-
lum System and Address the Root Causes of the Border Crisis, WHITE HOUSE 
(Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-
donald-j-trump-working-stop-abuse-asylum-system-address-root-causes-border-
crisis/ [hereinafter Trump Working to Stop Abuse of Asylum System] (“The Asy-
lum Loophole: Migrants are flooding to our border to use asylum to gain entry 
into our country and remain here indefinitely.”). President Trump is quoted as 
stating, “The biggest loophole drawing illegal aliens to our borders is the use of 
fraudulent or meritless asylum claims to gain entry into our great country.” Id.; 
see also Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-
office-immigration-review (charging that the asylum system “is currently subject 
to rampant abuse and fraud”). 
 416 President Trump made this statement during a campaign rally in Grand 
Rapids, Michigan. Donica Phifter, Donald Trump Calls Asylum Claims a ‘Big Fat 
Con Job,’ Says Mexico Should Stop Migrant Caravans from Traveling to U.S. 
Border, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 29, 2019, 12:13 AM). During the speech, he appeared 
to mock a would-be asylum applicant:  
You have people coming, you know they’re all met by the law-
yers . . . and they say, ‘Say the following phrase: I am very 
afraid for my life. I am afraid for my life.’ OK. And then I look 
at the guy. He looks like he just got out of the ring. He’s a heav-
yweight champion of the world. It’s a big fat con job. 
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ized immigrants as “invad[ing]” the country and advocated remov-
ing them with “no Judges or Court cases.”417 In addition to the in-
cendiary rhetoric, Trump has issued executive orders and proposed 
changes to existing administrative regulations that make it even 
more difficult, if not impossible, for asylum-seekers to file claims 
and have them fairly adjudicated.418 Much like the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1850, which gutted the limited procedural safeguards ac-
corded to those accused of being fugitive slaves, the changes 
wrought by the Trump administration have vitiated procedures de-
signed to protect some of society’s most vulnerable people. 
The most infamous of Trump’s policies designed to discourage 
migration of asylum-seekers into the United States was known as 
the “zero tolerance” family separation policy.419 Without a formal 
announcement of a change in policy, in 2017, the Trump administra-
tion began to forcibly separate parents and children who crossed the 
border together.420 Many of these families were fleeing persecution 
in their home countries and thus sought to claim asylum in the 
 
Id.; see also Maria Saccheti, U.S. Asylum Process is at the Center of Trump’s 
Immigration Ire, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019, 6:21 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/immigration/us-asylum-process-is-at-the-center-of-trumps-immi-
gration-ire/2019/04/09/7f8259b8-5aec-11e9-842d-7d3ed7eb3957_story.html. 
Trump also referred to the asylum process as a “con job” at a roundtable discus-
sion regarding the economy in Minnesota, claiming, “You look at some of these 
people, you want protection from them, and they are saying, ‘We need protection 
from our country.’” Steven Nelson, Trump Says GOP ‘Can Retake the House’ by 
Addressing Asylum ‘Con Job,’ WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 15, 2019, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/white-house/trump-says-gop-can-
retake-the-house-by-addressing-asylum-con-job. 
 417 President Trump tweeted, “We cannot allow all of these people to invade 
our Country. When somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or 
Court Cases, bring them back from where they came.” @realDonaldTrump, 
TWITTER (Jun. 24, 2018, 8:02AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/sta-
tus/1010900865602019329. 
 418 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); see 
generally Jean Galbraith, Trump Administration Tightens Procedures with Re-
spect to Asylum Seekers at the Southern Border, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 377 (2019) 
(discussing various actions by the Trump administration to restrict access to asy-
lum); see also infra notes 470–478 and accompanying text. 
 419 See Julia Ainsley, Trump Administration Discussed Separating Moms, 
Kids to Deter Asylum Seeks in Feb. 2017, NBC (June 18, 2018, 3:43 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-admin-discussed-separat-
ing-moms-kids-deter-asylum-seekers-feb-n884371. 
 420 See id. 
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United States.421 Rather than release or detain the parents and chil-
dren together, CBP agents began to forcibly separate the two by 
placing adults in federal detention centers and children in foster care 
or government facilities for “unaccompanied minors,” sometimes 
thousands of miles away.422 The federal government implemented 
the family separation policy to dissuade Central Americans from 
seeking asylum in the United States.423 As news of this policy began 
to trickle out, moral outrage ensued and continues to this day.424 
Forcibly separating children from their parents causes both the child 
and the parent to suffer severe emotional harm and can permanently 
damage the relationship between parent and child, even after they 
are reunited.425 A federal court has held that the policy deprives par-
ents of their substantive due process rights to family integrity.426 The 
 
 421 See Ms. L. v. U.S Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 
1137 (S.D. Cal. 2018), modified by 330 F.R.D. 284 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (finding that 
many of the parents and children who were separated were seeking asylum in the 
United States). 
 422 See id. at 1154–55. 
 423 John Burnett, To Curb Illegal Immigration, DHS Separating Families at 
the Border, NPR (Feb. 27, 2018, 7:41 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/589079243/activists-outraged-that-u-s-border-
agents-separate-immigrant-families (“The Department of Homeland Security has 
undertaken its most extreme measure yet to discourage asylum seekers from com-
ing to the U.S.—family separation.”). 
 424 See, e.g., Ashley Fetters, The Moral Failure of Family Separation, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2019/01/trumps-family-separation-policy-causes-national-out-
rage/579676/. 
 425 See HHS-OIG Oversight of the Unaccompanied Alien Children Program: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. 8 (2019) (state-
ment of Ann Maxwell, Assistant Inspector General, Department of Health and 
Human Services) (stating that “separated children exhibited more fear, feelings of 
abandonment, and post-traumatic stress than did children who were not separated. 
Separated children experienced heightened feelings of anxiety and loss as a result 
of their unexpected separation from their parents after their arrival in the United 
States.”); see also Christopher Sherman et al., US Held Record Number of Mi-
grant Children in Custody in 2019, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/015702afdb4d4fbf85cf5070cd2c6824 (quoting Dr. Jack 
Shonkoff as stating that “‘decades of peer-reviewed research’ show that detaining 
kids away from parents or primary caregivers is bad for their health”); Joanna 
Dreby, U.S. Immigration Policy and Family Separation: The Consequences for 
Children’s Well-Being, 132 SOCIAL SCI. & MED. 245, 247–49 (2015). 
 426 See Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1137. 
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damage that the U.S. government has done to these families may 
never be repaired.427 
After inflicting the trauma of family separation, the government 
had to admit that it had no plan to reunify the families it had torn 
apart. It had made no effort to do so.428 In June 2018, a federal court 
ordered the government to discontinue the policy and reunite the 
thousands of families that it had separated, finding that the govern-
ment’s conduct was “egregious,” “outrageous,” and sufficient to 
“shock the contemporary conscience.”429 Approximately 5500 mi-
grant children were separated from their parents at the border under 
the policy that was officially halted in June 2018.430 Although most 
of these families were eventually reunited, as of January 2020, 
twenty-one children remained in government custody.431 
 
 427 A class action lawsuit was filed in 2019 seeking damages against the fed-
eral government for the harms inflicted by the family separation policy. Class Ac-
tion Complaint, A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, No. 4:19-CV-00481-JAS (D. Ariz., Oct. 10, 
2019). 
 428 The court made the following findings in this regard:  
[T]he practice of separating these families was implemented 
without any effective system or procedure for (1) tracking the 
children after they were separated from their parents, (2) ena-
bling communication between the parents and their children af-
ter separation, and (3) reuniting the parents and children after 
the parents are returned to immigration custody following com-
pletion of their criminal sentence. This is a startling reality. 
Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1144; see also Jonathan Blitzer, The Government Has 
No Plan for Reuniting the Immigrant Families it is Tearing Apart, NEW YORKER 
(June 18, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-government-
has-no-plan-for-reuniting-the-immigrant-families-it-is-tearing-apart. 
 429 Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1145–46. 
 430 Jasmine Aguilera, Here’s What to Know About the Status of Family Sepa-
ration at the U.S. Border, Which Isn’t Nearly Over, TIME, 
https://time.com/5678313/trump-administration-family-separation-lawsuits/  
(last updated Oct. 25, 2019, 2:49 PM); see also Camilo Montoya-Galvez, U.S. 
Planned to Separate 26,000 Migrant Families Before Outcry Over ‘Zero Toler-
ance’ Policy, CBS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/family-separations-zero-tol-
erance-policy-us-planned-to-separate-more-than-26000-migrant-families-2019-
11-27/ (last updated Nov. 27, 2019, 9:47 PM). 
 431 CHRISTI A. GRIMM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES IMPEDED HHS’S RESPONSE 
TO THE ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICY 8 (2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-
BL-18-00510.pdf; see also Aguilera, supra note 430 (noting that, as of September 
2020] FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 673 
 
Although the Trump administration officially halted the family 
separation policy in June 2018,432 family separation has clearly con-
tinued.433 Over one thousand children have been separated from 
their parents since the family separation policy officially ended in 
June 2018.434 Thousands of young children have been detained in 
government facilities without adequate access to medical care or 
basic hygiene.435  
Several children have died in government custody.436 Despite at 
least three deaths attributable to the flu, the government has refused 
to provide children in ICE detention with the flu vaccine, even when 
doctors volunteered to provide the vaccinations at no cost to the gov-
ernment.437 One commentator has characterized the federal govern-
ment’s immigration policy of taking children from their parents as 
“of a piece with some of the darkest moments of American history,” 
including slavery.438 
Images of screaming children ripped from the arms of their par-
ents were just as devastating in the nineteenth century as they are 
 
2019, twenty-seven children remained in government custody as a result of the 
policy).  
 432 The family separation policy was partially withdrawn by the Trump ad-
ministration on June 20, 2018. See Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29435 
(June 20, 2018). 
 433 See Aguilera, supra note 430; Montoya-Galvez, supra note 430. 
 434 See Aguilera, supra note 430; Montoya-Galvez, supra note 430. 
 435 See Lizzie O’Leary, ‘Children Were Dirty, They Were Scared, and They 
Were Hungry,’ ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/fam-
ily/archive/2019/06/child-detention-centers-immigration-attorney-inter-
view/592540/; Simon Romero et al., Hungry, Scared and Sick: Inside the Migrant 
Detention Center in Clint, Texas, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2019/07/06/us/migrants-border-patrol-clint.html. 
 436 Nicole Acevedo, Why Are Migrant Children Dying in U.S. Custody?, NBC 
(May 29, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/why-are-mi-
grant-children-dying-u-s-custody-n1010316 (noting that at least seven children 
died in CBP custody between 2018 and May 2019). 
 437 See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, After Child Deaths, Doctors Pressure Border 
Patrol to Let Them Administer Flu Vaccines, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019, 11:32 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-11-19/la-na-border-pa-
trol-migrant-flu; see Robert Moore, CDC Recommended that Migrants Receive 
Flu Vaccine, but CBP Rejected the Idea, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019, 3:58 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/cdc-recommended-that-migrants-
receive-flu-vaccine-but-cbp-rejected-the-idea/2019/11/25/8aba198e-0fb8-11ea-
b0fc-62cc38411ebb_story.html. 
 438 Fetters, supra note 424. 
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today. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s iconic novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 
brought a vivid picture of slavery’s destruction of the family into 
American homes when it was published in March 1852.439 In one of 
the novel’s early scenes, a mother, Eliza, flees over the frozen Ohio 
River with her four year-old son, Harry, to avoid separation after 
Harry was sold to pay the debts of the family who “owned” them.440 
Although Stowe’s novel was a work of fiction, it was based on 
Stowe’s investigation of actual events and people caught up in the 
web of slavery.441 The book was immensely popular in the free 
North, where it sold over 300,000 copies in its first year of circula-
tion and helped to turn the tide of public opinion against slavery.442 
Although “[h]istory cannot evaluate with precision the influence of 
a novel upon public opinion . . . the northern attitude toward slavery 
was never quite the same after Uncle Tom’s Cabin.”443 Whether out-
rage over the Trump administration’s family separation policy will 
have a similarly lasting impact on public opinion regarding federal 
immigration law remains to be seen. 
The family separation policy is one of several executive actions 
taken by the Trump administration designed to deter and prohibit 
migrants from seeking asylum in the United States. All of these ex-
ecutive actions have been challenged in court, and some have been 
enjoined, at least temporarily.444 In June 2018, Attorney General 
 
 439 See generally HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN: A TALE OF 
LIFE AMONG THE LOWLY (1852); see also POTTER, supra note 236, at 140 (noting 
that Stowe “made vivid the plight of the slave as a human being held in bondage”). 
 440 STOWE, supra note 439, at 42, 59–73. 
 441 See HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 1 
(1853). 
 442 See POTTER, supra note 236, at 140 (noting that the book ultimately sold 
almost three million copies in the United States, and another three and a half mil-
lion copies abroad); see generally DAVID S. REYNOLDS, MIGHTIER THAN THE 
SWORD, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA (2012). 
 443 POTTER, supra note 236, at 140. 
 444 President Trump has made several additional proposals that, if ultimately 
implemented, will further burden asylum-seekers and undermine the United 
States’ commitment to the principle of non-refoulement, a fundamental tenet of 
international law that is embodied in multiple federal statutes. In April 2019, Pres-
ident Trump issued a “presidential memorandum” directing the implementation 
of regulations that would (1) require the payment of a fee to apply for asylum or 
a work permit; (2) deny provisional work permits while asylum applications are 
pending; and (3) mandate that all asylum cases be decided within 180 days. See 
Presidential Memorandum on Additional Measures to Enhance Border Security 
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Sessions issued a decision overruling and vacating precedent from 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), finding that  victims of 
domestic abuse in their country of origin generally should not qual-
ify for asylum in the United States.445 He further noted in dictum 
that those fleeing gang violence should also “generally” not qualify 
for asylum.446 A federal lawsuit challenging Sessions’s decision as 
applied to expedited removal proceedings was filed on behalf of 
twelve adults and children seeking asylum in the United States, who 
were found not to have a credible fear of persecution based on Ses-
sions’ new policy.447 The court held that a blanket application of 
Sessions’ ruling at the credible fear stage was inconsistent with the 
INA and the Administrative Procedure Act.448 As a result, the policy 
of subjecting asylum seekers expressing fear of domestic abuse or 
 
and Restore Integrity to Our Immigration System, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-ad-
ditional-measures-enhance-border-security-restore-integrity-immigration-sys-
tem/; see also Trump Working to Stop Abuse of Asylum System, supra note 415; 
Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Caitlin Dickerson, Asylum Seekers Face New Re-
strictions Under Latest Trump Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/trump-asylum.html. Proposed 
regulations have been issued that would charge migrants $50 to apply for asylum, 
and $490 to apply for a work permit. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Re-
quirements, 84 Fed. Reg. 62,280, 62,318, 62,320 (Nov. 14, 2019) (proposed). The 
vast majority of countries do not require payment from asylum seekers; currently, 
only Australia, Fiji, and Iran impose such a fee. See Sasha Abramsky, Charging 
for Asylum? It’s Unpopular for a Reason, NATION (Nov. 12, 2019). 
 445 In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320–21 (A.G. 2018); see also U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE FOR 
PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF A-B- (2018) (discussing the implementation of the 
policy announced In re A-B-). 
 446 In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to 
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will 
not qualify for asylum.”). 
 447 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 104–05 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing 
how plaintiffs “alleged accounts of sexual abuse, kidnappings, and beatings in 
their home countries during interviews with asylum officers”). 
 448 Id. at 125–28. 
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gang violence to expedited removal was enjoined.449 The govern-
ment is appealing this decision.450 
A few months later, President Trump issued an executive proc-
lamation rendering any individual who did not present himself for 
inspection at an authorized port of entry ineligible for political asy-
lum.451 This rule also contravenes the INA, which specifies that 
“[a]ny alien” who is physically present in the United States or who 
arrives in the United States, “whether or not at a designated port of 
arrival,” may apply for asylum.452 As a result, another lawsuit was 
filed in federal court, and implementation of the rule was en-
joined.453 This decision was also appealed; however, the Supreme 
Court denied review.454 
In January 2019, the Department of Homeland Security issued 
the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”), commonly referred to as 
the “Remain in Mexico” policy,455 which requires non-Mexican asy-
lum-seekers who enter the United States through Mexico to be “re-
 
 449 Id. at 105 (“[B]ecause it is the will of Congress—not the whims of the 
Executive—that determines the standard for expedited removal, the Court finds 
that those policies are unlawful.”). 
 450 Brief for the Appellants, Grace v. Barr, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(No. 19-5013), 2019 WL 2354784. 
 451 Donald J. Trump, Exec. Office of the President, Addressing Mass Migra-
tion Through Southern Border of the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661 (Nov. 9, 
2018) (ordering that “aliens who enter the United States unlawfully through the 
southern border in contravention of this proclamation will be ineligible to be 
granted asylum”); see also Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presi-
dential Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934, 
55,939–40 (Nov. 9, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 452 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 453 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 868 (N.D. Cal. 
2018) (issuing temporary restraining order against implementation of the policy); 
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 780 (9th Cir. 2018) (denying 
emergency motion to stay district court’s order pending appeal). The district court 
reasoned that “[w]hatever the scope of the President’s authority, he may not re-
write the immigration laws to impose a condition that Congress has expressly for-
bidden.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 844. 
 454 Trump v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2018), denying cert. 
 455 Vanessa Romo, U.S. Supreme Court Allows ‘Remain in Mexico’ Program 
to Continue, NPR (Mar. 11, 2020, 3:38 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/03/11/814582798/u-s-supreme-court-allows-remain-
in-mexico-program-to-continue. 
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turned to Mexico . . . for the duration of their immigration proceed-
ings,” and, with certain limited exceptions, excluded from the 
United States during that time period.456 In other words, these asy-
lum applicants must wait in Mexico, typically for several months, 
while their asylum claims are being adjudicated in the United 
States.457 Between January and November 2019, approximately 
60,000 asylum applicants were forced back across the border and 
required to remain in Mexico while their asylum applications are 
being adjudicated pursuant to this policy.458 To date, only eleven 
applicants pursuing asylum claims from Mexico—approximately 
0.1 percent—have been granted asylum.459 Like the family separa-
 
 456 Migrant Protection Protocols, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols; see also In-
novation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (dis-
cussing the MPP). The United States and Canada have entered into an agreement, 
the Safe Third Country Agreement (“STCA”), under which asylum-seekers who 
enter Canada through a land-border with the United States, or vice-versa, are eli-
gible to apply for asylum only in their state of first arrival. Agreement Between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada 
for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of 
Third Countries art. 4, U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 2002, T.I.A.S. No. 04-1229; see also 
Cara D. Cutler, The U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement: Slamming the 
Door on Refugees, 11 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 121, 128–29 (2004) (critiquing 
the STCA). A lawsuit was recently filed in Canada, challenging the STCA on the 
grounds that, under the Trump administration’s current immigration policies, the 
United States is no longer “safe” for refugees. See Annie Hylton, Canada Ques-
tions the Safety of Asylum Seekers in the U.S., NEW YORKER (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/canada-questions-the-safety-of-
asylum-seekers-in-the-us; see also Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Indirect Re-
foulement: Challenging Canada’s Participation in the Canada-United States Safe 
Third Country Agreement, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 142, 150–52 (2012). 
 457 See Jonathan Blitzer, How the U.S. Asylum System is Keeping Migrants at 
Risk in Mexico, NEW YORKER (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-the-us-asylum-system-is-keep-
ing-migrants-at-risk-in-mexico. 
 458 See Juju Chang et al., Blocked at the Border: Young Families, Pregnant 
Mothers Struggle for Asylum, ABC (Dec. 18, 2019, 4:08 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/International/blocked-border-young-families-pregnant-
mothers-struggle-asylum/story?id=67777661. 
 459 Gustavo Solis, Remain in Mexico Has a 0.1 Percent Asylum Grant Rate, 
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Dec. 15, 2019, 4:42 AM), https://www.sandiegoun-
iontribune.com/news/border-baja-california/story/2019-12-15/remain-in-mex-
ico-has-a-0-01-percent-asylum-grant-rate; see also Details on MPP (Remain in 
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tion policy, the MPP is designed, at least in part, to discourage Cen-
tral Americans from filing asylum claims in the United States.460 
Hundreds of migrants, most of them fleeing violence in Central 
America, have been subject to kidnappings, rape, other forms of as-
sault, and even murder while living in makeshift encampments on 
the Mexican border.461 Migrant children, in particular, are being fur-
ther traumatized by the violence they are witnessing and experienc-
ing in Mexico.462 Though these asylum applicants have a statutory 
 
Mexico) Deportation Proceedings by Hearing Location and Attendance, Repre-
sentation, Nationality, Month and Year of NTA, Outcome, and Current Status, 
TRACC IMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/mpp/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Details on MPP]. 
 460 Molly O’Toole, Trump Administration Appears to Violate Law in Forcing 
Asylum Seekers Back to Mexico, Officials Warn, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2019, 
12:12 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-28/trump-admin-
istration-pushes-thousands-to-mexico-to-await-asylum-cases (quoting Mark 
Morgan, acting head of CBP, as stating that the policy was for immigrants’ “own 
protection” but was also intended to “deter asylum seekers”). 
 461 As of December 2019, there were 636 publicly documented cases of kid-
nappings, rapes, and other violent assaults perpetrated against migrants living in 
Mexico under the MPP, with almost half of those assaults occurring in November 
2019 alone. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HUMAN RIGHTS FIASCO: THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION’S DANGEROUS ASYLUM RETURNS CONTINUE 2, 4–5 (2019) 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-rights-fiasco-trump-admin-
istration-s-dangerous-asylum-returns-continue (“Vulnerable asylum seekers and 
migrants, including pregnant women, children, and people with disabilities, are 
kidnapped, raped, and assaulted in shelters, in taxis and buses, on the streets, on 
their way to U.S. immigration court, and even while seeking help from Mexican 
police and migration officers.”); Miriam Jordan, ‘I’m Kidnapped’: A Father’s 
Nightmare on the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/12/21/us/border-migrants-kidnapping-mexico.html (describing 
various cases of abduction, rape, assault, and murder, suffered by asylum appli-
cants forced to live in Mexican border towns under the MPP). According to data 
collected by the U.S. Immigration Policy Center at the University of California, 
San Diego, a quarter of asylum seekers subject to the MPP have experienced vio-
lence in Mexico. Judy Woodruff, Asylum Seekers Forced to Remain in Mexico 
Face Daily Threat of Violence, PBS (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/news-
hour/show/asylum-seekers-forced-to-remain-in-mexico-face-daily-threat-of-vio-
lence (interviewing Yamiche Alcindo, a White House Correspondent who trav-
eled to Mexico to experience firsthand the impact of the MPP). 
 462 Steven Berkowitz & Alisa R. Gutman, Trump’s ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy 
is Traumatizing Kids. Bring Asylum-Seekers Here to Heal, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/01/06/trump-re-
main-in-mexico-policy-causing-child-trauma-psychiatrists/2784393001/ (stating 
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right to seek legal representation,463 they have little to no access to 
lawyers while forced to live in Mexico.464 A district court judge pre-
liminarily enjoined implementation of the policy, holding that it 
conflicted with the INA.465 After initially staying implementation of 
the district court’s order,466 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunc-
tion, finding that the “individual plaintiffs risk substantial harm, 
even death, so long as the directives of the MPP are followed.”467 
However, less than a week later, the Ninth Circuit temporarily 
stayed implementation of its own ruling, despite finding that the 
MPP “clearly violates” federal law.468  When the Ninth Circuit stay 
expired, the Supreme Court issued another emergency stay, effec-
tively blocking the injunction until the final resolution of the case.469 
Whether the courts will ultimately determine that the MPP is con-
sistent with the will of Congress, as reflected in the INA, has yet to 
be determined. 
 
psychiatrists’ opinion that “[t]he children whom the Trump administration is 
sending back to unspeakable violence in Mexican border towns are at risk for 
serious traumatic reactions and dysfunction that could impact them for the rest of 
their lives”). 
 463 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2018) (cross-referencing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)). 
 464 Miriam Jordan, In Court Without a Lawyer: The Consequences of Trump’s 
‘Remain in Mexico’ Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/08/03/us/migrants-court-remain-in-mexico.html?ac-
tion=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article. Data shows that migrants 
subject to the MPP have obtained legal representation in less than one percent of 
cases. Details on MPP, supra note 459 (finding that migrants obtained legal rep-
resentation in 57 immigration cases out of a total of 8,377). 
 465 Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 
2019) (holding that plaintiffs were likely to prove that the MPP does not comply 
with the Administrative Procedures Act, “because the statute DHS contends the 
MPP is designed to enforce does not apply to these circumstances, and even if it 
did, further procedural protections would be required to conform to the govern-
ment’s acknowledged obligation to ensure aliens are not returned to unduly dan-
gerous circumstances”). 
 466 Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 467 Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 951 F.3d 1073, 1093 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 468 Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 469 Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, 2020 WL 1161432 (Mar. 11, 2020).  Justice 
Sotomayor dissented from the order granting the emergency stay. Id. 
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Even more significantly, in July 2019, the Trump administration 
proposed and began to implement a federal regulation that consti-
tutes a “new mandatory bar for asylum eligibility,” applicable to 
any migrant who fails “to apply for protection in a third country out-
side the alien’s country of citizenship, nationality, or last lawful ha-
bitual residence through which the alien transited en route to the 
United States.”470 “The effect of the Rule is to categorically deny 
asylum to almost anyone entering the United States at the southern 
border if he or she did not first apply for asylum in Mexico or an-
other third country.”471 Immigrant advocacy organizations immedi-
ately sued to block enforcement of the rule, arguing that “[t]he Rule 
is a part of an unlawful effort to significantly undermine, if not vir-
tually repeal, the U.S. asylum system at the southern border, and 
cruelly closes our doors to refugees fleeing persecution, forcing 
them to return to harm.”472 Although the district court initially en-
joined enforcement of the rule,473 the injunction was later limited in 
scope by the Ninth Circuit.474 However, the Supreme Court, in a 
one-paragraph opinion, stayed enforcement of the injunction pend-
ing final adjudication of the case.475 In her dissent, Justice So-
tomayor lamented that “[o]nce again the Executive Branch has is-
sued a rule that seeks to upend longstanding practices regarding ref-
ugees who seek shelter from persecution.”476 The implementation of 
this rule will effectively preclude Central Americans, Cubans, Hai-
tians, and anyone else who attempts to cross into the United States 
 
 470 Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829, 
33,830 (July 16, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (emphasis added). 
 471 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 929–30 (N.D. 
Cal. 2019). 
 472 Complaint at 3, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922 
(N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 473 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 930–31. 
 474 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 475 Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3, 3 (2019). 
 476 Id. at 4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined Justice So-
tomayor’s dissent. Id.; see also Opinion, The Supreme Court Just Gave Trump 
Temporary Rein to Play with the Lives of Desperate Migrants, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
12, 2019, 2:14 PM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-09-12/asylum-
supreme-court-trump-mexico-central-americans (decrying the willingness of “the 
U.S. government and the nation’s highest court” to “disregard the health, safety 
and legal rights of people in desperate need”). 
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through the Southern border from seeking asylum in this country.477 
Although the legal viability of this executive action remains to be 
determined, while it is enforced, it will effectively deter and outright 
bar the vast majority of refugees from seeking or obtaining asylum 
in the United States.478 
The executive measures discussed above have had the practical 
effect of precluding asylum seekers from finding refuge in the 
United States. However, all of them purport to provide some form 
of legal process for those with legitimate asylum claims. In the 
throes of the COVID-19 crisis, the Trump administration has, at 
least temporarily, closed the Southern border to asylum seekers 
completely. Under this policy, anyone attempting to cross the border 
without proper documentation, including those attempting to seek 
asylum, will be removed from the country immediately and without 
due process.479 The administration claims that the measures are nec-
essary to protect “migrants, our frontline agents and officers and the 
American people” from the spread of the coronavirus at Border Pa-
trol stations and detention facilities.480 Immigration advocates have 
 
 477 See Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Top Trump Official Ken Cuccinelli Says Asy-
lum Restriction will be a “Deterrent” for Migrants, CBS: FACE THE NATION 
(Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cuccinelli-says-asylum-re-
striction-allowed-by-supreme-court-will-be-a-deterrent-for-migrants. 
 478 See id. 
 479  See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Michael D. Shear, & Maggie Haberman, 
Citing Coronavirus, Trump Will Announce Strict New Border Controls, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/politics/trump-
coronavirus-mexican-border.html (“Under the [proposed] policy, asylum seekers 
would not be held for any length of time in an American facility nor would they 
be given due process.”); Quinn Owen, Trump Administration to Impose New Re-
strictions at Border, Leaving Asylum Seekers in Limbo, ABC NEWS (Mar. 20, 
2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-administration-impose-re-
strictions-border-leaving-asylum-seekers/story?id=69717143 (quoting Acting 
Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf as stating that those “without proper 
travel documentation” will face “immediate removal”). 
 480 Owen, supra note 479 (quoting Acting Homeland Security Secretary 
Wolf).  To date, the administration has rejected calls to release some portion of 
the approximately 37,000 individuals held in crowded immigration detention fa-
cilities, to prevent the spread of the virus, even though about half of those detain-
ees have not been charged with any crimes and are being held solely due to alleged 
civil immigration violations.  About 6,000 of those detained are seeking asylum.  
See Joel Rose, Immigration Grinds to a Halt as President Trump Shuts Borders, 
NPR (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/18/817965714/immigration-
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decried these measures as yet another attempt to “falsely [scapegoat] 
immigrant communities in the name of public safety,” and argue that 
they “unquestionably violate both domestic and international law” 
and abdicate the country’s “moral responsibility to protect vulnera-
ble people.”481 
The Trump administration has all but repudiated the United 
States’ commitment to the principle of non-refoulement. The Presi-
dent’s own statements show that he does not value either the histor-
ical or humanitarian significance of asylum law, a belief reflected in 
the policies he has tried to implement. Moreover, the Trump admin-
istration’s attempts to impose such laws via executive action, rather 
than through the legislative process, violate basic principles of fed-
eralism and separation of powers, which is largely why—to date—
many of these policies have been enjoined by federal courts. The 
Trump administration’s failure to seek or obtain Congressional ap-
proval for these fundamental changes to asylum law reflects a lack 
of national consensus sufficient to support them. In this sense, these 
executive actions lack even the level of democratic legitimacy en-
joyed by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. That heinous Act—alt-
hough enacted at a time when vast swaths of the American popula-
tion were excluded from the franchise—was part of a legislative bar-
 
grinds-to-a-halt-as-president-trump-shuts-borders; Michael Edison Hayden, Na-
tivist Hate Groups Want to Keep People in ICE Detention Despite COVID-19 
Threat, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2020/04/09/nativist-hate-groups-want-
keep-people-ice-detention-despite-covid-19-threat.  See also Class Action Com-
plaint at 3, Gayle v. Meade, No. 1:20-cv-21553-XXXX (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2020) 
(seeking court order releasing ICE detainees due to ICE’s practice of “cohort 
quarantin[ing]” in detention); (Complaint at 3, Dawson v. Asher, No. 2:20-cv-
00409 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2020) (seeking court order releasing certain civil 
detainees from ICE facilities due to increased risk of serious illness resulting from 
COVID 19).    
 481 Rose, supra note 480 (quoting Michelle Brané at the Women’s Refugee 
Commission); see also Hamed Aleaziz, The Trump Administration Is Now De-
porting Unaccompanied Immigrant Kids Due to the Coronavirus, BUZZFEED 
NEWS (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hame-
daleaziz/coronavirus-unaccompanied-minors-deported?bfsource=relatedmanual 
(quoting Human Rights First representative as stating that the Trump administra-
tion is using a public health crisis “to advance their long-standing goal of over-
turning U.S. laws protecting vulnerable children and people seeking asylum”). 
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gain and hence adopted by the majority of the nation’s elected Con-
gressional representatives. The same cannot be said for the “execu-
tive proclamations” and federal regulations promulgated by the 
Trump administration with regard to asylum. Although the federal 
government does have broad powers in the immigration arena, at a 
minimum, those powers are shared by Congress and do not belong 
to the President alone. 
3. FEDERAL SUPREMACY AND THE LIMITS OF STATE POWER TO 
REGULATE MATTERS CONCERNING FUGITIVE SLAVES AND 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 
Just as it did with respect to the Fugitive Slave Acts and the per-
sonal liberty laws, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal law 
preempts state law in the immigration arena. The Constitutional case 
for federal supremacy, in the immigration context, is actually much 
stronger than it was in the case of fugitive slaves. As discussed 
above, the list of subjects over which Congress has the power to act, 
as enumerated in Article I, Section 8, does not include any reference 
to fugitive slaves.482 This Constitutional provision does, however, 
address immigration, specifying that Congress shall have the power 
to create a “uniform Rule of Naturalization.”483 The Supreme Court 
has observed that “[t]he Government of the United States has broad, 
undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of 
aliens.”484 However, although the Executive Branch does have 
 
 482 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. IV.; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 
see generally Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 618 (1842). 
 483 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. It is worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court 
originally found that the federal government’s right to exclude “foreigners of a 
different race” came from sovereignty itself rather than the text of the Constitu-
tion. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). The Supreme 
Court has held that the federal government’s broad power over immigration mat-
ters stems from its “inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations 
with foreign nations.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012); see 
also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing the Federal Government’s 
“broad authority over foreign affairs” as a source of its authority to regulate the 
status of aliens). 
 484 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394–95 (“The federal power to determine immigration 
policy is well settled.”; “Federal governance of immigration and alien status is 
extensive and complex.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (“[T]he 
supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including 
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broad powers in this area of the law, it shares that power with the 
legislative branch, as reflected in the plain language of the Consti-
tution.485 Most of the changes that the Trump administration has at-
tempted to inflict on the asylum process would almost certainly have 
been upheld in court if they had been adopted by Congress rather 
than executive fiat. 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of state authority to reg-
ulate immigration matters in Arizona v. United States, a case in 
which it invalidated multiple Arizona state laws on grounds of fed-
eral preemption.486 However, unlike the state personal liberty 
laws—which often sought to impede the federal government’s ef-
forts to expel individuals arrested under the auspices of the federal 
law—the Arizona laws aimed for the opposite effect. The laws’ 
stated purpose was to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and 
presence of aliens and economic activity [in Arizona] by persons 
unlawfully present in the United States,” and thereby to implement 
a policy of “attrition through enforcement.”487 The Court found that 
“Arizona bears many of the [negative] consequences of unlawful 
immigration” based on the factual record in the case.488 
Most, but not all, of the laws passed by Arizona regarding the 
immigration process, collectively known as State Bill (“S.B.”) 1070, 
were struck down on grounds of federal preemption.489 The first 
state law at issue, section 3 of S.B. 1070, purported to criminalize a 
 
power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear by the Con-
stitution . . . and has since been given continuous recognition by this Court.”); 
Toll, 458 U.S. at 10 (“Our cases have long recognized the preeminent role of the 
Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders.”). 
 485 See U.S CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 2. 
 486 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 387; see also Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of 
Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 528–39 (5th Cir. 2013) (invalidating, on preemp-
tion grounds, a Texas ordinance that purported to criminalize the rental of housing 
to and by aliens not lawfully present in the United States); Pratheepan Gu-
lasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2088 (2013) (noting that “the Supreme Court has con-
sistently and overwhelmingly disapproved of state attempts to regulate immigra-
tion, discriminate against noncitizens, or discourage immigrant presence in a par-
ticular locality”). 
 487 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 393 (quoting Note following ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 11-1051 (2012)). 
 488 Id. at 397–98. 
 489 Id. at 416. 
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person’s failure to obey federal laws regarding alien registration.490 
The Court held that, because Congress has occupied this entire field, 
“even complementary state regulation was impermissible.”491 Sec-
tion 5(C) of S.B. 1070 would have criminalized employment, or ef-
forts to obtain employment, by “unauthorized alien[s].”492 This law 
was also struck down as preempted by federal law.493 Because Ari-
zona’s criminal penalties differed from the federal civil penalties 
imposed for the same conduct regarding employment, the Court held 
that the Arizona law posed an “obstacle” to the federal regulatory 
scheme.494 Finally, section 6 of S.B. 1070 permitted state officers to 
arrest a person without a warrant if the officer found “probable 
cause” that he had committed a “public offense” that would render 
him removable from the United States.495 This statute was also 
struck down, because it also posed an obstacle to the comprehensive 
system of federal laws governing alien removability.496 
Only one provision in the Arizona statutory scheme was upheld 
and allowed to co-exist with federal immigration law: Section 
2(B).497 Section 2(B) requires all state and local authorities to con-
tact the federal government and attempt to verify the immigration 
status of any individual they have lawfully stopped, arrested, or de-
tained, if they have a “reasonable suspicion” that “the person is an 
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.”498 Further, the 
 
 490 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(A) (2012); see also Arizona, 567 U.S. at 
401–03 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-509). 
 491 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 401; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–
68 (1941) (finding a similar Pennsylvania alien registration statute invalid on 
grounds of federal supremacy). 
 492 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C). 
 493 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 403–07. 
 494 Id. at 406–07. 
 495 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5). 
 496 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407–10. 
 497 Id. at 415. 
 498 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B). In upholding the constitutionality of 
section 2(B), the Supreme Court noted the three limitations embodied in the stat-
ute: (1) an officer implementing the statute cannot consider the race, ethnicity, or 
national origin of the person arrested, except to the extent permitted by the Ari-
zona and United States constitutions; (2) the statute requires that it be “imple-
mented in a manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, protect-
ing the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of 
United States citizens”; and (3) any person presenting an officer with a valid form 
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law provides that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the per-
son’s immigration status determined [by contacting the Federal 
Government] before the person is released.”499 In upholding the con-
stitutionality of the law, the Court noted that, under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(g)(10)(A), the federal government welcomes this type of co-
operation, and therefore a state law requiring it does not frustrate the 
purpose or pose an obstacle to the federal scheme.500 
Critically, the federal law referenced in the Arizona opinion, 
Section 1357(g)(10)(A), permits—but does not mandate—the type 
of federal/state cooperation required by the Arizona law.501 Section 
1357(g) authorizes the federal government to enter into written 
agreements with the states allowing state employees to implement 
federal immigration law; however, it specifies that such agreements 
cannot be required.502 In addition, it clarifies that, even in the ab-
sence of a written agreement, state officers may communicate with 
the federal government “regarding the immigration status of any in-
dividual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not 
lawfully present in the United States,” or otherwise to cooperate 
with the government regarding the “identification, apprehension, 
detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United 
States.”503 However, even though the federal statute allows commu-
nication and cooperation between federal and state governments re-
garding immigration matters, it does not, and, for reasons addressed 
below, cannot compel it.504 
Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in Arizona v. United 
States did not cite or otherwise reference Prigg v. Pennsylvania—in 
which the Court struck down the Pennsylvania personal liberty law 
on grounds of federal supremacy—the decisions are consistent. As 
discussed, the Supreme Court in Prigg invalidated Pennsylvania’s 
efforts to regulate the process by which the federal government de-
 
of identification (including an Arizona driver’s license) is presumed not to be an 
alien unlawfully present in the United States. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411. 
 499 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (emphasis added). 
 500 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411–12. 
 501 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018). 
 502 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(1)–(9). 
 503 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10). 
 504 See infra notes 516–549 and accompanying text. 
2020] FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 687 
 
termined whether individuals were removable from the state as fu-
gitive slaves on grounds of federal supremacy.505 Similarly, the 
Court largely struck down Arizona’s efforts to regulate alien remov-
ability and other aspects of immigration law, also on grounds of fed-
eral supremacy.506 Both decisions also addressed the question of 
federal/state cooperation in their respective contexts.507 However, in 
Prigg, the federal law at issue, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, at 
least indirectly required state cooperation to enforce it.508 In Ari-
zona, state law, rather than federal law, directed state officials to 
assist the federal government in achieving its aims.509 
In both Prigg and Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the Con-
stitution permitted the state to cooperate with the federal govern-
ment, even in areas deemed to be exclusively within the control of 
the federal government.510 The Court distinguishes permission from 
compulsion, however. In Prigg, Story concluded that the states 
could not be compelled to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law: “it might 
well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of inter-
pretation, to insist, that the states are bound to provide means to 
carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere del-
egated or intrusted [sic] to them by the constitution.”511 However, 
he entertained no doubt that state magistrates could, “if they choose, 
exercise that authority [in Fugitive Slave Act cases], unless prohib-
ited by state legislation.”512 In sum, Story’s opinion meant that 
“[s]tates could . . . either assist in enforcing federal law or refuse to 
aid in enforcement if they so desired.”513 In Arizona, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of a state statute requiring state officers to 
 
 505 See supra Section I.C. 
 506 See supra notes 486–496 and accompanying text. 
 507 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 600 (1842); Arizona v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012). 
 508 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; see also Prigg, 41 U.S. 
at 565. 
 509 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416. 
 510 Prigg, 41 U.S. at 656; Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411–13. 
 511 Prigg, 41 U.S. at 615–16. 
 512 Id. at 622. 
 513 See Kraehenbuehl, supra note 6, at 1477; see also Finkelman, The Roots of 
Printz, supra note 22, at 1408–09 (interpreting Story’s opinion as finding “that 
state officials should, but could not be required to, enforce the Fugitive Slave 
Law”). 
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provide such aid and assistance in the immigration context.514 How-
ever, it did not hold or suggest that the federal government could 
similarly compel state officers to assist in the enforcement of federal 
immigration law. As discussed below, the federal government’s in-
ability to coerce the states to carry out its mandates—known as the 
anti-commandeering principle—was and is a critical tool of states’ 
resistance to federal policies that they do not support, both in the 
antebellum era and today. 
C. The Anti-Commandeering Principle as a Vehicle of State 
Resistance 
In the modern era, unlike the mid-nineteenth century, the con-
cept of federal supremacy and judicial review are well established. 
States that disagree with federal immigration policy cannot directly 
change the way in which it is being implemented, and, as a general 
matter, they do not attempt to do so. As discussed above, the Su-
preme Court has invalidated even indirect attempts to legislate in the 
immigration arena by the states on grounds of federal supremacy.515 
However, the states do have one legal recourse: they can refuse to 
cooperate and choose not to assist the federal government in enforc-
ing federal immigration law. This precedent was set by the Supreme 
Court in 1844, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,516 and reaffirmed by the 
Court in Printz v. United States517 in 1997. The “non-cooperative” 
personal liberty laws, discussed supra, utilized this means of re-
sistance.518 States that have followed this model in the modern era 
are often referred to by the misnomer of “sanctuary” jurisdictions, 
implying that immigrants cannot be prosecuted for violating federal 
immigration law within their borders.519 States do not provide true 
sanctuary in this sense. Rather, these states have insisted that the 
 
 514 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411–13. 
 515 See supra Section II.B.3.  
 516 Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622. 
 517 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
 518 See supra notes 147–187 and accompanying text. 
 519 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 281 (7th Cir. 2018) (char-
acterizing the term “sanctuary” city as “commonly misunderstood”); see also 
RABBEN, supra note 302, at 95 (“Sanctuary was and is a predominantly religious 
institution, and it often flourishes outside the law.”). 
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federal government retain responsibility for the implementation and 
enforcement of federal immigration laws within their borders.520 
1. THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL COERCIVE POWER 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court scouted the boundaries 
of federalism in the context of both slavery and immigration in its 
decisions in Prigg and Arizona. However, the Court has not ad-
dressed the precise question of whether and to what extent the fed-
eral government can compel the states to execute the nation’s immi-
gration laws—particularly when the states do not wish to do so. The 
Court has, however, ruled on the question of whether the federal 
government can direct state actors to effectuate a federal regulatory 
scheme in a different context: gun control.521 In Printz v. United 
States, the Court held that “even where Congress has the authority 
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain 
acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or 
prohibit those acts.”522 The rule articulated in Printz and a case that 
preceded it, New York v. United States,523 has come to be known as 
the anti-commandeering doctrine, which forbids the federal govern-
ment from “commandeering” state actors to enforce federal laws 
and regulations.524 
Although the anti-commandeering doctrine explicated in Printz 
and New York follows the Court’s reasoning in Prigg,525 neither case 
cites this opinion. In Printz, Justice Scalia cites the 1793 Fugitive 
Slave Act as an example of an early federal statute that imposed a 
 
 520 See City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 281. 
 521 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 522 Id. at 924 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)). 
 523 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 524 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475–76 
(2018) (“The anticommandeering doctrine . . . is simply the expression of a fun-
damental structural decision incorporated into the Constitution, i.e., the decision 
to withhold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the States.”; not-
ing that “conspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the 
power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States”); Printz, 521 U.S. 
at 925 (referring to the “[f]ederal commandeering of state governments”); New 
York, 505 U.S. at 175 (noting federal action that would “‘commandeer’ state gov-
ernments into the service of federal regulatory purposes . . . would . . . be incon-
sistent with the Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state gov-
ernments.”). 
 525 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925; New York, 505 U.S. at 175. 
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duty on state judges “to enforce federal prescriptions,” which in this 
case related to hearing the claims of slaveholders and issuing certif-
icates authorizing the “forced removal” of alleged fugitives to the 
states where they were enslaved.526 In doing so, Justice Scalia dis-
tinguished the compulsion of state judges from that of the state ex-
ecutive power.527 However, he never mentions that the Court—at 
the very least—called into question the constitutionality of this part 
of the Act in Prigg.528 As discussed at length above, this reasoning 
in Prigg was significant, as it led to the enactment of a slew of state 
laws that attempted to capitalize on it.529 Congress avoided this con-
stitutional issue when it changed the enforcement provisions of the 
1850 Act.530 
The anti-commandeering doctrine is grounded in the history of 
the Founding. Both the form of government adopted at the Consti-
tutional Convention and the process by which the Constitution was 
ratified derived their authority directly from “We the People.”531 In 
this respect, the nation’s new form of government diverged signifi-
cantly from the Articles of Confederation, under which the national 
government was required to act through the states and had no power 
to enact legislation that regulated the conduct of individuals.532 Al-
exander Hamilton characterized this limitation under the Articles of 
Confederation as “a great evil,” the cure for which lay in enabling 
“the national laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as 
those of the states.”533 Because the Constitution conferred upon 
 
 526 Printz, 521 U.S. at 906. 
 527 Id. at 907. 
 528 Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1401 (discussing the 
omission in the majority opinion in Printz). 
 529 See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text. 
 530 Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1410. 
 531 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 532 Compare id., with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781.  
 533 The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York, in 2 THE DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 205, 233 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS] (remarks by Alexander Hamilton during 
New York ratifying convention). In lamenting the federal government’s inability 
to collect moneys owed from the states under the Articles of Confederation, Mas-
sachusetts delegate Rufus King observed that “[l]aws, to be effective, . . . must 
2020] FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 691 
 
Congress a list of enumerated powers as to which it may issue laws 
binding directly upon the people, it may not instead command or 
“commandeer” the states to implement these powers on its behalf.534 
To do so infringes on the sovereignty of the States, reducing them, 
in Justice Scalia’s words, to “puppets of a ventriloquist Con-
gress.”535 
The anti-commandeering doctrine also seeks to preserve the no-
tion of dual sovereignty that lies at the heart of federalism itself. 
“Residual state sovereignty” is inherent in the structure of the Con-
stitution, which grants “discrete, enumerated” powers to Congress 
in Article I, Section 8, but reserves the remainder to the States and 
the people via the Tenth Amendment.536 “This separation of the two 
spheres [of government] is one of the Constitution’s structural pro-
tections of liberty.”537 The division of sovereignty created by the 
Constitution is intended to prevent either state or federal govern-
ments from accumulating too much power over the people: “a 
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front.”538 As the Court noted in Printz, “[t]he power of the Federal 
Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to 
impress into its service—at no cost to itself—the police officers of 
the 50 States.”539 
 
not be laid on states, but upon individuals.” Debates in the Convention of the 
Commonwealth of Massachussetts, in THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS 1, 56 (remarks by Rufus King at the Massachusetts ratifying con-
vention); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence 
Ball ed., 2003) (describing this limitation as a “great and radical vice in the con-
struction of the existing Confederation,” rendering its laws “mere recommenda-
tions which the States observe or disregard at their option”); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 165–66 (1992); Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018). 
 534 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
 535 Id. at 928 (quoting Brown v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th 
Cir. 1975)). 
 536 Id. at 919; see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (“The Constitution confers 
on Congress not plenary legislative power but only certain enumerated powers. 
Therefore, all other legislative power is reserved to the States, as the Tenth 
Amendment confirms.”). 
 537 Printz, 521 U.S. at 921. 
 538 Id. (citation omitted); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477. 
 539 Printz, 521 U.S. at 922; see also Trevor George Gardner, Immigrant Sanc-
tuary as the “Old Normal”: A Brief History of Police Federalism, 119 COLUM. 
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Although the anti-commandeering doctrine primarily derives 
from the structure of the Constitution, it also has public policy im-
plications. First, it “promotes political accountability” by requiring 
each political sovereign—either the state or federal government—to 
take responsibility for the policies that it enacts.540 When states are 
forced to implement a federal program, they are “put in the position 
of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.”541 
As Justice Scalia noted in Printz, if the federal government were to 
require state police officers to conduct background checks for gun 
purchasers, a state police officer would be “stand[ing] between the 
gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun, . . . not some 
federal official,” leading the purchaser to direct his ire about the pol-
icy to the state rather than the federal government.542 Second, the 
anti-commandeering policy forces each sovereign to shoulder the 
financial burden, as well as the political consequences, of its own 
policy choices.543 If state governments are compelled to “absorb the 
financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, 
Members of Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ problems without 
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher 
federal taxes.”544 In sum, the anti-commandeering doctrine forces 
 
L. REV. 1, 5–6, 67 (2019) (“Historically, Americans have . . . insisted that the fed-
eral government keep its distance from local police institutions . . . .[T]he Amer-
ican public has traditionally rejected the prospect of the local beat cop serving as 
an agent of the federal government.”); Louis Freeh, Former FBI Director Says 
U.S. Doesn’t Need a National Police Force, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117529284571255075 (last updated Mar. 31, 
2007, 12:01 AM) (“For over 200 years, Americans have thoroughly rejected the 
notion of a national police force.”). 
 540 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 929–30; New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992). 
 541 Printz, 521 U.S. at 930; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 168–69 (noting that 
if the Federal Government makes a “detrimental or unpopular” decision, state of-
ficials “will bear the brunt of public disapproval” if forced to implement that de-
cision). 
 542 Printz, 521 U.S. at 930. The Court added that, if the purchaser were mis-
takenly rejected in his attempt to purchase a firearm, he would likely direct his ire 
at the state rather than the federal government. Id. 
 543 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (“[T]he anticommandeering principle pre-
vents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States.”). 
 544 Printz, 521 U.S. at 930; see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (reasoning 
that, if Congress were allowed to shift the cost of implementing its programs onto 
the State, then Congress would avoid the responsibility of weighing the expected 
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the federal government to bear the costs—both in terms of dollars 
and constituent displeasure—of legislating in fraught policy arenas, 
rather than push those burdens onto the States. 
Not surprisingly, the anti-commandeering doctrine tends to arise 
in controversial arenas. The temptation for Congress to “comman-
deer” the States to enforce its policy choices is especially high when 
the policy itself is polarizing and, hence, deeply unpopular among 
some groups. As discussed supra, the roots of the doctrine trace to 
the fugitive slave crisis, one facet of the system of slavery that ulti-
mately brought about the Civil War. It resurfaced when Congress 
attempted to legislate responsible gun control545 and the safe dis-
posal of low-level radioactive waste.546 These laudable goals were 
thwarted when the Court invalidated both statutes due to the federal 
government’s attempt to compel state cooperation on these issues.547 
In Printz, the Court observed that the result in these cases may seem 
“formalistic” to “partisans of the [federal statute] at issue,” because 
these legislative efforts are “typically the product of the era’s per-
ceived necessity.”548 However, “the Constitution protects us from 
our own best intentions: it divides power among sovereigns and 
among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the 
temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient so-
lution to the crisis of the day.”549 In the eyes of many, the current 
“crisis of the day” is immigration. 
 
benefits of these programs against their costs); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for 
Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1360 (2001) (“If our system  of po-
litical checks is to rest on a foundation of popular loyalty, the people need to know 
when to get upset and at whom . . . . It must be clear when the national govern-
ment has acted, as opposed to the states, so that the people can provide feedback 
to the political process that resulted in the action.”). 
 545 Printz, 521 U.S. at 902–04 (describing the Brady Act). 
 546 New York, 505 U.S. at 149–54 (describing the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act). The doctrine also resurfaced in the arena of sports gambling. 
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477. 
 547 Printz, 521 U.S. at 933, 936; New York, 505 U.S. at 149. 
 548 Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187). 
 549 Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187). 
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2. STATES AND CITIES PUSH BACK: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY 
LAWS OF TODAY 
Conflicts between states and the federal government over immi-
gration policy are nothing new. As discussed above, the Reagan Ad-
ministration’s policies regarding Salvadorans gave rise to the Sanc-
tuary Movement in religious institutions across the United States.550 
President Obama’s immigration policies generated dissatisfaction 
on the right as well as the left, as he was attacked for both under- 
and over-enforcement of federal immigration laws.551 However, the 
Trump administration’s stance on immigration is unique, at least in 
the post-World War II era, in terms of its overall hostility to refugees 
and its rejection of the nation’s asylum laws, which the President 
has called “ridiculous.”552 The administration’s hostile stance to-
wards asylum-seekers and immigrants in general has inspired nu-
merous states and municipalities to enact laws that seek to resist im-
plementation of these federal policies within their borders.553 Like 
the personal liberty laws that sprang up in the wake of the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850, these so-called “sanctuary laws” seek to fill the 
space created for state action—more accurately characterized as 
state inaction—by the anti-commandeering doctrine discussed 
above. 
The Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s, as discussed, was pri-
marily fueled by a religious and moral imperative that operated out-
side of federal immigration law, rather than within it.554 However, 
even during this time period, some states and municipalities enacted 
 
 550 See supra notes 317–22 and accompanying text. 
 551 Compare Lasch, supra note 6, at 234 (arguing that the “federal govern-
ment’s promise [under the Obama administration] to prioritize the deportation for 
so-called ‘criminal aliens’ has been largely myth”; critiquing the Secure Commu-
nities program), with supra notes 486–504 and accompanying text (discussing 
Arizona’s efforts to legislate in the immigration field, to increase enforcement of 
federal immigration laws during the Obama Presidency). 
 552 Ian Kullgren et al., Trump Weighs Plan to Choke off Asylum for Central 
Americans, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/30/asylum-re-
strictions-trump-central-america-1489012 (last updated May 30, 2019, 9:00 PM) 
(“The asylum procedures are ridiculous . . . . No place in the world has what we 
have in terms of ridiculous immigration laws.”) (quoting President Trump). 
 553 See, e.g., infra notes 560–578 and accompanying text (discussing the Cal-
ifornia Values Act); S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2 (2019) (prohibiting use of City 
or County funds or resources to assist federal immigration officers). 
 554 See supra notes 316–322 and accompanying text. 
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laws that attempted to thwart the enforcement of federal immigra-
tion laws within their borders.555 These measures aimed to create a 
safe space for refugees.556 One tool for doing so—similar to both the 
antebellum era and today—involved prohibiting local police from 
reporting the presence of refugees seeking sanctuary to federal au-
thorities.557 However, these statutes were adopted without the full 
benefit of the Court’s anti-commandeering jurisprudence, which pri-
marily emerged during the 1990s with the Court’s decisions in New 
York and Printz.558 During the Trump era, the vast majority of states 
and municipalities that have attempted to exert independence in the 
immigration arena have attempted to do so within the confines of 
the modern anti-commandeering doctrine.559 
California has taken the strongest stance against the federal im-
migration policies of the Trump administration. California has en-
acted multiple statutes that seek to minimize the impact of the 
Trump administration’s immigration policies within the borders of 
the state.560 The U.S. government has sued California, claiming that 
these statutes are preempted by federal immigration law and are thus 
 
 555 During this period, four states and twenty-three cities adopted some type 
of sanctuary measure, ranging from enacted state laws to municipal resolutions 
and ordinances, state executive orders, and proclamations. See Begaj, supra note 
302, at 145; see also Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations: 
Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 297, 297–98 
(1989) (discussing various municipal and state sanctuary laws passed during the 
1980s); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sover-
eignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (2006). 
 556 See Munson, supra note 316, at 52–53. 
 557 Carro, supra note 555, at 311–12. 
 558 See supra notes 524–549 and accompanying text. 
 559 See Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the 
Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 557–58 (2017); 
Davide Macelloni, Note, A Violation of the Anti-Commandeering Principle and 
Spending Powers Jurisprudence or a Valid Exercise of Federal Powers? Execu-
tive Order 13768 and Its Effects on Florida Localities, 42 NOVA L. REV. 95, 104–
05 (2017). 
 560 The three statutes enacted by the California legislature are (1) The Califor-
nia Values Act (“S.B. 54”), (2) the Immigrant Worker Protection Act (“A.B. 
450”), and (3) Inspection and Review of Facilities Housing Federal Detainees 
(“A.B. 103”). See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282; id. § 7282.5 (West 2017); id. 
§ 7284.2; id. § 7284.6; id. § 7285.1; id. § 7285.2; id. § 7285.3; id. § 12532. 
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unenforceable.561 The statute at the heart of the controversy is the 
California Values Act (“S.B. 54”), 562 which evokes the noncooper-
ative personal liberty laws of the nineteenth century as it directs state 
officials not to assist or support federal officers in carrying out a 
policy that is inconsistent with the values of the people of the state 
of California. Also echoing the personal liberty laws, the California 
Values Act does not permit the use of state resources, specifically 
state facilities, to detain individuals for immigration purposes.563 
The words of historian Thomas Morris, used to describe the post-
Prigg personal liberty law in Pennsylvania, are equally apt in de-
scribing the California Values Act, as “an experiment in the possi-
bilities left open by [Supreme Court precedent], as well as an effort 
at containment.”564 
The California Values Act delineates the policies that support it: 
(1) immigrants are “valuable and essential” members of society in 
California; (2) state and local officials need to have a “relationship 
of trust” with immigrant communities; and (3) that relationship of 
 
 561 See United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 873 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirm-
ing in part and reversing in part the district court’s decision regarding motion for 
preliminary injunction). The government has filed a petition for a writ of certio-
rari, seeking review of this decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019), No. 
19532. The federal government has also recently filed a similar lawsuit against 
the state of New Jersey, arguing that a New Jersey state law limiting state and 
local cooperation with ICE also conflicts with 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) and is 
preempted by federal law.  See Complaint, United States v. New Jersey, No. 20-
CV-01364-FLW-TJB (S.D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2020). On the same day, the federal gov-
ernment filed an additional lawsuit against California, challenging a new state law 
banning the operation of private detention facilities in the state.  See Complaint, 
United States v. California, No. 20-CV-0154-MMA-AHG (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 
2020). 
 562 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284. 
 563 Id. §§ 7284.6 (a)(5)–(6) (prohibiting the dedication of office space within 
a city or county law enforcement facility exclusively for use by federal immigra-
tion authorities; barring state law enforcement agencies from entering into con-
tracts with the federal government to use state law enforcement facilities to detain 
individuals under federal immigration laws); see also City of Phila. Exec. Order 
5-16 (2016), https://www.phila.gov/ExecutiveOrders/Executive%20Or-
ders/eo0516.pdf (prohibiting use of Philadelphia prison facilities to detain prison-
ers pursuant to ICE civil detainer requests, unless the detainer is supported by a 
judicial warrant, or the person is being released after conviction for a violent fel-
ony). 
 564 Morris, supra note 41, at 118. 
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trust is threatened such that members of the immigrant community 
may be reluctant to contact these officials to report crimes, attend 
school, or seek health services if the officials are “entangled with 
federal immigration enforcement.”565 The statute also states a policy 
objective that derives directly from the anti-commandeering doc-
trine: “[e]ntangling state and local agencies with federal immigra-
tion enforcement programs diverts already limited resources and 
blurs the lines of accountability between local, state, and federal 
governments.”566 
The California Values Act bars state law enforcement agencies 
from using resources or personnel to “investigate, interrogate, de-
tain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement pur-
poses.”567 In directing its law enforcement personnel in this manner, 
the California statute is the inverse of Arizona statute 2(B).568 The 
law instructs California law enforcement agencies not to assist fed-
eral immigration authorities in the manner permitted under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(g), whereas the Arizona law compels such cooperation.569 
As discussed supra, the Supreme Court upheld the Arizona law; 
however, the Court’s ruling in Arizona in no way suggested that any 
state was required to enact such a law, or that the federal statute 
compelled such cooperation.570 
Two key provisions of the INA are addressed in the California 
Values Act. INA section 287(g), cross-listed at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) 
 
 565 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7284.2(b)–(c). Studies have shown that “fear of po-
lice inquiring into immigration status” reduces the likelihood that undocumented 
immigrants will contact police to report a crime, either as a victim or a witness, 
by seventy percent. San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 951–52 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018). Even for Latinos who were born in the United States, and thus are 
citizens of this country, the rate of reporting drops by twenty-eight percent. Id. at 
964. The California Values Act also seeks to preserve the constitutional rights of 
the people of the state, specifically under the Fourth Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clauses. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.2(e). 
 566 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7284.2(d), (f); see also supra notes 540–544 and ac-
companying text (discussing this policy justification for the anti-commandeering 
doctrine). 
 567 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a). 
 568 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2012), with CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 7284.6. 
 569 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051, with CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 7284.6. 
 570 See supra notes 502–0504 and text accompanying. 
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permits the Attorney General to “enter into a written agreement with 
a State,” pursuant to which officers of that state may carry out the 
duties of a federal immigration officer, including apprehending and 
detaining aliens, “at the expense of the State . . . and to the extent 
consistent with State and local law.”571 The statute specifies that 
such agreements are strictly voluntary.572 However, section 1357(g) 
also specifies that an officer or an employee of a State may do the 
following without a written agreement between the state and federal 
government: (1) “communicate with the Attorney General regarding 
the immigration status of any individual, including reporting 
knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the 
United States,” or (2) “cooperate with the Attorney General in the 
identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not law-
fully present in the United States.”573 Unlike the provisions outlined 
in 1357(g), section 1373(a) is couched in mandatory terms: “a Fed-
eral, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, 
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from send-
ing to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, 
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”574 
The California Values Act prohibits any law enforcement officer 
from entering into an agreement with the federal government to per-
form the functions of a federal immigration officer, “whether formal 
or informal.”575 In doing so, it declines to enter into the type of writ-
ten agreement described in section 1357(g), as it is permitted to do 
pursuant to the terms of the federal statute.576 The Values Act also 
goes further and, in doing so, declines to provide the federal govern-
ment with the type of cooperation that is described in section 
1357(g)(10).577 Specifically, it instructs California law enforcement 
officers not to (1) detain an individual based on an immigration hold 
request from the federal government; (2) transfer an individual to 
 
 571 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2018). 
 572 Id. § 1357(g)(9). 
 573 Id. § 1357(g)(10). 
 574 Id. § 1373(a) (emphasis added). 
 575 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.6(a)(1)(G) (West 2017). 
 576 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed 
to require any State . . . to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General un-
der this subsection.”). 
 577 Compare CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.6(a)(1), with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). 
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federal immigration authorities, “unless authorized by a judicial 
warrant or judicial probable cause determination”; (3) provide per-
sonal information about an individual to the federal government, in-
cluding home and work address, unless that information is publicly 
available; or (4) notify the federal government of a person’s release 
date from state custody, unless that information is publicly availa-
ble.578 The federal government has argued that federal law preempts 
these state law provisions.579 
The government contends that the California Values Act con-
flicts with the plain language of sections 1373(a) and 1357(g).580 
Particularly as to section 1357(g), this argument is weak. As noted 
above, the portions of section 1357(g) that permit cooperation be-
tween the federal and state governments in the immigration arena do 
not mandate any state action.581 Both the Ninth and the Fifth Circuits 
have held that section 1357(g) “does not require cooperation at 
all.”582 The federal statute that does compel state action is section 
1373(a), which, as discussed above, bars states from prohibiting or 
restricting state and local officials from exchanging information 
with the federal government regarding a person’s citizenship or im-
migration status.583 
The California Values Statute directly addresses section 
1373(a), specifying that it does not prohibit any state entity or offi-
cial from complying with it.584 California and the federal govern-
ment, however, disagree as to the meaning of the statute’s reference 
 
 578 CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 7284.6(a)(1)(B)–(D), (G)(4). The law also bars state 
law enforcement officers from (1) inquiring into an individual’s immigration sta-
tus; (2) arresting any individual based on a civil immigration warrant; and (3) 
using federal immigration officers as interpreters in state law enforcement mat-
ters. Id. at §§ 7284.6(a)(1)(A), (E), (G)(3). 
 579 See United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 580 See id. at 887. 
 581 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9); see also California, 921 F.3d at 887. 
 582 California, 921 F.3d at 887; City of City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 
164, 178 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 583 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a). 
 584 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.6(e). The statute also purports to comply with 8 
U.S.C. § 1644, which contains the same language as 1373(a), except to apply 
more narrowly to any “alien in the United States” instead of “any individual.” See 
id.; compare 8 U.S.C. § 1644, with 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a). 
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to “information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, law-
ful or unlawful, of an individual.”585 The federal government con-
tends that this language encompasses data such as an individual’s 
release date from state custody and her personal information (e.g., 
an address), both of which the Values Act prohibits state officials 
from sharing with federal immigration officers.586 Both the district 
court and the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the 
plain meaning of the statute referenced only “a person’s legal clas-
sification under federal law,” consistent with the state’s interpreta-
tion.587 
The government also argues that California’s failure to cooper-
ate with it—specifically by refusing to provide “personal infor-
mation” like addresses and release dates from state custody—poses 
an “obstacle” to the federal immigration scheme.588 The government 
claims that the “cooperation” provisions of section 1357(g) imply a 
duty to provide these types of information.589 While the Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed that California’s failure to cooperate made enforcement 
of the federal law more burdensome, it rejected the conclusion that 
the government’s frustration constituted obstacle preemption: 
“[R]efusing to help is not the same as impeding. If such were the 
rule, obstacle preemption could be used to commandeer state re-
sources and subvert Tenth Amendment principles.”590 
The anti-commandeering rule and the Tenth Amendment prin-
ciples that it embodies are, at least in part, built into the plain lan-
guage of the INA. As the federal courts have, at least to date, recog-
nized, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) uses non-compulsory language in terms 
 
 585 California, 921 F.3d at 891. 
 586 Id.; see also San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 951 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018) (Justice Department argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 required disclosure 
of an immigrant’s “address, location information, release date, date of birth, fa-
milial status, contact information, and any other information that would help fed-
eral immigration officials perform their duties.”). 
 587 California, 921 F.3d at 891. 
 588 Id. at 880. 
 589 Id. at 874. 
 590 Id. at 888 (citing United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1104 
(E.D. Cal. 2018)). 
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of its direction to the states—because it must.591 Otherwise, the stat-
ute would run afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine.592 Con-
gress cannot satisfy the anti-commandeering rule by using non-com-
pulsory language in a statute, but nevertheless compelling compli-
ance by the states; to do so would subvert the rule entirely. Con-
gress’s expectation of state cooperation in the federal immigration 
regime does not engender a duty on the part of the state to comply: 
“when questions of federalism are involved, we must distinguish be-
tween expectations and requirements. In this context, the federal 
government was free to expect as much as it wanted, but it could not 
require California’s cooperation without running afoul of the Tenth 
Amendment.”593 
3. FEDERAL TOOLS FOR INDUCING STATE COOPERATION 
Although both the plain language of the INA and the anti-com-
mandeering doctrine prohibit the federal government from compel-
ling state cooperation with federal immigration authorities, the gov-
ernment has sought to utilize exceptions to the anti-commandeering 
rule to achieve the same end. The level of federal/state interaction 
today far exceeds that which existed in the nineteenth century, when 
Northern states enacted personal liberty laws to avoid implementa-
tion of the federal Fugitive Slave Acts. The federal government’s 
provision of grants to the states to fund certain programs, and its 
ability to attach conditions to those grants, provides the federal gov-
ernment with a potential vehicle to persuade where it cannot compel 
compliance by the states. Whether the federal government’s at-
tempts to assert control over the states in this manner will succeed 
remains to be seen. 
a. Is Information Sharing an Exception to the Anti-
Commandeering Rule? 
One provision of the INA orders, rather than permits, state co-
operation: 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a), which forbids states from adopting 
laws that bar information sharing with the federal government.594 In 
 
 591 See, e.g., id. at 888–91. 
 592 See Lasch, supra note 6, at 219–24 (reaching similar conclusions as to fed-
eral immigration detainer requests). 
 593 California, 921 F.3d at 891 (emphasis in original). 
 594 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2018). 
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United States v. California, the government has argued that section 
1373 does not violate the prohibition against commandeering, be-
cause it merely mandates information sharing.595 In dicta, the Court 
in Printz distinguished statutes that force a state to administer a fed-
eral program—which it held invalid under the Tenth Amendment—
from those statutes that “require only the provision of information 
to the Federal Government.”596 The Court did not indicate whether 
such statutes would survive scrutiny under the anti-commandeering 
doctrine, other than to discount their significance as part of a “con-
stitutional tradition” of federal/state interaction based on their rela-
tively recent vintage.597 As noted above, California, like many other 
states and municipalities, has attempted to comply with the infor-
mation-sharing provisions of section 1373(a), although it disputes 
the federal government’s broad interpretation of the plain language 
of the law.598 However, the constitutional question remains: does a 
federal information-sharing requirement imposed upon the states 
constitute commandeering? 
Some federal courts have held that the answer to this question is 
“yes.”599 The government’s broad interpretation of section 1373 is 
critical to the constitutional analysis. The Department of Justice has 
argued that section 1373 compels states to disclose to federal immi-
gration officers far more than an individual’s legal immigration or 
citizenship status, including “address, location information, release 
date, date of birth, familial status, contact information, and any other 
information that would help federal immigration officials perform 
 
 595 California, 921 F.3d at 889. 
 596 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917–18 (1997); see also id. at 936 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court appropriately refrains from deciding 
whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on 
state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly 
invalid.”). 
 597 Id. at 918 (majority opinion). In doing so, the Court cited INS v. Chadha, 
which held the legislative veto to be unconstitutional, despite its enshrinement in 
hundreds of federal statutes that were enacted between 1932 and the 1970’s. INS 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983). 
 598 See supra notes 584–587 and accompanying text. 
 599 See, e.g., San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 950–53 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018); Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 885, 865–66 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
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their duties.”600 By forcing state officials to provide federal immi-
gration officers with any information they have that would help fed-
eral officers perform their duties, the federal government essentially 
seeks to compel the type of broad cooperation that it is free to permit 
or expect, but not require, as discussed above.601 The district court 
in City and County of San Francisco noted that, to comply with sec-
tion 1373 as the federal government interprets it, a state or munici-
pality would “need to submit control of their own officials’ commu-
nications to the federal government” and “allocate their limited law 
enforcement resources to exchange information with the federal 
government whenever requested,” rather than provide essential ser-
vices to their communities.602 In doing so, the federal government 
effectively “shifts a portion of immigration enforcement costs onto 
the States,” a result that contravenes the anti-commandeering doc-
trine.603 
Section 1373, especially as it has been interpreted by the Trump 
administration, directly targets and seeks to invalidate the “personal 
liberty laws” of today. In doing so, section 1373 “effectively 
thwart[s] policymakers’ ability to extricate their state or municipal-
ity from involvement in a federal program,” which is the statute’s 
goal.604 The anti-commandeering doctrine does not permit the fed-
eral government to compel participation by the States in the federal 
immigration system. 
 
 600 San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 951; see also Chicago v. Sessions, 888 
F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 
(7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated en banc on other grounds, No. 17-2991, 2018 
WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (stating that “[t]he Attorney General in this 
case used the sword of federal funding to conscript state and local authorities to 
aid in federal civil immigration enforcement”). 
 601 See supra notes 590–593 and accompanying text. 
 602 San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 951 (“The statute undermines existing 
state and local policies and strips local policy makers of the power to decide for 
themselves whether to communicate with INS.”). 
 603 See id. at 952; see also supra notes 543–544 and accompanying text. 
 604 San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 953 (quoting Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d 
at 949)). 
704 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:598 
 
b. Can Cooperation Be Compelled via the Attachment 
of Conditions to the Provision of Federal Funds to the 
States? 
Another purported exception to the anti-commandeering doc-
trine relates to funding provided to the states via federal programs. 
The Court in New York recognized that “Congress may attach con-
ditions on the receipt of federal funds.”605 Such funding can function 
as a “method of influencing a State’s policy choices.”606 However, 
Congress cannot use the power of the purse as a means of “outright 
coercion” on the States.607 For this reason, conditions placed upon 
the receipt of federal funds must “bear some relationship to the pur-
pose of the federal spending”; otherwise, “the spending power could 
render academic the Constitution’s other grants and limits of federal 
authority.”608 In addition, the exercise of the Congressional spend-
ing power, via grant conditions, must further the “general welfare”; 
in other words, it must be “intended to serve general public pur-
poses.”609 Finally, if Congress wishes to impose a condition on the 
States’ ability to receive federal funds, “it must do so unambigu-
ously,” so that States can make a fully informed decision as to 
whether they wish to participate in the federal program.610 
The Trump administration embraced the funding-related excep-
tion to the anti-commandeering doctrine when it issued Executive 
Order 13,768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United 
States, on January 25, 2017, five days after President Trump was 
inaugurated.611 The Order targets so-called “sanctuary jurisdic-
 
 605 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (quoting South Da-
kota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 917–18 (1997) (distinguishing federal statutes that impose “conditions upon 
the grant of federal funding” from those that act as “mandates to the States”). 
 606 New York, 505 U.S. at 166. 
 607 Id. 
 608 Id. at 167; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987). 
(affirming constitutionality of federal statute that withheld highway funds from 
states that chose not to adopt the minimum drinking age established by Congress). 
 609 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
 610 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 611 Exec. Order No. 13,76, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also San 
Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing the Ex-
ecutive Order); Lai & Lasch, supra note 559, at 557–63 (discussing efforts to de-
fund “Sanctuary Cities” during the Trump presidency). 
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tions,” claiming that they “willfully violate Federal law in an at-
tempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States,” and, in 
so doing, have “caused immeasurable harm to the American people 
and to the very fabric of our Republic.”612 The Order gives the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security the authority to decide whether a state 
or municipality is a “sanctuary jurisdiction,” defined as a jurisdic-
tion that “willfully refuse[s] to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”613 If 
a state is deemed a sanctuary jurisdiction, then the Order instructs 
that the state is “not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as 
deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes.”614 Remarkably, 
at a campaign rally, President Trump proclaimed that “nobody who 
supports sanctuary cities should be allowed to run for President of 
the United States.”615 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that conditions may 
attach to the States’ receipt of federal funds, the power to impose 
such conditions lies with Congress, not the Executive.616 Implemen-
tation of President Trump’s Executive Order 13,768 was therefore 
enjoined because it violates the Constitution’s separation of powers 
doctrine.617 Congress exclusively holds the power of the purse, 
which is directly tied to its power to legislate.618 No provision in the 
 
 612 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799. 
 613 Id. at 8801. 
 614 Id. The Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security are em-
powered to decide whether grant funding is necessary for law enforcement pur-
poses. Id. 
 615 Amy Davidson Sorkin, In Orlando, Trump Kicks Off His Reelection Cam-
paign with an Old, Divisive Message, NEW YORKER (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/in-orlando-trump-kicks-off-
his-reelection-campaign-with-an-old-divisive-message. 
 616 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). 
 617 City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 
2018) (affirming summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs but vacating nationwide 
injunction and remanding for further factual findings). 
 618 Id. at 1231 n.2. The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and 
collect Taxes,” pay debts, and to borrow money on behalf of the United States, so 
as to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” 
U.S. CONST., Art. I, §§ 8 (1), (2); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 378 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003) (Congress “commands the purse.”). 
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Constitution enables the President to enact, amend, or repeal stat-
utes, or to cancel appropriations passed by Congress.619 As Justice 
Kennedy observed, if spending decisions are “determined by the Ex-
ecutive alone, without adequate control by the citizen’s Representa-
tives in Congress, liberty is threatened.”620 Therefore, President 
Trump exceeded his authority as President in issuing the Executive 
Order. 
The Trump administration’s second attempt to influence state 
policy choices regarding immigration via the power of the purse tar-
geted the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“Byrne 
JAG”). The Byrne JAG program, which is administered by the Jus-
tice Department, awards grants to state and local governments to 
“support law enforcement efforts by providing additional personnel, 
equipment, supplies, training, and other assistance.”621 The Byrne 
JAG is the “leading source of federal [criminal] justice funding to 
state and local jurisdictions.”622 The Byrne JAG is a “formula grant” 
program, meaning that the statute creating the program establishes 
a formula to calculate the amount of grant funding for all appli-
cants.623 The statute identifies eight program areas for the use of 
funding under the Byrne JAG; immigration enforcement is not in-
cluded.624 In 2017, the Department of Justice announced that it 
 
 619 San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1232, 1235 (quoting Clinton v. New York, 524 
U.S. 417, 438 (1998)) (holding that, without Congressional approval, “the Ad-
ministration may not redistribute or withhold properly appropriated funds in order 
to effectuate its own policy goals”). 
 620 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 621 City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 935 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing 34 U.S.C. § 10152). California uses Byrne JAG funds to 
support education and crime prevention, as well as court and law enforcement 
programs. Id. at 936. California expected to receive 28.3 million dollars in JAG 
funding for fiscal year 2017. Id.; see also Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 
855, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (noting that, in 2016, Chicago used Byrnes JAG funding 
to buy police cars and to support non-profits working in high-crime areas). 
 622 Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, https://bja.ojp.gov/program/jag/overview (last visited Mar. 19, 
2020). 
 623 See 34 U.S.C. § 10156(a) (2018); see also San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d 
at 935–36, 945. 
 624 The program areas included are law enforcement, prosecution and courts, 
crime prevention and education, corrections, drug treatment and enforcement, 
technological improvements, crime victims and witnesses, and mental health. 34 
U.S.C. §§ 10152(a)(1)(A)–(H); see San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 936. 
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would be imposing three new conditions on any state or city apply-
ing for funds under the Byrne JAG: (1) the grant applicant must pro-
vide ICE with “access to their correctional facilities for immigration 
enforcement purposes”; (2) the applicant must notify ICE of the re-
lease dates for any individual detained by the applicant; and (3) the 
applicant must certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 under pen-
alty of perjury.625 Two of these three provisions directly conflict 
with the California Values Act.626 
Like President Trump, the Department of Justice is not Con-
gress. Therefore, it also does not hold the power of the purse. As a 
result, its attempt to impose new prerequisites for receipt of federal 
funding by the States under the Byrne JAG was challenged under 
the separation of powers doctrine.627 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
statute authorizing the Byrne JAG program did not empower the At-
torney General to precondition receipt of funding on federal immi-
gration cooperation.628 It noted that Congress has previously im-
posed conditions on Byrne JAG grant funding related to various pol-
icy objectives, but it tried and failed to enact “anti-sanctuary” legis-
lation as a funding-related proviso to the Byrne JAG program.629 
Because Congress did not statutorily authorize the Attorney General 
to tie Byrne JAG grant funding to immigration-related conditions, 
 
 625 San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 933–34. The Department of Justice at-
tempted to impose similar conditions as part of the community-oriented policing 
(“COPS”) grant program, which provides funds to police departments to hire 
more officers to increase their capacity for community policing. City of Los An-
geles v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2018). The conditions 
were challenged on various grounds and the district court entered a nationwide 
injunction barring their enforcement. Id. 
 626 See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.6(a). 
 627 San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 944–49. 
 628 Id. at 946; see also Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 271, 281 (E.D. 
Pa. 2018); Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 282, 293 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 629 San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 946 (citing Stop Sanctuary Cities Act, 
S. 1814, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2015); Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act, 
H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. § 3(b)(2) (2015)); see also San Francisco v. Trump, 897 
F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Congress has frequently considered and thus 
far rejected legislation accomplishing the goals of the Executive Order.”); Lai & 
Lasch, supra note 559, at 550–53 (discussing various failed attempts by Congress 
to legislate the defunding of “Sanctuary” states and cities). 
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the court enjoined the Trump administration from imposing these 
requirements on grant recipients.630 
To date, Congress has not yet amended the statute authorizing 
the Byrnes JAG grants, or any other statute, to condition a state’s 
receipt of federal funds on that state’s participation in the enforce-
ment of federal immigration laws. If Congress were to impose such 
a restriction, it would have to show that the conditions being im-
posed bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal law.631 
The government could not readily show that compelling states to 
open their jails to ICE and provide ICE with the release dates for all 
state inmates furthers the purpose of the Byrne JAG.632 As noted 
above, the statute identifies eight program areas for these grants, 
none of which include immigration enforcement.633 A federal pro-
gram more directly tied to immigration issues would be a better fit 
in terms of justifying the imposition of any grant condition similar 
to the ones being pushed by the Department of Justice today. 
Whether Congress will eventually pass such legislation remains to 
be seen and will turn, in part, on the results of federal elections in 
2020 and beyond. 
The anti-commandeering doctrine, as applied in the nineteenth 
century and today, allows the safety valve of federalism to function 
as the drafters of the Constitution intended it. The Trump admin-
istration is attempting to compel state participation in the enforce-
ment of federal immigration law.634 The Constitution permits the 
states to volunteer this type of cooperation. It does not permit the 
federal government to require it. If Congress cannot pass legislation 
and appropriate funds to pay for the type of immigration enforce-
ment that the Trump administration seeks, then these policies do not 
enjoy sufficient support to warrant their implementation. 
 
 630 San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 953. 
 631 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) 
 632 The Ninth Circuit has noted that, even if Congress had authorized the De-
partment of Justice to impose the challenged conditions on the Byrne JAG, they 
would still be unenforceable because they fail the relatedness requirement. San 
Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 958–61. 
 633 See supra note 624 and accompanying text. 
 634 See Gardner, supra note 539, at 76 (noting that President Trump’s execu-
tive order regarding immigrant sanctuary “makes clear that, with respect to the 
enforcement of federal immigration law, the federal executive, commandeering 
rule or not, is demanding rather than requesting compliance”). 
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CONCLUSION 
“Our Federalism” is central to the Constitution as the foundation 
of the American government. The Supreme Court has described it 
as follows: 
[federalism] does not mean blind deference to 
‘States’ Rights’ any more than it means centraliza-
tion of control over every important issue in our Na-
tional Government and its courts. The Framers re-
jected both these courses. What the concept does rep-
resent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the 
legitimate interests of both State and National Gov-
ernments, and in which the National Government, 
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect 
federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors 
to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with 
the legitimate activities of the States.635 
In both the nineteenth century and today, political crises test the 
resilience of the system of government established by the Framers 
of the Constitution. In the nineteenth century, the fundamental con-
tradiction of slavery in a nation founded on the principle that “all 
men are created equal” triggered one such crisis. The demarcation 
between slavery and freedom, North and South, became more dis-
tinct over time, widening the gulf between the values of the people 
in the free states and those reflected in the federal Fugitive Slave 
Acts. The federal government’s determination to rigidly enforce the 
fugitive slave laws, without responding to the Northern states’ legit-
imate concerns regarding the rights of the accused fugitives, hard-
ened rather than softened the resolve of the people who resisted im-
plementation of the federal laws. The chasm between North and 
South was ultimately resolved via the Civil War, which almost 
ended the United States as we know it. 
Today, the Trump administration’s approach to immigration—
often described as “zero tolerance”636—is also tone-deaf as to the 
 
 635 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
 636 See Catherine E. Shoichet, Zero Tolerance a Year Later: How the U.S. 
Family Separations Crisis Erupted, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/interac-
tive/2019/04/us/immigrant-family-separations-timeline/ (last updated Apr. 8, 
2019). 
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concerns of states like California, where about half of all children 
have at least one parent who is an immigrant.637 As the Supreme 
Court has recognized, the federal government must respect the le-
gitimate interests of the states, even when it is anxious to vindicate 
an important national interest.638 Attempts to force compliance with 
a federal law in a manner that ignores legitimate state concerns—
e.g., as to the due process rights of asylum applicants who reside 
within the borders of the state—inevitably invite resistance, just as 
in the antebellum era. Moreover, the Trump administration’s heavy 
reliance on executive orders and proclamations, rather than the leg-
islative process, has generated policies that lack widespread support 
among the national citizenry, not just that of an individual state. Like 
dual federalism, separation of powers is a central pillar of the gov-
ernment framework created by the Constitution. 
The United States may learn some valuable lessons by reflecting 
on its past, specifically the history of the federal laws that sought to 
force the free states to recognize slavery within their borders. 
Heavy-handed attempts to compel compliance with federal law tend 
to engender resistance rather than cooperation, especially when, in 
the eyes of many citizens, the federal law lacks both moral and dem-
ocratic legitimacy. Ideally, the legislative process should resolve 
this problem: if the voters dislike the laws enacted by Congress or 
the executive proclamations issued by their President, they can elect 
new politicians who more closely reflect their views. However, this 
process may take years, and federalism plays a critical role in the 
interim. At a minimum, California and similar states should not be 
commandeered by the federal government to implement federal im-
migration policies that are misaligned with the mores of the majority 
of their citizens. Until Congress enacts an immigration law that en-
joys support in both Red and Blue states, especially those states 
where the laws will be implemented, the federal government should 
not demand or expect state cooperation. 
 
 
 
 637 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.2(a) (West 2017). 
 638 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. 
